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This thesis investigates counterfactual thinking and counterfactually mediated emotions 
(CMEs) by studying brain-damaged patients and healthy adults.  In 5 experiments 
neurologically damaged patients’ counterfactual reasoning, decision making (DM), and 
experience of CME was explored. 17 patients, with varying lesion sites resulting from a 
stroke, (7 female) aged 31 to 84 (M = 64.9 years) and 17 controls (12 female) aged 28 to 74 
(M = 59 years) participated. There were three aims: to establish if regret is experienced in 
brain-damaged individuals; to explore the component processes of CMEs and widen the 
search for the brain areas that supports these; to conduct research that points to how the 
experience of regret impacts on future DM and underpins adaptive behavioural change. 
Through exploring the link between regret and adaptive choice switching, investigating 
counterfactual reasoning abilities, CME responses, emotional responses to The Regret 
Gambling Task (RGT), and responses in a task designed to measure risk taking, this project 
sheds new light on how neurological damage affects counterfactual reasoning, emotions, 
and DM. In addition, two experiments were conducted with undergraduate students to 
explore whether CMEs are produced slowly, through deliberative processes, or quickly and 
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1.1 What is Counterfactual Thinking? 
Counterfactual thoughts are conceptions of what might have been; an alternative 
world (Epstude & Roese, 2008). For example, if a student fails an exam they might think ‘if I 
had revised more, I would not have failed’. This reflection on previous events is thought to 
be of evolutionary value, we experience counterfactually mediated emotions (CMEs) such as 
regret so we can learn from our mistakes (Epstude & Roese, 2008). Thus, next time the 
student has an exam they may revise more in order to not fail a second time, avoiding the 
negative emotions that were associated with the previous exam.  
Inference is a key aspect of producing a counterfactual as it is necessary to infer or 
predict how the outcome would have been different if alterative actions had been taken. 
The produced inference must meet several criteria to differentiate it from imagination or 
fantasy. Firstly, the counterfactual world must closely mirror the actual world. The imagined 
alteration in behaviour must be tied to a specific situation and fit with previous knowledge 
the individual has about the situation, thus limiting the number of changes to the real world 
(Dehghani et al., 2012). Minimising the number of changes between the real and alternative 
world allows for the counterfactual to be realistic; an outcome that could have genuinely 
occurred (Petrocelli et al., 2011). In order for a thought to be considered a counterfactual- 
and not a fantasy- it must not violate the laws of nature (Dehghani et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, counterfactual thoughts are produced predominantly in situations 
where the individual had a high level of personal control over the outcome (Rips & Edwards, 
2013). For example, when contemplating why I failed an exam, I would produce an 
alternative world where I revised more and thus received a higher grade. I do not, generally, 
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think that I would have not failed the exam if I had developed the ability to read minds and 
copied the person next to me.  
In a recent review article Van Hoek, Watson and Barbey (2015) describe 
counterfactual reasoning through a three stage model; activation, inference, and 
adaption/learning. The model describes the process in which counterfactuals are produced. 
Using the example from above, when a student receives a grade following a recent exam, 
memories from the exam are activated (such as the specific questions) as well as a mental 
simulation of the event itself (the student’s answers to the questions). As these memories 
are accessed, activation spreads, triggering further mental simulations of relevant 
information (such as previous exams) thus allowing the individual to compare and infer how 
the current scenario could have been different; a better grade could have been achieved 
through more revision. This is known as the counterfactual. Through comparing the actual 
outcome to the counterfactual, the interpretation of factual events is influenced (failure due 
to lack of preparation or alternatively failure due to missing important lectures because of 
other commitments). This process facilitates adaptive learning that alters behaviour in 
future similar circumstances (revising more for an exam). The authors build on The Mental 
Model Theory of counterfactual thought (Byrne; 2002, 2007) in which counterfactual 
thinking (CFT) is the tool that we use to search for possible alterative outcomes among 
hypothetical worlds that run parallel to the actual world. In addition to this, The Structured 
Event Complex Theory suggests that regions in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) support CFT 
through representing motivations and intentions, enabling behavioural change (Barbey et 




1.2 What are Counterfactually Mediated Emotions? 
Over the past decade much research has focused on the concept that successful 
decision making (DM) and behavioural modification is influenced, not only by cognitive 
processes, but by emotions (Kirman et al., 2010; Mellers, 2000). One focus of this research 
has been the concept that CMEs, specifically regret, have a key role to play in understanding 
DM. However, it is unclear how the experience of regret directly, or indirectly, effects 
behavioural change (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Roese et al., 2007; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 
2007). In order to experience the feeling of regret and therefore undertake behavioural 
change, one must first engage in CFT (O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2012).  
Regret has been defined by Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2005, pg152) as “A negative 
emotion that we experience when we realise or imagine that our present situation would 
have been better, if we only had decided differently.” This is an example of a downward 
counterfactual. Whereas, relief originates from the comparison of the present situation to a 
more negative hypothetical (Coricelli & Rustichini, 2010). Relief is an example of a 
downward counterfactual. In this scenario the individual would feel better about the 
choices they made through avoiding a more negative outcome (Roese, 1994).  
Regret and disappointment are both emotions that are experienced as a result of an 
undesirable outcome and a product of CFT where the actual outcome is compared with a 
hypothetical outcome (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998). However, there is an 
important distinction between the two emotions. Zeelenberg et al. (1998) suggest that 
regret is experienced after an individual makes a decision that ends in a negative result. 
Importantly the individual feels responsibility for the outcome. Whereas disappointment is 
caused by more general counterfactual thought after a situational change. The individual 
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does not feel personally responsible for a negative outcome. Throughout this project I will 
focus on the experience of regret and not that of disappointment because regret, over 
disappointment, is more likely to result in behavioural change (Zeelenberg et al., 1998) due 
to the more intense feeling of sadness (Camille et al., 2004).  
Although the majority of research on successful DM focuses on regret, and its 
counterpart relief, it is important to note that there are multiple emotions that arise from 
counterfactual thinking. The experience of shame and guilt are also deemed CMEs. Shame 
arises after thoughts that manipulate an individual’s perception of self; ‘If only I was fitter, I 
could have won that game’). Guilt arises after thoughts that manipulate an individual’s 
behaviour; ‘If only I hadn’t forgotten my friend’s birthday, she would be not upset’ 
(Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski, 1994). Michl et al. (2014) investigated the 
neuroanatomy that supports shame and guilt. The authors found a shared network for the 
emotions in the following areas: anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), parahippocampal gyrus, 
fusiform gyrus and medial temporal gyrus. Activation in the medial and inferior frontal gyrus 
was found during shame conditions only and activation in the amygdala and insula was 
observed in guilt conditions only. The ACC,  medial temporal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, 
medial frontal gyrus, amygdala and insula are all implicated in regret also. 
Research investigating the neuroanatomy that supports CFT has shown that there 
are key brain regions that support CMEs and its component processes. I will discuss the 





1.3 Project Justification   
The aim of this PhD project was to investigate CFT, regret, and DM in neurologically 
impaired patients. Recent research conducted with neurologically impaired patients has 
suggested that particular brain areas are implicated in regret (e.g. Camille et al., 2004, 
Canessa et al., 2009; Clausi et al., 2015). Camille et al. (2004) in particular reported a 
subgroup of patients who do not seem to experience regret or the behavioural modification 
(after losing) that non brain-damaged individuals demonstrate.  
The neuroscience literature focusses on the experience of CMEs (mainly regret). 
However, the experience of regret is dependent on CFT; thoughts about what might have 
been and CFT is a complex higher cognitive process that develops gradually (e.g. Beck, Riggs, 
& Burns, 2011). In particular, individuals must be able to hold multiple possible worlds in 
mind and make comparisons between them. To gain a full understanding of the neurological 
processes involved in CFT and DM, a project must explore the component processes of 
CMEs and widen the search for the brain areas that support these. 
My focus for this project will be on the experience of regret. Classic models of regret 
and consequent DM traditionally state that individuals anticipate potential regret as a 
consequence of hypothetical actions and act in a manner which will avoid this regret 
(Loomes & Sugden, 1987). In line with this assumption, research has shown that individuals 
anticipate regret as a consequence of their actions and make choices in an attempt to 
minimise the experience of regret (Zeelenberg, 1999; Mellers et al., 1999). As previously 
described, Camille et al. (2004) showed that patients with orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) lesions 
initially do not experience regret in a simple gambling task and, in addition, the same 
patients do not become regret averse over time. However, it is unclear if the experience of 
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regret itself has consequences on behaviour independently of anticipated regret. Their 
interpretation is that OFC patients fail to report and anticipate regret.  
 Evidence has shown that the experience of regret effects behavioural decisions in an 
economic context such as negotiation and bidding (Creyer & Ross, 1999). Although Raeva et 
al. (2011) have claimed that the experience of regret itself is not necessary for behavioural 
modification and adaptive learning. Overall, there is limited experimental research that 
focuses on the behavioural consequences of regret and not on the experience of anticipated 
regret (for review, see Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007).  
1.4 Project Aims 
There are three general aims of this research. First, to explore the component 
processes of CMEs, namely regret, and widen the search for the brain areas that support 
these. Second, to establish if regret or its alleged component processes are experienced in 
brain-damaged individuals. Third, to investigate, in brain injured patients, how the 
experience of regret directly impacts future DM and underpins adaptive behavioural 
change.  
In order to explore the component processes of CMEs (Aim 1) it is essential to break 
down the processes of DM. One way to do this is to better understand the processes 
involved in the experience of regret and how CMEs are generated in healthy adults. This will 
be done by investigating whether experiencing regret is an effortful process, or whether its 
generation is fast and effortless.  
It is important to also establish if some patients are unable to experience regret or 
its alleged component processes (Aim 2). The developmental literature suggests that CFT 
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arises before the experience of regret. I will investigate if this trend is present within the 
patient group who participate in my research. I will devise an experiment that examines 
participants’ ability to answer counterfactual questions without an emotional element and 
adapt developmental tasks that require an emotional response to winning and losing. In line 
with the developmental pattern, patients may not be able to experience regret because 
they cannot engage in counterfactual reasoning. On the other hand, some patients may 
have problems in thinking counterfactually, but not experience problems reporting regret. 
This would suggest that the developmental pattern is not preserved in the patient 
population. 
Developmental work has linked the experience of regret with the ability to engage in 
future adaptive choice switching (ACS) (O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2014). ACS is the 
process where individuals modified their behaviour in order to increase their gains 
(O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2014). However, this relationship has not been 
investigated with a patient population (Aim 3). It is possible that some patients cannot 
report regret but their prior experiences still influence their future DM and allow for 
adaptive future DM. Therefore one aim of this project is to investigate if, when regret is 
preserved in brain-damaged patients, this experience correlates with behavioural 
modification, as in children. 
The experience of regret has been linked to risky DM (RDM), in that counterfactual 
information regarding a missed opportunity elicits regret and as a result increases 
subsequent risk taking (Zeelenberg et al., 1996). I will investigate RDM, an indirect measure 




1.5 Research Strategy 
 Various neurological areas have been shown to be involved in counterfactual 
reasoning, CME production, and DM; the OFC, middle temporal gyrus, ACC, hippocampus 
(Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005), the ventral medial PFC (VMPFC), anterior insula 
(Canessa et al., Chua et al., 2009; 2009; Nicolle et al., 2011) and amygdala (Berntson et al., 
2011). 
These highlighted regions have been established as important for CFT and CMEs. 
However, to gain a full understanding of the neurological processes involved in CFT 
(including CMEs) and DM, this project will explore the component processes of CMEs by 
developing a broad set of tasks while widening the search for the brain areas that support 
these abilities. I hope to find further brain regions, than those highlighted above, which 
have previously not been cited as supporting CFT and CME production. Through undertaking 
this research I am not trying to make methodological changes to how neuropsychological 
research is conducted, I am merely attempting to find further brain regions that have 
previously not been cited as important 
In order to create a battery of experiments that will provide a comprehensive 
overview of each patient’s counterfactual reasoning ability, experience of CMEs, and ability 
to make decisions, it is necessary to review the developmental literature. Developmental 
research is relevant to this project because developmental studies have systematically 
investigated children’s CFT and CMEs. Results from these investigations will allow us to gain 
a unique insight into the processes and systems that develop gradually, resulting in the 
ability to think counterfactually as adult. Developmental methods have been adapted for 
various tasks in the current project because many of the original tasks aimed to identify 
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specific stages in CFT (such as Beck, Riggs & Burns, 2011). Additionally, tasks designed for 
children minimise demands on executive functioning (EF) and language which need to be 
considered when working with neuropsychological patients.  
I will now review the neurological areas that possibly support CFT, CMEs and DM. I 
will then discuss previous work on these topics with patients with neurological damage, 
degenerative conditions, mental health conditions, and healthy controls to highlight the 
importance of conducting further research with a group of neurologically injured patients 
with a wide range of damage.  
I will then review the developmental literature with the goal of explaining the 
developmental processes that lead up to an adult like understanding of CFT, CMEs and DM. 
In addition, I will review studies where I have adapted methodological approaches to tackle 




1.6 Neuroanatomy that supports Counterfactual Thinking and Counterfactual Mediated 
Emotions 
1.6.1 Overview 
It is important to understand basic neuroanatomy and how commonly cited brain 
regions in counterfactual reasoning and DM models are connected through neuro circuitry.  
If damage occurs in a neural pathway this could result in an inability to complete a task that 
relies on a specific brain region which could be unaffected by the brain injury. Thus, it is 
necessary to understand how different brain regions work together to produce a working 
system. 
Research conducted with patients has shown that there are key brain areas 
responsible for regret as a CME. The OFC, ACC, and anterior hippocampus have been 
implicated in patient and fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) studies (Camille et 
al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005). The VMPFC has also been implicated as another key region 
(Canessa et al., 2009; Nicolle et al., 2011). The amygdala has also been cited as an important 
area for emotional processing (see Phelps & LeDoux, 2005 for a review).  
The PFC is comprised of three regions: the OFC, ACC, and dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) 
(Crews & Boettiger, 2009). The OFC is primarily linked with DM that is based upon emotions 
and stimulus–response. However, due to cortico–cortical connections between the DLPFC 
and the ACC, these regions also facilitate successful DM (Barbas, 2000).  It has been 
suggested that the ACC is involved in complex DM in conjunction with the OFC, DLPFC, and 
insula cortex (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). 
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The OFC has multiple limbic connections including the amygdala, hippocampus, 
insula, medial temporal cortices, entorhinal cortex and para-hippocampal gyrus (Barbas, 
2007; Zald & Rauch, 2006). The ACC can be divided into dorsal and ventral components. The 
ventral ACC is connected with the amygdala, nucleus accumbens, hypothalamus, and 
anterior insula  (Allman, 2001), whereas the dorsal ACC is connected to the lateral thalamic 
nucleus, caudate nucleus, OFC,  lateral intraparietal cortex, and precuneus (Pearson et al., 
2011). The DLPFC is connected to the posterior parietal cortex, inferior temporal cortex, 
superior temporal polysensory areas, ACC, retrosplenial cortex, the para-hippocampal gyrus, 
dorsal nucleus, caudate nucleus, and thalamus (Osaka, Logie &  D'Esposito, 2007).  
Rosenbloom and Schmahman (2012) review the role of connectivity in DM and 
suggested that the above regions interact with each other and also subcortical structures: 
the limbic system, striatum, thalamus, and cerebellum all of which influence DM (see Figure 
1.0 for visual representation). The authors describe a model of DM that defines a cortical 
area by its neural connections. Thus, a lesion affecting any of cortical or subcortical areas 





















Figure 1.0: Representation of Rosenbloom and Schmahman’s (2012) model of the DM 
Network, demonstrating connections between neocortical and subcortical regions. 
 
1.6.2 Neural Networks in Counterfactual Thinking 
Recently, Van Hoek et al. (2015) reviewed the neural networks that support CFT, 
highlighting three systems: the mental simulation network, the cognitive control network 
and the reward network. The authors quote Barrett and Satpute (2013 p4) when describing 
counterfactual reasoning; ‘‘networks that underlie domain general functions that cut across 
different psychological domains’’.  The notion that three networks work together in 
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combination with one another to allow for counterfactual thought, including CMEs, implies 
that there is no single counterfactual network or system. In contrast, it is suggested that the 
counterfactual thoughts and emotions that are produced are dependent on the information 
that is processed at that time, activating the necessary brain regions associated with each of 
the three networks.  
The first neural network that supports CFT is the mental simulation network.  This 
network is important during the production of counterfactual thoughts because one must 
hypothetically ‘undo’ the current state of reality and create an alternative reality where a 
different course of action was taken (Van Hoek et al., 2015). The authors claim that the 
mental simulation network activates regions in the medial frontal temporal lobes, the 
posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus, and the lateral parietal and temporal lobes, when 
engaging in self projection and autobiographical memory retrieval (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). 
This suggests that the network is utilised when processing an observed outcome and 
imagining alternative outcomes; counterfactual thoughts. The hippocampus is crucial for 
mental simulation, as it provides information based on past experiences and memories. This 
information is used to fit novel situations through activation in the medial PFC.  
The second neural network that Van Hoek (2015) discusses is the cognitive control 
network. This network is split into two; the fronto-parietal network and the cingulo-
opercular network. It is suggested that the two networks are responsible for the ability to 
swap between the current world and the hypothetical world, for the ability to mentally 
transform the information on reality and the counterfactual to produce a counterfactual 
inference, and lastly the observed behavioural modification as a result of counterfactual 
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thought. It is likely that inhibition underpins the ability to ignore information about the real 
world in order to speculate about what didn’t happen.  
The fronto-parietal control network is made up of the lateral PFC, middle cingulate 
cortex, inferior parietal lobe, and precuneus. This network facilitates the integration of 
several pieces of information and regulates thoughts (Chein & Schneider, 2009). Henderson 
and Norris (2013) demonstrate that the DLPFC was strongly activated in goal orientated 
circumstances, encoding how desirable an outcome is to the individual. The DLPFC was 
activated more strongly when participants could have won more than they actually did 
during a gambling task. Evidence to support the difference between the mental simulation 
network and the goal orientated cognitive control network comes from Gomez Beldarin et 
al. (2005) who report significantly fewer spontaneous counterfactuals produced by OFC 
patients during a free recall task. Furthermore, the patient’s ability to produce hypothetical 
scenarios was unimpaired, highlighting the difference in neural networks.  
The second section of the cognitive control network is the cingulo-opercular network 
which includes the dorsal ACC, the posterior medial frontal cortex, anterior insula, frontal 
operculum (posterior LOFC), and the anterior PFC. The system is considered to be associated 
with maintaining goal orientated behaviour and monitoring behaviour. Counterfactual 
thoughts are goal orientated due to their adaptive purpose to regulate and modify 
behaviour (Epstude & Roese, 2008).  
The final neural network to discuss is the emotion and value processing network that 
is associated with affective learning (Roy et al., 2012). The brain regions highlighted as 
comprising the emotion and value processing network are the VMPFC (including the medial 
OFC), amygdala, basal ganglia, inferior OFC, and inferior PFC. The amygdala is cited as being 
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the most frequently linked to emotional and evaluative judgments (Berntson et al., 2011) 
chiefly when processing negative stimuli. 
1.6.3 Counterfactual Thinking and Counterfactual Mediated Emotions in Healthy 
Participants 
Canessa et al. (2009) used a gambling task in combination with fMRI in order to 
determine if the same neural networks are active when not only experiencing regret for 
oneself, but also when imagining someone else’s regret. The VMPFC, ACC, and hippocampus 
were active in both conditions. It is a possibility that this identical activation is facilitated by 
a mirror system which enables a theory of mind (ToM) like state. This evidence implies that 
if the neural network that supports CFT is damaged, patients who are not able to engage in 
CFT and experience CFE, would also not be able to understand another individual’s CFE.  
Research by Van Hoeck et al. (2012) has directly investigated the link between 
episodic memory and CFT. The brain network that supports episodic memory has been 
implicated in more general functioning (e.g. imagining oneself in an alternative perceptive 
or time) (Spreng et al., 2008).  Therefore the authors aimed to investigate if this neural 
network is activated during CFT. fMRI was used to compare activity when participants 
imagined an upward counterfactual compared to re-living a past negative event and 
envisaging positive future events. Neural activity for episodic memories and counterfactual 
production was overlapping; hippocampal area, temporal lobes, midline, and lateral parietal 
lobes were activated. Although CFT was shown to recruit additional areas, such as the 
bilateral inferior parietal lobe and posterior medial frontal cortex, Van Hoeck et al.’s (2012) 
finding demonstrates that the ToM network and the counterfactual network have 
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commonalities which would go some way to explaining the identical activation observed in  
Canessa et al.’s (2009) gambling task.  
Contrary to the belief that regret is required for behaviour modification (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008; O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2014), research by Raeva, Dijk and 
Zeelenberg (2011) investigated the possibility that experiencing regret is not critical for 
successful DM. Healthy participants were presented with two DM exercises. The initial task 
was designed so that participants either would or would not experience regret. This was 
achieved by manipulating the amount of feedback participants were given after they made a 
choice. The subsequent task required the matching of two monetary outcomes in 
concordance with attractiveness. The outcomes were matched in attractiveness by 
manipulating the prize amounts and the probability of the participant winning the prize. The 
higher monetary reward had a lower probability of winning. Participants were asked to state 
the amount of money they would accept if the probability of winning was 100%, thus 
matching the attractiveness of the two options. It was found that regardless of the 
experience of regret in the initial task, DM was not significantly different. Therefore, the 
authors argue that experiencing regret is not necessary for behavioural modification. The 
authors highlight the role of comparing the present situation to ‘what might have been’. It is 
suggested that due to this comparison of the known and the hypothetical, a comparative 
mind-set is created which may ‘carry-over’ to future decisions. Therefore, the experience of 
regret itself is not the key factor in future DM. This evidence implies that something other 
than regret is responsible for behavioural change; it is possible that CFT alone can direct 
goal orientated behaviour, without experiencing CMEs.   
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1.6.4 Counterfactual Thinking and Counterfactually Mediated Emotions in Acquired Brain 
Damage  
In order to establish a fully comprehensive understanding of CFT and the role regret 
plays in DM, a broad search for supporting brain areas is necessary. Camille et al. (2004) 
designed the Regret Gambling Task (RGT) for patients with OFC lesions and healthy age-
matched controls. The task involved two wheels of fortune, both offering different amounts 
of points indicated by sections of the wheel (-50, 50, -200, or 200). An arrow was pictured in 
the centre of both wheels. Participants chose one of the two wheels to gamble on. The 
arrow on the chosen wheel spun and landed on one of the two sections on the wheel, 
participants won the number of points associated with that section. The chances of winning 
the points were manipulated by changing the percentage of each wheel which 
corresponded with its allocated number of points; for example during some trials there was 
a large chance (a greater percentage of the wheel) of losing a low number of points and only 
a small chance (a smaller percentage of the wheel) of winning a high number of points. 
During half of the trials participants received information on the outcome of their wheel 
only (partial feedback). On the other half of trials participants received information on the 
outcome of the unchosen wheel also (complete feedback). Regret can be induced during the 
complete feedback condition as participants are provided with information about the 
outcome of the unchosen wheel which provides a counterfactual alternative; participants 
are now aware of the actual outcome and the other possible outcome that could have 
occurred, had they made a different choice of wheel.  Disappointment is induced in partial 
feedback trials as the desired result (the higher number of points) is not obtained yet the 
participant had no control over the outcome. Both patients and controls reported feeling 
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happier after winning and sadder after losing. Controls reported regret in high-risk complete 
feedback trials. This negative emotional response (regret), in controls, was felt more keenly 
in complete feedback conditions rather than partial feedback conditions. This is an example 
of the amplification effect as the emotional response was more extreme during regret trials 
(complete feedback) compared to disappointment trials (partial feedback).  The authors 
found that the amplification effect was reversed in patients with OFC lesions; the difference 
in mean emotional ratings when then obtained outcome was 50 or -50 and the unobtained 
outcome was 200 or -200 was less in the complete feedback condition compared to the 
partial feedback condition. Thus, in contrast to controls, regret was not reported over 
disappointment.  
Coricelli et al. (2005) highlighted differing neural responses to regret through using 
Camille et al.’s (2004) RGT.  Activity in the medial OFC, ACC, and hippocampus increased 
proportionally with the experience of regret. While activity within medial OFC and amygdala 
represented participants’ tendency to become regret averse as the experiment continued. 
This activation also occurred prior to participants making a choice between the two 
gambles; suggesting that the same neural network is recruited for the experience of regret 
and also regret anticipation.   
Levens et al. (2014) also used the RGT to compare the experience of regret in VMPFC 
and lateral orbital frontal cortex (LOFC) patients. It was found that VMPFC patients made 
financially worse choices, in comparison to controls, yet reported regret after the 
counterfactual was revealed. Whereas, LOFC patients made financially better choices, in 
comparison to VMPFC patients, yet did not report regret post-counterfactual. The authors 
suggest that the VMPFC is recruited when choices and anticipated emotions are considered 
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and consequently is involved in guiding future DM. The LOFC is thought to be linked with 
experiencing regret after a choice is made which is turn is associated with signalling that 
behavioural modification is required. These findings point to the distinct functions of the 
different brain regions and their involvement in DM and emotional responses and explain 
the differing activation in Coricelli et al.’s (2005) study.  
In more recent years the search for brain regions that support CFT and regret has 
expanded. The cerebellum is not traditionally cited as a key area when considering CMEs, 
although the area has been implicated in DM (Guggisberg et al., 2008; Rosenbloom et al., 
2012). Clausi et al. (2015) showed that patients with cerebella lesions were indeed able to 
make choices that minimise regret, but were impaired in evaluating the feeling of regret 
subjectively. The authors used the RGT (see Camille et al., 2004). In addition to this, the 
counterfactual inference test (CIT) was administered. During the CIT participants are 
presented with descriptions of 4 events that two people experience. Participants are tasked 
with inferring how one of the protagonists would feel based on the counterfactual. For 
example ‘Jack misses his train by 5 minutes. Ed misses his train more than an hour. Who 
spends more time thinking about the missed train?’ Participants must choose one of the 
available responses: Ed, Jack, Same or Can’t tell (Hooker et al., 2000). The patients did not 
show any deficits on the general neuropsychological assessment and CIT performance was 
not different to that of controls. There was no significant difference between patients and 
controls during partial feedback trials when disappointment and joy were reported. During 
complete feedback trials there was no significant difference between the two groups when 
relief was analysed, however there was a significant difference for regret. Patients reported 
significantly less regret than controls when the outcome of the chosen gamble was lower 
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compared to the outcome of the unchosen gamble. Additionally, there were no within 
group differences for regret and disappointment in the patient group. Analysis of choice 
behaviour showed that patients acted to maximise expected value and minimise future 
regret. There was no difference between patients and controls for choice behaviour. In 
addition to this, analysis of skin conductance responses showed that patients, like controls, 
differed significantly between regret and disappointment trials. There were no between 
group differences. This implies that the patient group experienced the same automatic 
response to regret and disappointment as the control group. Results from the study 
implicate the cerebellum in the expression of regret and demonstrate that cerebella 
damage can affect self-monitoring of regret. 
The authors note that the apparent link between the cerebellum and the ability to 
monitor one’s own regret could be due to the cerebellum’s connectivity with the PFC, limbic 
system, and basal ganglia. Habas et al. (2009) used resting state fMRI to implicate the 
cerebellar systems in nonmotor functions. Analysis showed that the cerebellum contributes 
to intrinsic connectivity networks that are in part responsible for executive control, episodic 
memory/self-reflection, salience detection, and sensorimotor function. Therefore, damage 
to the cerebella might interrupt the cortico-cerebellar loops which may play a role in social 
cognitive processing.  
In order to establish if the cerebellum does play a role in social cognitive processing, 
specifically counterfactual reasoning and the experience and expression of regret, several 
patients with cerebella lesions will be tested during this project.  
It has been speculated that the frontal cortex is linked to the ability to engage in CFT; 
Gomez-Beldarrain, Harries, Garcia-Monco, Ballus and Grafman (2004) used an economic DM 
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task with patients with right frontal lobe lesions and parietal lobe lesions. Patients listened 
to information from four advisors regarding the outcome of a forecasting task. They then 
aimed to predict the successful sales of consumer products over the oncoming month. The 
results indicated that frontal cortex lesions result in impaired reasoning when forecasting 
oneself into the future; greatly affecting DM.  
1.6.5 Conclusion  
The VMPFC, and in particular the OFC have consistently been signposted by 
neurological research as key brain regions associated with CFT (Camille et al., 2004; Canessa 
et al., 2009; Coricelli et al., 2007; Nicolle et al., 2011). Research has suggested that the 
VMPFC is recruited when choices and anticipated emotions are considered and 
consequently is involved in guiding future DM (Levens et al., 2014).  
It is clear that the OFC is involved in producing counterfactual thoughts and 
regulating emotional responses.  It appears that the OFC integrates cognitive and emotional 
information in order to process how rewarding an outcome would be and in turn creates a 
‘value signal’ (Coricelli et al., 2007). The produced value signal can be memorised and 
utilised by the lateral PFC to plan a course of action which will obtain the reward outcome. 
The medial PFC also acts upon the value signal by evaluating the success and effort of the 
action taken (Ursu & Carter, 2005; Wallis, 2007). Overall, the OFC dictates DM through 
interaction with other brain areas, such as the amygdala. This interaction allows the OFC to 
create a representation of outcome reward and its value, resulting in behavioural 
modification (Coricelli et al., 2007).   
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Despite these regions being flagged as having an influence on counterfactual 
production and CMEs, we still understand very little about the neurological processes 
involved in CFT and DM. For example, we do not know if damage to brain areas outside 
those listed can affect individuals’ experience of CMEs. It is unclear if brain injured patients 
can experience regret yet not engage in behaviour modification. Additionally there is, to my 
knowledge, no research which investigates the link between brain injured patients’ ability to 
answer counterfactual questions and their experience of CMEs (the developmental 
literature would suggest that an ability to pass tasks assessing counterfactual reasoning 
comes before the experience of CMEs). Therefore this project aims to develop a broad set of 
tasks while widening the search for the brain areas that support CFT, CMEs and DM. 
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1.7 Developmental Literature 
1.7.1 Overview 
The development of CFT and CMEs has been widely investigated in children. It is 
important to conduct developmental research with children of varying ages as the results 
allow us to gain a unique insight into the processes that develop gradually, resulting in the 
ability to think counterfactually as adult. In addition, developmental tasks can be adapted 
for the purpose of this project.  
It is clear from the developmental literature, which will be reviewed in detail, that 
there is a hierarchy in the development of counterfactual abilities. Counterfactual questions 
that require future hypothetical thinking are passed at 3 years whereas counterfactual 
conditional questions are passed at approximately 4-5 years (Beck et al., 2006; Riggs, 
Peterson & Mitchell, 1998; Robinson & Beck, 2000). The ability to experience CMEs appears 
to develop after counterfactual reasoning, with the experience of regret preceding the 
experience of relief (Weisberg & Beck, 2010). Behaviour modification and ACS appears to be 
the last ability that develops and is possibly dependent on the experience of regret 
(O’Connor et al, 2014). 
1.7.2 Counterfactual Thinking in Children  
Riggs, Peterson, Robinson and Mitchell (1998) showed that children of 4 years can 
answer counterfactual questions with responses that indicate an understanding of 
counterfactual alternatives.  Children were given a false belief task in conjunction with a 
physical state task, both investigations necessitated similar counterfactual processing but 
the latter did not demand understanding about beliefs. Children were asked what physical 
state the world might be in if a previous event had not happened. For example, Jenny, the 
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story’s protagonist, creates a painting which she leaves outside while re-entering the house. 
While Jenny is inside, and cannot see outside, a gust of wind blows the painting into a tree. 
The counterfactual question asked: ‘‘What if the wind hadn’t blown, where would the 
picture be?’’ 3-year-old children made realist errors on this task. This means that children 
described a scenario that was correct in the present and used existing knowledge(“the 
painting would be in the tree”)  instead of how the scenario ‘would be’ in the counterfactual 
(“the painting would be on the table”). Further evidence that children indeed develop CFT at 
4 years comes from Kuczaj and Daly (1979), who reported children using counterfactual 
language within their speech. 
It is possible that performance on counterfactual tasks is affected by inhibitory 
control. The role of inhibitory control in counterfactual production has been investigated by 
Beck, Riggs and Gorniack (2009). The authors tested 3 and 4 year old children on various 
tasks assessing counterfactual ability. Counterfactual performance for both 3 and 4 year old 
children was predicted by inhibitory control. It is possible that the development in inhibitory 
control is what facilitates successful CFT; without the inhibition to ignore a known outcome, 
individuals may have deficits in their counterfactual ability 
Thinking counterfactually is particularly challenging for young children. Robinson and 
Beck (2000) used future hypothetical questions ‘What if next time he drives the other way, 
where will he be?’ and counterfactual conditional questions ‘What if he had driven the 
other way, where would he be?’ 3-4 year olds found future hypothetical questions easier to 
answer than counterfactual conditional questions. Additional evidence that at 3 years of age 
children find future hypothetical questions easy to answer was provided by Beck et al. 
(2006), Perner et al. (2004) and Riggs et al. (1998).  
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Drawing from this evidence that children are able to speculate about events that 
occur in the future, suggests they are able to ignore the current facts, using inhibitory 
control, and project themselves into a future state. Therefore, it is unlikely that the children 
fail the counterfactual conditional questions at this age, purely because they cannot ignore 
current reality. If this was the case, children would not pass the future hypothetical 
questions correctly as they would be unable to project themselves into the future and 
consider alternative possibilities. It is possible that after brain injury, patients may not be 
able to disengage their attention from the known outcome and so may struggle with future 
hypothetical and counterfactual questions. However, projecting one’s self into the future, 
according to developmental research, appears to be much easier. Therefore, patients, like 
children, may have the ability to consider future alternatives but not think counterfactually.  
1.7.3 Is Basic Conditional Reasoning the same as Counterfactual Thinking? 
Rafetseder, Cristi-Varga and Perner (2010) aimed to pin point the stage in 
development where children are able to engage in CFT. They argue that when 4 year old 
children pass counterfactual conditional questions, they may not need to engage in real CFT. 
They suggest that basic conditional reasoning (BCR) can be used to answer questions by 
applying regularities and logical rules. In other words, children might answer using general 
knowledge of the world rather than considering a specific alternative that might have been. 
Children were shown a story depicted by dolls; a mother of two children (a small girl named 
Julia or a tall boy named Simon) placed sweets on either the top shelf of a cabinet or the 
bottom shelf. Once the mother had left the room, the children looked for the sweets and 
took them to their room if they were found. In one trial, the sweets were hidden on the top 
shelf where the tall boy, Simon, finds them and takes them into his room. The child was 
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then asked ‘what if Julia had come, where would the sweets be?’ If BCR was used to answer 
this question, the response would be ‘in Julia’s room’ because the question states that Julia 
would have looked for the sweets before Simon. However, this would be incorrect as Julia 
cannot reach the top shelf and so would not have retrieved the sweets in order to take 
them to her room. Thus, CFT is required to answer this question correctly (on the top shelf). 
The results of the experiment showed that only 35% of 6 year old children answered 
questions requiring CFT correctly. 
In addition to this, Rafetseder and Perner (2010) used a further study that isolated 
CFT from BCR to show that children at age 6 are able to reason the correct response. 
Children were told a story that depicted a doctor in two locations: a hospital (typical) or at a 
park (atypical). In both conditions children were told that the doctor was called to an 
emergency at a swimming pool. The children are then asked “If there had been no 
emergency, where would the doctor be?” In the typical condition the correct response is ‘at 
the hospital.’ However, because a doctor’s logical location would be in a hospital, BCR could 
be used to correctly answer this question. However, CFT is required to respond correctly in 
the atypical condition because doctors are not generally located in the park. Children under 
6 were not able to correctly answer questions in the atypical conditions, demonstrating a 
lack of counterfactual reasoning.  
More recently Rafetseder, Schwitalla and Perner (2013) continued to investigate 
how BCR can influence the apparent ability of children to pass counterfactual tasks. Through 
using the same methods as described above by Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas and Perner (2010), 
the authors showed that children did not reach ‘adult like’ counterfactual reasoning until 
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12- to 14-year-olds. They concluded that counterfactual reasoning is not full developed 
before the age of 12.  
It is possible that some patients, after a brain injury, have problems reasoning 
counterfactually. If this is the case then these patients may rely on BCR to answer 
counterfactual questions. It will be possible to establish, using a task which asks varying 
counterfactual questions (such as future hypothetical and basic counterfactual) if some 
patients, like the children discussed by Rafetseder, answer using typical regularities (BCR) or 
if counterfactual reasoning is preserved.  
1.7.4 Counterfactually Mediated Emotions in Children  
Amsel and Smalley (2000) investigated regret and relief in children aged 3 and 5. 
Children played a game where two cards were placed face down and one card was facing 
upwards. The aim of the game was to choose one of the two face down cards and to try to 
beat (numerically) the face up card. In all trials the children were required to rate their 
feelings on their chosen card and then again when the unchosen card was turned over. If 
children considered what they could have won had their choice of card been different, then 
we would expect their emotional rating to go down after learning the alternative card was a 
higher number. This behaviour would indicate the experience of regret. Conversely, 
children’s emotional rating should increase upon finding out the unchosen card was a lower 
number; a demonstration of relief. It was found that for both 3- and 5-year-old children, 
their emotional rating did not change once the alternative cards was revealed, regardless if 
it was higher or lower than the face up card (therefore, no regret or relief were 
demonstrated). However, all children acknowledged they would have been happier if they 
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had selected the face down card that ultimately ended up winning. Therefore, even though 
CFT could take place, neither 3- nor 5-year-old children reported experiencing CMEs.  
Subsequently, Weisberg and Beck (2010) found evidence that 5-year-olds experience 
regret.  The authors devised a task where children chose one of two coloured boxes. A 
number of stickers was won according to the box chosen. The contents of the chosen box 
were revealed first. An emotional rating was then taken from the children using a 5 point 
smiley face scale. The non-chosen box was then opened, revealing its contents. A second 
emotion rating was taken (how the child now felt about their chosen box). Both regret and 
relief trials were created. In the case of regret trials, the alternative box had a higher 
number of stickers in than the chosen box. In relief trials, the alternative box had a lower 
number of stickers in than the chosen box. Children aged 5-6, 6-7 and 7-8 were tested. All 
age groups reported regret with no significant difference separating the age groups. 
However, only 7-8 year olds reported the feeling of relief. This task will be adapted for the 
purpose of my research to assess if patients with neurological damage can report the 
experience of regret and relief.  
It is possible that when children were asked to rate their emotional response to their 
chosen box a second time they felt they were required to change their original answer. This 
would cause the second emotional rating to change. In order to control for this, O’Connor, 
McCormak and Feeney (2012) incorporated a baseline trial where the chosen and 
alternative box contained the same prize. The inclusion of this trial identified children who 
changed their emotional rating without a systematic reason. The authors found evidence for 
the experience of regret emerging at 6-7 years. These children were also able to answer 
questions about their emotional experience of regret using counterfactual explanations. No 
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evidence for this behaviour was recorded for 4- to 5-year-olds. Taking into consideration the 
methodological improvements made by O’Connor, McCormak and Feeney (2012), my 
research will incorporate a baseline trial.  
In order to establish that the measure of CMEs used by Weisberg and Beck (2012) 
was reliable the authors made some methodological modifications. A new experiment was 
devised where children chose between one of two cards; win or lose. During regret trials, 
participants either won 2 or 3 tokens and had a missed opportunity to win 8 (win trials) or 
participants lost 2/3 tokens and had a missed opportunity of winning 3 tokens (lose trials). 
The reverse pattern was used for relief trials. As before, participants were required to rate 
their emotions. For the purpose of this experiment the authors altered the rating scale used 
to allow participants to rate their emotional responses categorically the second time. A 
horizontal 5 point smiley face scale (ranging from very happy to very sad) with a three 
pronged arrow was developed. One arrow pointed up vertically with the other two arrows 
pointing out towards the left and right respectively. Above the vertical pointing arrow, a 
‘window’ was cut into the cardboard. The window could be placed over one of the 5 smiley 
faces on the scale and was used to signify the child’s emotional response to the outcome of 
their chosen box. The child was then asked to point to one of the three arrows depending 
on how they felt after seeing the alternative prize. If the child pointed to the leftward 
pointing arrow this signified that they felt sadder, if they chose the rightward pointing 
arrow, they felt happier, and finally if the child chose the vertical upward pointing arrow, 
they felt the same as they previously rated themselves. The 5 point smiley face scale and 




Results showed that regret after winning was reported at 4 years, regret after losing 
as well as relief after winning was reported at 5 years, but relief after losing was not 
reported until 7 years. These findings support the claim that previous experiments 
examining the experience of relief have been artificially difficult. Additionally, it would 
appear that regret and relief are experienced earlier than previously reported by other 
authors. 
However, it could be suggested that even the children who reported feeling sadder 
in Weisberg and Beck’s study are not experiencing regret. The authors assumed that 
participants think counterfactually; ‘I should have picked the other box’. However, children 
may have simply felt frustrated at their decision, thinking ‘I do not have the higher number 
of tokens’. To address this Weisberg and Beck (2012) manipulated the responsibility 
children had for which box they opened, which should impact counterfactual thinking but 
not frustration. Six- to 7-year-olds reported more sadness when their feelings of 
responsibility were stronger. Thus it appears they were experiencing regret.  
1.7.5 The Relationship between Adaptive Choice switching and Regret 
The relationship between ACS and the experience of regret has been investigated in 
adults as well as children. It has been suggested that adults anticipate regret as a 
consequence of DM, and in order to limit this negative experience, will make active 
attempts to avoid similar regret inducing consequences (Zeelenberg, 1999; Mellers Schwartz 
& Ritov, 1999).  
 Adults have been shown to anticipate regret and as a result consider alternative 
courses of action in an economic context (Bell, 1982).  Creyer and Ross (1999) demonstrated 
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that the experience of regret impacts on future DM during in an investigation into adaptive 
behaviour when negotiation and bidding. O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney (2014) 
investigated the relationship in children. Children’s DM was examined over a two day 
experiment. On day 1 children chose to open one of two boxes. They rated their emotions 
after seeing what they won (the prize in the chosen box) and again once the alternative 
prize (the unchosen box) was revealed. There were three conditions; baseline (both boxes 
contained the same number of tokens), regret (the unchosen box contained more tokens) 
and relief (the unchosen box contained fewer tokens). On day 2 children were shown the 
boxes from the previous day and reminded which box they initially chose to open. They 
were given one token which they could use to exchange for the decision to switch their box 
from day 1. Children were categorised as engaging in ACS when they chose to exchange 
their token for the opportunity to switch boxes in the regret condition; this would 
accumulate more tokens overall. Results showed that children who reported regret on day 1 
were more likely to engage in ACS on day 2. The authors interpreted this as evidence to 
suggest that regret facilities learning after an undesirable outcome.  
1.7.6 Developmental Conclusion  
It would appear from developmental research that there is a hierarchy in the 
development of counterfactual abilities. Children begin to answer future hypothetical 
questions correctly at 3 years of age. Counterfactual conditional questions are answered 
correctly at 4-5 years (Beck et al., 2006; Riggs et al., 1998; Robinson & Beck, 2000). 
Counterfactual emotions develop after counterfactual reasoning. Regret it thought to be 
experienced before relief (Weisberg & Beck, 2010). ACS appears to emerge after the 
development of regret (O’Connor et al., 2014). 
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It is also important to remember that some authors (Rafetseder, Cristi-Varga & 
Perner, 2010; Rafetseder & Perner, 2010) think young children pass counterfactual 
conditional tasks using BCR and so development of adult-like CFT may emerge in later 
childhood. If this is the case then regret may emerge before full CFT, which brings the 
described hierarchy into question.  
1.8 The Thesis 
There are three general aims for this project: to explore the component processes of 
CMEs and widen the search for the brain areas that supports these; To conduct research 
that points to how the experience of regret directly impacts on future DM and underpins 
adaptive behavioural change; To establish if regret itself is experienced in brain-damaged 
individuals.  
Through reviewing the previous research conducted with neurological patients I 
have identified key brain areas which have been associated with CFT, CMEs and DM. I have 
established that there is a need to widen the search for brain areas that support these 
abilities and establish if there is a relationship between CFT and CME production and also 
regret and adaptive behaviour modification. Developmental research has shed light on 
these relationships in children; demonstrating a clear hierarchy. One experiment tested with 
adults, the RGT, will be adapted for the purpose of this investigation along with four 
developmentally designed experiments. In addition to this, I will further investigate healthy 






Is the Processing of Regret in Adulthood Effortless? 
A collaboration between: Putt, C., FitzGibbon, L., Feeney, A., McCormack, T., & Beck, S. 
The work for this chapter was conducted as a collaboration between the above authors. 
However I am the primary author of this work.  
 I formulated the idea for the experiment, programmed the experiment (with Dr 
FitzGibbon) tested participant, analysed the data (with Dr FitzGibbon), interpreted the 
findings and wrote the report. Dr FitzGibbon, Dr Feeney, Prof McCormack, and Dr Beck 
provided feedback on the original development of ideas and writing up.  
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2.1 Introduction  
Successful DM and behavioural modification is influenced, not only by cognitive 
processes, but by emotions (Kirman et al., 2010; Mellers, 2000). CMEs reflect events that did 
not happen, but could have, and they play a key role in DM. This is especially true of the 
negative CME regret, which is based on a comparison of what really happened with what 
might have happened had a different choice been made. However, it is unclear how the 
experience of regret directly, or indirectly, affects behavioural change (Roese et al., 2007; 
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). To address this we need a better understanding of the process 
by which CMEs are generated. In this chapter I explore whether experiencing regret is an 
effortful process, or whether its generation is fast and effortless. In this study both a 
negative CME, regret, and its positive complement, relief were measured.  
Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2005, pg152) describe regret as “A negative emotion that 
we experience when we realise or imagine that our present situation would have been 
better, if we only had decided differently.” Whereas, relief originates from the comparison 
of the present situation to a more negative hypothetical (Coricelli & Rustichini, 2010). 
During this investigation, in line with previous research (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 
2005), I will focus on the negative CME, regret.  
Kahneman (2013) describes two systems that underpin the workings of DM. His 
metaphor that thinking happens fast or slow, was developed from Stanovich and West 
(2000). System one allows individuals to respond to situations quickly through relying on 
known associations and stimulus similarities. It is characterised as intuitive and effortless, 
i.e. ‘fast’. Whereas system two uses logic and deliberation and thus is slow and effortful. 
Drawing on this two systems approach, it is possible that CMEs are produced quickly and 
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effortlessly; the experience of a CME is inherently an emotional reaction thus lending itself 
to system 1. Alternatively, it is possible that CMEs require effortful processing to compare 
the real and counterfactual world; thus akin to system 2. Note that in this chapter I refer to 
effort (effortful/effortless) but do not make claims about whether CMEs are automatic. For 
that claim it would be necessary to show that these CMEs are processed even when they are 
not explicitly sought and even when they are counterproductive (see Apperly & Butterfill, 
2009, for a similar argument about theory of mind). 
 CFT is often construed in terms of inferences: one needs to work out how the 
outcome would have been different if alternative choices had been made. The imagined 
alternative must be closely related to the real world, must be tied to a specific situation and 
fit with previous knowledge the individual has about the situation, and must not violate the 
laws of nature (Dehghani et al., 2012). Minimising the number of changes between the real 
and alternative world allows for the counterfactual to be realistic: an outcome that could 
have genuinely occurred (Petrocelli et al., 2011). Making logical inferences about the 
counterfactual world seems likely to rely on slow, effortful thinking.  
Another reason to think that CFT (and hence CMEs) will be effortful is that regret has 
a protracted development. In a typical study of regret with young children, participants 
choose to open one of two boxes, winning the number of stickers inside. They then rate 
their emotional response using a scale comprised of five faces ranging from extremely 
happy to extremely sad. Only then do they see the contents of the unchosen box. On regret 
trials the unopened box contains more stickers than the chosen box and during relief trials 
the unopened box contains fewer stickers than the chosen box. Children rate their emotions 
a second time after what they could have won has been revealed. It is not until children are 
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at least 5 or 6 that they report experiencing regret (Beck & Weisberg, 2010; O’Connor, 
McCormack, & Feeney, 2012) and indeed others claim that the emotion is not experienced 
until early adolescence (Rafetseder, Schwitalla, & Perner, 2012)  Furthermore, children 
under 7 fail to report when others feel regret (Beck & Crilly, 2009; Ferrell, Guttentag, & 
Gredlein, 2009).  
When interpreting counterfactual statements in discourse, encoding counterfactual 
and factual information does not seem to differ in effort, but integrating counterfactual and 
factual information relies on cognitive resources. Here encoding refers to the initial 
formation of a representation of the information, whereas integration refers to using the 
information in combination with relevant context. Ferguson and Cane (2015) measured 
event-related brain potentials while participants read factual or counterfactual statements 
and reasoned about consistent and inconsistent events. In their first experiment, both 
counterfactual and factual statements led to differences in the N400 between consistent 
and inconsistent events. This suggests that individuals encode and hold in mind both the 
counterfactual and factual worlds when making predictions about events in upcoming 
discourse. However, integrating the counterfactual was more demanding: in a second 
experiment, the authors divided their sample according to participants working memory 
(WM) capacity, and found that those who had low WM capacity failed to detect 
inconsistencies relating to counterfactual worlds (while they were merely delayed for 
factual worlds). 
These processes have not yet been fully investigated in other contexts that elicit 
counterfactual thought, such as in DM. Very little is known about the processing of factual 
and counterfactual information that is spontaneously generated from observing decision 
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outcomes. When faced with information about the outcomes of decisions that have been 
made and decisions that could have made, encoding can be interpreted as the selection and 
processing of such outcomes. Whereas integration is the comparison between the factual 
and the counterfactual, in the experiments in this chapter integration is expressed via the 
emotional responses to the outcomes (regret and relief).  
Thus, instead of assessing the cognitive processes of CFT in discourse I will 
investigate whether emotional responses after DM are affected by manipulating cognitive 
resources.  
One the other hand, others have claimed that CFT occurs automatically, and requires 
cognitive capacity to suppress it. Goldinger, Kleider, Azuma and Beike (2003) investigated 
this process of suppression, characterising it as an active process where an individual 
attempts to remove thoughts from the forefront of their mind. In their study, participants 
read a story and made decisions based on the story events. For example, in one story the 
protagonist is watching a baseball game and a light falls on his foot. Participants had to 
decide how much compensation to award the victim. Critically, in one version of the story 
the protagonist was sat in his usual seat when the incident occurred, and in the other he 
had purposely moved to a different seat. In the latter, the counterfactual ‘If only he hadn’t 
changed seats’ is likely to be available. Participants assigned more blame to the victim when 
counterfactual thoughts were easily generated. Most importantly, when participants with 
lower WM span held a further memory load during the DM stage, they were more 
influenced by the counterfactual world than participants in other conditions: They 
attributed more blame to the victim and recommended less compensation. However, when 
participants held a memory load while reading the story (encoding) there was little effect. 
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The authors interpreted these results as suggesting that counterfactuals are automatically 
produced during the encoding stage and need effortful suppression at a later stage. In other 
words, this evidence suggests that CFT is quick and effortless. 
Other evidence to support the fast view of CFT comes from recent neuroscience 
studies of regret. Giorgetta et al. (2013) used a paradigm developed by Camille et al. (2004).  
Participants took part in a gambling task while magnetoencephalography (MEG) was used. 
The task involved two wheels of fortune; each wheel offered two different point rewards, 
one of which would be won depending on the spin of an arrow. One wheel was categorised 
as safe and one as risky. The safe wheel had the smaller outcome values whereas the risky 
wheel had the larger outcome values. 3 different combinations of points were used: (-5, 5 
(safe options), -25, 25 (risky option) or -10, 10 (safe option), -30, 30 (risky options) or -15, 15 
(safe options) or -35, 35 (risky option). Participants chose which wheel they wanted to 
gamble on in half of the trials (participant agency trials), during the other half of trials the 
choice was made by the computer (computer agency trials). Information on the outcome of 
the chosen gamble/wheel was presented, followed by the outcome of the unchosen 
gamble/wheel. Disappointment and regret were induced by manipulating the outcome of 
the two wheels, for example, regret was induced through combining a loss on participant 
agency trials (the participant chose the wheel that the gamble was placed on) with a win on 
the unchosen wheel. Disappointment was created using a loss on computer agency trials 
while the alternative wheel won. MEG results indicated that the regret and disappointment 
trials were differentiated extremely fast at the neural level (between 190 and 305ms). After 
305ms the cortical activity was very similar. The early differentiation in activity was shown 
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to be a result of feedback and agency; and as previously explained, feedback and agency 
were used to induce feelings of regret and disappointment respectively.  
However, Giorgetta et al.’s findings do not show how these early neural signals are 
linked to the emotion itself; a question this experiment aims to address. Giorgetta et al.’s 
research has highlighted the speed at which neural processing of stimuli that induce regret 
and disappointment occurs. The experiments presented in this paper aim to establish if the 
experience of these emotions is also fast and effortless.  
There is evidence to support both the possibilities that CFT and CMEs are the results 
of slow, deliberative processes, and that they are fast and effortless. Here I address this by 
investigating the experience of regret in healthy adults. I used the wheels of fortune 
paradigm to induce regret in participants, and used two manipulations to see if they are 
susceptible to manipulations of cognitive load. The logic being that if they are susceptible to 
these manipulations, then they are more like System 2 processes, rather than System 1. In 
Experiment 1, the length of time that participants were able to view the outcome of the two 
wheels was manipulated. In this way the time available for encoding factual and 
counterfactual outcomes was manipulated. In Experiment 2, the WM load that participants 
were exposed to was manipulated; load was maintained during both encoding and 
integration. If generating the counterfactual thoughts that underpin CMEs is effortful, then 
one would expect both of these manipulations to disturb the experience of CMEs. 
2.2 Experiment 1 
The design of the experiment was closely based upon Camille et al.’s (2004) 
gambling task where two wheels of fortune were manipulated so that there were different 
41 
 
probabilities of winning and losing a high and low number of points. In the first experiment, 
the amount of time that participants were exposed to the outcome of the two wheels was 
manipulated. The aim of this experiment was to establish whether there is a difference in 
reported emotions when the outcomes of chosen and unchosen gambles were viewed for a 
short length of time (1 second) compared to a longer length of time (4 seconds).  
Bault et al. (2015) reported that participants spent roughly 2 seconds looking at the 
outcomes of both the unchosen and chosen wheel, thus 1 second was chosen as the short 
exposure to determine if participants required this time to process the counterfactual and 
factual outcomes. As the 4 second condition gives participants longer to process the 
outcomes, it is possible that this will elicit stronger CME responses compared to the 1 
second condition. This could occur through possible mechanisms such as more comparison 
between the obtained and unobtained outcomes occurring in the 4 second condition or 
emotional responses building up over time, thus generating a stronger CME in the 4 second 
condition.   
The unobtained outcome during partial feedback trials is the number of points 
associated with the section of the chosen wheel where the arrow did not land, for example 
if the possible outcomes on the chosen wheel are 200 and -50 and the arrow lands on 200 
the unobtained outcome is -50. The unobtained outcome during complete feedback trials is 
the number of points associated with the section of the wheel where the arrow lands on the 
unchosen wheel. In order to replicate previously analysis with the RGT the points associated 






A total of 18 participants (16 female) aged between 18 and 24 (M = 20.33 years) 
completed the experiment. All participants were Psychology undergraduate students at the 
University of Birmingham and were recruited for course credit.  
Design 
The experiment was administered on a Toshiba 15" laptop and run on PsychoPy, 
version 1.73.04 (Peirce, 2007; 2009). Each trial presented two wheels of fortune, one on the 
left side of the screen and one on the right (see Figure 2.0 for example wheels). Each wheel 
was divided into two sections; red or blue. Each section contained a number which 
represented a number of points. An arrow was presented in the middle of each wheel 
pointing upward. Participants chose one of the two wheels. The arrow would spin between 
2 and 5 seconds (randomly determined by the programme) and stopped on either the blue 
or red section, where the corresponding number of points would be won by the participant. 
The arrows span for the same length of time on both wheels on each trial. The points that 
were available were: -50-, -200, 50, and 200. In 50% of trials only the arrow inside the 
chosen wheel would spin, winning the corresponding number of points (partial feedback). 
During the other 50% of trials, both the arrow inside the chosen wheel and the unchosen 
wheel would spin (complete feedback). Therefore, the participant would see not only the 
outcome of their chosen wheel but also the outcome of the unchosen wheel. Participants 
were split into two groups; fast-slow and slow-fast. During the slow condition, the outcome 
of the wheel/wheels was shown for 4 seconds. During the fast condition, the outcome of 
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the wheel/wheels was shown for 1 second. Participants in fast-slow group completed the 
fast condition first followed by the slow condition whereas participants in the slow-fast 
group completed the slow condition first followed by the fast condition. There were 60 trials 
in each condition respectively.  
Materials  
Participants rated their emotions using the arrow keys on the keyboard by moving a 
marker along a line. The marker started in the centre and could be moved left towards the 
“Extremely sad” anchor, or right towards the “Extremely happy” anchor. There were 50 
interval points on each side of the central starting point. 
Procedure  
Training: Participants were given 2 practice trials before each of the slow and fast 
conditions respectively:  a partial feedback trial and a complete feedback trial. Each 
participant received the same practice trials (see Table 2.0). During both practice trials, 
there was always a -50 or 50 vs a -200 or a 200 score. After each trial was completed 





Combination of points available on left and right wheels, including feedback condition, 
during training trials. 
 
Left Wheel Right Wheel Feedback 
-50 / -200 50 / -50 Partial  
-50 / 200 -200 / 200 Complete 
  
Experimental procedure: Participants read the following instructions ‘In this game, 
you are trying to win as many points as possible. You get to choose between two wheels of 
fortune. After you choose a wheel, you will see an arrow spinning. When the spinning arrow 
stops, points will be added or subtracted from your running total. You will then be asked to 
record how you feel about the outcome.’ Participants were also informed that a memory 
check would be incorporated into the experiment; ‘Sometimes there will be a memory test 
that asked what happened on that round. You might be asked about your wheel or the 
other wheel. Before you start you have two practice goes, press space when you’re ready to 
start.’ On 20% of trials, participants’ memory for the outcome of the chosen wheel or the 
unchosen wheel was tested. The memory check asked participants either ‘What was the 
outcome on your wheel’ or ‘What was the outcome on the other wheel’. Participants were 
then given a choice between two numbers, one of which was the correct answer to the 
question, for example ‘-50 or -200’; the choices were always the values associated with the 
two coloured portions of the wheel in question. No feedback was given for the memory 
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check. Both practice trials included the memory check procedure. See figure 2.0 for an 

















Figure 2.0: Example trial including a memory check.  
Note: The memory check is the question written in the bottom two boxes: ‘Where did the 
arrow land on your/other wheel?’ 
2.3 Results and Discussion 
In line with previous usage of the RGT, during complete feedback conditions analysis 
of emotional ratings were conducted on 50 or −50 for the obtained outcome and 200 or 
−200 for the unobtained outcome. This combination is chosen for analysis in the RGT as 
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winning 200 results only in possible comparisons where the outcome of 200 is better than 
any alternative, 50, -50, -200, i.e. only relief can be elicited. The opposite is true for an 
obtained outcome of 200. However, if the obtained outcome analysed is 50 both regret and 
relief can be induced by either presenting the unobtained outcome as more desirable, 
creating regret(200) or less desirable, creating relief (-50/-200). The opposite is true for an 
obtained outcome of -50.  
In Experiment 1, participants chose between two wheels of fortune on each trial. 
They were then shown either the outcome of the chosen wheel only (partial feedback) or of 
both wheels (complete feedback). The length of exposure to the outcomes (exposure time) 
was varied in a blocked within-participants design with the order counterbalanced between 
participants. In order to examine the effect of outcome exposure time on CMEs, a four-way 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. The four factors, and their respective levels 
were as follows: exposure time (1 second and 4 seconds); feedback type (partial and 
complete); obtained outcome (-50 and 50), and unobtained outcome (-200 and 200). Figure 
2.1 shows the mean emotion rating following the presentation of the outcome of the trial 
for each combination of exposure time, trial type, obtained outcome and unobtained 
outcome.  
There were three significant main effects and three significant interactions. Table 2.1 




Table 2.1  
Statistics for analysis on exposure time, feedback type, obtained outcome, and unobtained 
outcome 
            
Effect DFn DFd F p  η2  
exposure time 1 17 .077 .79 .005 
Feedback 1 17 5.11 .037 .23 
Obtained 1 17 42.33 < .001 .71 
Unobtained 1 17 43.62 < .001 .72 
exposure time*feedback 1 17 .43 .52 .02 
exposure time*obtained 1 17 .09 .76 .01 
feedback*obtained 1 17 4.55 .048 .21 
exposure time*unobtained 1 17 .134 .72 .01 
feedback*unobtained 1 17 9.96 .006 .37 
obtained outcome*unobtained 1 17 13.62 .002 .44 
exposure time*feedback*obtained 1 17 .78 .39 .04 
exposure time*feedback*unobtained 1 17 .01 .90 .001 
exposure time*obtained*unobtained 1 17 .03 .88 .001 
feedback*obtained*unobtained 1 17 3.61 .074 .18 
exposure time*feedback*obtained*unobtained 1 17 .84 .37 .05 




There was a main effect of feedback type, F(1,17) = 5.11, p = 0.037, partial 𝜂2 = 0.02 
Participants reported that they were happier after partial trials than after complete trials. 
There was a main effect of the obtained outcome, F(1,17) = 42.33, p < 0.001, partial 𝜂2 = 
0.36. Participants reported that they were happier after winning 50 points than after losing 
50 points. There was also a main effect of the unobtained outcome, F(1,17) = 43.62, p < 
0.001, partial 𝜂2 = 0.45. Participants reported that they were happier after the unobtained 
outcome was worse than their own outcome than after the unobtained outcome was better 





Figure 2.1: Mean emotion rating for each combination of obtained and unobtained 
outcomes with complete and partial feedback in the two exposure time conditions. The 
slopes of the lines represent the effect of the obtained outcomes, and the differences 
between the red and blue lines represent the effect of the unobtained outcomes. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean. 
There were three two-way interactions. A feedback type x unobtained outcome 
interaction, F(1,17) = 9.96, p = 0.006, partial η2 = 0.033. We explored all 2x2 interactions 
using post hoc t tests, with a Bonferroni correction for 4 tests such that α = .013. 
Participants were affected by the unobtained outcome when they received complete 
feedback, t(17) = 5.59, p < .001, d = 1.65 and when they received partial feedback, t(17) = 
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8.81, p < .001, d = 1.73. There was not a significant difference between complete and partial 
trials when the unobtained outcome was negative, t(17) = 0.91, p > .999, d = 0.06 although 
the difference for positive trials approached significance, t(17) = 2.68, p = .063, d = 0.60. This 
finding demonstrated the “amplification effect” whereby emotions related to unobtained 
outcomes are felt more keenly when they were missed by choice (regret and relief) than by 
chance (disappointment and elation). 
An obtained outcome x unobtained outcome interaction, F(1,17) = 13.62, p = 0.002, 
partial 𝜂2 = 0.016, indicated that participants were affected by the obtained outcome when 
the unobtained outcome was positive t(17) = 6.43, p < .001, d = 1.64, and when it was 
negative,  t(17) = 5.74, p < .001, d = 0.89. Participants were also affected by the unobtained 
outcome when the obtained outcome was negative, t(17) = 6.59, p < .001, d = 1.85, and 
when it was positive, t(17) = 6.22, p < .001, d = 1.32. This finding is in accord with eye-
tracking data that suggests that people spend more time looking at unobtained outcomes 
after obtaining negative outcomes than after obtaining positive outcomes (Bault, et al., 
2015).  
Finally, a feedback type x obtained outcome interaction, F(1,17) = 4.55, p = 0.048, 
partial 𝜂2 = 0.003, indicated that participants were affected by their obtained outcome in 
the complete feedback condition, t(17) = 5.20, p < .001, d = 1.26, and in the partial feedback 
condition, t(17) = 7.61, p < .001, d = 1.64. Participants were also affected across feedback 
type when the unobtained outcome was negative, t(17) = 1.16, p < .001, d = 0.17, and 
positive,  t(17) = 3.43, p = .013, d = 0.40.  
Overall, reported emotions did not differ in the two exposure time conditions. This 
finding is evidence that the length of time participants were exposed to the outcomes does 
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not affect reported CMEs. We interpret this observation as support for the notion that CMEs 
are produced quickly, with only limited exposure to the obtained and unobtained outcomes 
required. It should be noted that the manipulation used in Experiment 1 could only affect 
the encoding phase and not that of integration. It is thus possible that while participants 
encoded the information quickly, integration of that information was still effortful. To 
further investigate the nature of counterfactual reasoning, a second experiment was 
conducted in which the cognitive resources available to participants were manipulated 
through a cognitive load dual task. Importantly, the load was maintained through both the 
encoding and integration of the counterfactual information. Through this manipulation it 
will be possible to establish if CMES are processed effortlessly.  
2.3.1 Memory for obtained and unobtained outcomes 
Participants' memory for the outcome on the chosen wheel and the unchosen wheel 
were analysed for a subset of memory test trials on which they received complete feedback, 
the obtained outcome was -50 or 50 and the unobtained outcome was -200 or 200. 
Depending on their gamble choices, participants entered between 1 and 3 trials for each 
combination of wheel tested and exposure time into this analysis. Figure 2.2 shows mean 
memory accuracy by wheel tested and exposure time condition. Memory performance was 
analysed using a mixed-effects logistic regression model with memory accuracy as the 
binary dependent variable, exposure time condition (1s or 4s) and wheel tested (chosen or 
unchosen) as fixed effects, and participant as a random effect. A mixed-effects logistic 
regression was chosen as the most suitable method to analyse the memory for the chosen 
and unchosen wheel due to the limited, and varied, number of trials across participants. It 
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should be noted that if more participants had been served a greater number of memory 
trials, an ANOVA would have been used instead.  
There was a main effect of wheel tested, z = 3.62, p < 0.001. Memory was better for 
the obtained outcome than for the unobtained outcome. There was no effect of exposure 
time, nor was there a significant interaction between wheel tested and exposure time, ps > 
0.05. This suggests that encoding was poorer for counterfactual than factual information, 









Figure 2.2: Mean memory accuracy when tested on the outcome of the chosen and 
unchosen wheel, and when exposed to the outcomes for 1 second or 4 seconds. Error bars 






2.4 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 used the same design as Experiment 1. The aim of the second 
experiment was to establish if cognitive load affected participants’ reported emotions. To 
achieve this aim, WM load was manipulated while participants completed the gambling 
task. A load was used in which participants had to remember a list of numbers during the 
trial and were after asked to recall which number was presented to the right of another. 
Therefore, load was maintained during both encoding and integration. Similar 
manipulations have been used by Anderson, Reder and Lebiere (1996) and Hinson, Jameson 
and Whitney (2003). If producing CMEs makes demands on WM, then holding the WM load 
in mind should lead to reduced task performance. This would suggest that CME production 
is effortful.  Alternatively, the WM manipulation may not affect task performance, which 
would indicate that CMEs are produced effortlessly.  
2.4.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 20 female participants aged between 18 and 25 (M =19.4 years) completed 
the experiment. All participants were Psychology undergraduate students at the University 
of Birmingham and were recruited via the research participation scheme. Participants 
received 0.55 credits for their participation over a 30 minute time period.  
Design 
The experiment was set up with the same format as the previous experiment. 
However, instead of varying the length of time the participants view the outcome of the 
wheels (fast-slow and slow-fast groups) participants all saw the outcome for 2 seconds. 
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Additionally, a digit number string which comprised digits between 1 and 9 (digits were 
never repeated in each number string) was shown to the participants before they chose 
their wheel. The number strings were created using a random number generator; once a 
string had been used for a participant, it was not repeated for that participant. Participants 
viewed the outcome of the wheels for 2 seconds in all trials. There were two conditions 
during the experiment, high load and low load. During low load conditions, two numbers 
were shown in the digit string, during high load conditions, five numbers were show in the 
digit string. There were 60 trials in each condition respectively. The order in which 
participants received the loads was counterbalanced. Half of trials during each condition 
were full feedback and half were partials feedback trials. 
Materials 
The 2 and 5 number digit strings were created by selecting a series of numbers 
between 1 and 9. Within each digit string, no one number was repeated E.g. 16396 and 
continuous number patterns of more than three were not used E.g. 456.  
Procedure  
Participants were given 2 practice trials before the experimental phase began. 
Participants were assigned to either the high or the low load condition. Participants were 
informed that a 2 or a 5 digit number (depending on the condition) string would appear 
between the two wheels of fortune, the digit string was to be remembered. This occurred 
after the participant had selected their chosen wheel. Participants were required to retain 
the digit string and answer the following question (in order to unload their WM) after the 
outcome of the wheels had been revealed; ‘what was the digit to the right of X’. During low 
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load trials, digit ‘X’ was always the first of the two numbers to have appeared, for example if 
the digit string was 3 9, the participants would be asked to recall the digit to the right of the 
3. During high load conditions, digit ‘X’ was any of the first 4 numbers in the digit string, for 
example if the digit string was 4 8 2 7 9, the participant could be asked ‘what was the digit 
to the right of [4, 8, 2 or 7]?’. Once the outcome of the two wheels had been revealed, 
participants were asked to report their emotional rating; the same scale was used as in 
Experiment 1. Participants then unloaded their working memory. See Figure 2.3 for example 
of experimental procedure in partial and complete feedback with a memory load.  
                 
 Figure 2.3: Visual example of experimental procedure in chronological order. Figure 




2.5 Results and Discussion 
In Experiment 2, participants were given a WM load on each trial. They were 
required to maintain this load while they observed the outcome(s) of their choice and while 
they made their emotion rating. First I checked whether participants were able to maintain 
the WM load in the two conditions, and whether the two conditions differed in effort for 
the participants. Overall accuracy was very high in both conditions, a paired t-test revealed 
that participants were marginally less accurate in the high load condition (M = .92, SD = .07) 
compared to the low load condition (M = .95, SD = .05) WM load; t(19)= -2.05, p = .055. 
Differences in participants’ response times when unloading their WM between the WM 
conditions revealed that high WM load prompted significantly slower responses (M = 1.85, 
SD = .31) compared to low WM load (M = 1.1, SD = .24); t(19)= 10.87, p<0.001. These 
findings suggest that the high WM load condition was indeed more effortful than the low 
WM load condition.  
Figure 2.4 shows the mean emotion rating following the presentation of the 
outcome of the trial for each combination of WM load, obtained outcome, unobtained 
outcome and feedback type. In order to examine the effect of WM load on CMEs, a four-
way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with factors WM load (low load and high 
load); obtained outcome (-50 and 50); unobtained outcome (-200 and 200) and feedback 
type (partial and complete).  
There were three significant main effects. There was a main effect of the obtained 
outcome, F(1,19) = 95.64, p < 0.001, partial 𝜂2 = 0.36. Participants were happier after 
winning 50 points (M = 10.96, SD = 13.63) than after losing 50 points (M = -4.76, SD = 16.54). 
There was a main effect of the unobtained outcome, F(1,19) = 54.82, p < 0.001, partial 𝜂2 = 
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0.51. Participants reported that they were happier after the unobtained outcome was worse 
than their own outcome (M = 13.67, SD = 12.69) than after the unobtained outcome was 
better than their own outcome (M = -7.47, SD = 14.05). Finally, there was a main effect of 
feedback type, F(1,19) = 4.54, p = 0.046, partial 𝜂2 = 0.008. Participants reported that they 
were happier after partial trials (M = 4.05, SD = 15.65) than after complete trials (M = 2.15, 






Figure 2.4:  Mean emotion rating for each combination of obtained and unobtained 
outcomes with complete and partial feedback in the two WM load conditions. The 
slopes of the lines represent the effect of the obtained outcomes, and the 
differences between the red and blue lines represent the effect of the unobtained 




These main effects were qualified by two two-way interactions and one three-way 
interaction. There was a feedback type x unobtained outcome interaction, F(1,19) = 9.12, p 
= 0.007, partial 𝜂2 = 0.029. Emotional responses to unobtained outcomes differed in 
complete trials, t(19) = 6.58, p < .001, d = 1.47, and partial trials, t(19) = 7.72, p < .001, d = 
1.73. Across feedback conditions, participants were affected when the outcome was 
positive, t(19) = 3.55, p = .008, d = 0.79, but not when they were negative, t(19) = 0.60, p > 
.999, d = 0.13.  
An obtained outcome x unobtained outcome interaction, F(1,19) = 10.79, p = 0.004, 
partial 𝜂2 = 0.016 again indicated that participants were affected by the unobtained 
outcome after obtaining negative outcomes t(19) = 7.37, p < .001, d = 1.65, and after 
obtaining positive outcomes, t(19) = 7.15, p < .001, d = 1.60. Participants were affected by 
the obtained outcome when the unobtained outcome was positive, t(19) = 10.78,  p < 
.001, d = 2.41, and negative t(19) = 7.05, p < .001, d = 1.58.  
There was also a significant obtained outcome x unobtained outcome x WM load 
interaction, F(1,19) = 4.39, p = 0.049, partial 𝜂2 = 0.004. To examine this three-way 
interaction, the data were split by WM load condition, and the interaction between the 
obtained and unobtained outcome was examined for each WM condition. For the low WM 
load condition, there was no interaction between the obtained outcome and the 
unobtained outcome, Bonferroni adjusted p = .38. In contrast, for the high WM load 
condition, there was a significant interaction between the obtained and unobtained 
outcomes, Bonferroni adjusted p = .002. This finding suggests that cognitive load interferes 
with the emotion regulation processes that follow the onset of CMEs rather than the 
experience of the emotions themselves as the amplification effect was still present after the 
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cognitive load was applied. This fits well with the findings of Goldinger, et al. (2003), who 
showed that participants with lower cognitive capacity were less able to suppress 
counterfactual thoughts when making judicial decisions. 
2.6 General Discussion 
We investigated whether the process of experiencing regret is effortful or effortless 
(perhaps slow or fast). I used a well-established test of regret in which participants made a 
choice between two risky options and rated their emotion based on the outcome and the 
unobtained outcome. In Experiment 1, I manipulated the amount of time that participants 
were exposed to the outcome of the two wheels. The length of time that participants 
viewed the outcome of the chosen and unchosen wheel did not affect their emotional 
rating. I then developed a second experiment where WM load was manipulated; the WM 
load that was given to participants on each trial was either high or low. Results indicated 
that the WM load did not affect participants’ ability to process regret. This suggests that 
regret is produced and reported effortlessly. In other words encoding and integration 
happen rapidly in the context of DM. The finding that these processes do not require a 
significant cognitive effort in relation to DM differs from discourse research (Ferguson & 
Cane, 2015).  
We used methods adapted from the theory of mind (ToM) literature that have 
argued for the existence of two systems for ToM. The present findings suggest that CMEs 
rely on fast processing akin to system 1. ToM is closely related to CFT and therefore CMEs, 
previous research has investigated this link (see Riggs et al., 1998). Qureshi, Apperly and 
Samson (2010) used a dual-task paradigm to incorporate a Level-1 visual perspective task 
and a secondary task which isolated executive functioning. On each trial the participants 
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were instructed to either take their own perspective or that of an avatar which appeared on 
the screen facing one of two ways. Simultaneously an auditory executive task was used (a 
WM load similar to the digit string used in the current experiment). The secondary executive 
task did not affect participant’s accuracy when assessing the avatar’s perspective; however 
the task did interfere with participants’ judging of perspective (self or other). This result 
points towards two different levels in which we solve ToM tasks. Firstly, a fast system that 
identifies perspective-taking and secondly a slow cognitively demanding system that is used 
during more complex thinking about mental states (typically tested in ToM studies). The 
authors suggest that infants’ success in some indirect measure of ToM and perspective 
taking tasks is due to the utilisation of the first system (Apperly & Butterfill 2009). The 
findings from the current experiment lends support to Kahneman (2013) first fast system. 
Our conclusion that CMEs are produced effortlessly supports Goldinger et al.’s 
(2003) standpoint that counterfactual thoughts are created automatically. In both Goldinger 
et al. and the current investigation, WM was manipulated during a DM process; in order to 
create a cognitive load. Interestingly, Goldinger et al. concluded that the process of ignoring 
the counterfactual emotion is effortful, but their production is automatic. Thus, their finding 
that counterfactual thoughts were automatically produced during the encoding stage of 
judgments is in line with the finding that regret is processed effortlessly.  
As previously described, Giorgetta et al. (2013) claim that neural signals are 
differentiated as quickly as 200-300ms when an individual observes loss outcomes in partial 
and full feedback trials. The results from this investigation build upon Giorgetta et al.’s 
finding that the processing of an outcome happens extremely quickly, as I suggest that the 
inference that leads to the emotion also happens effortlessly. 
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However, this claim is out of line with the developmental story, which suggests that 
experiencing CMEs is cognitively demanding. O’Connor et al. (2012) demonstrated that 
children do not successfully acquire the ability to repot regret until the age of 6. 
Additionally, Rafetseder, Schwitalla and Perner (2013) suggest that this development does 
not occur until as late as 13 years. Rafetseder and colleagues conclude that children who fail 
in their tasks lack an understanding of actions and events that causally underpin 
counterfactual assumptions.  One might assume that late developing processes are 
challenging and cognitively complex. Furthermore, there is evidence that the development 
of the ability to experience regret is related to executive processes, specifically attentional 
flexibility (Burns, Riggs, & Beck, 2012). This also suggested that regret may require cognitive 
control. 
Perhaps a longer-term developmental story is needed here. It could be the case that 
reporting regret is hard for children but effortless for adults. Burns, Riggs and Beck (2012) 
showed that that attentional flexibility predicted the experience of CMEs in 5- to 7-year-
olds, the age at which children first experience these emotions (pace Rafetseder & Perner). 
It is possible that, with experience, individuals no longer rely on executive skills to process 
CMEs: the experience of regret becomes effortless. This explanation would account for the 
developmental and adult evidence by suggesting that for children, who are acquiring the 
ability, processing regret is effortful, but it is not for adults.  
Overall, I aimed to investigate if the process of experiencing regret is effortful or 
automatic; it was established that the length of time that participants viewed the outcome 
of the chosen and unchosen wheel did not affect their emotional rating. Due to this finding, 
a second experiment was devised to which we found that WM load did not affect 
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participants’ ability to process regret. Therefore these results suggest that emotion is 
produced and reported effortlessly. This finding builds on Goldinger et al.’s work that 
counterfactual thoughts are not only automatically produced during the encoding stage, but 








3.1 Overview of Project Methodology 
I created a test battery to establish if a group of stroke patients’ performance on 
counterfactual tasks, some which included a regret component, differed from that of a 
group of age matched controls. The test battery was comprised of four experiments: 
‘Counterfactual Conditional Questions’ (Chapter 7), ‘Simple Regret’ (Chapter 6a), ‘Regret 
and ACS’ (Chapter 6b) and Agency1. Patients were tested individually either across two 45 
minute sessions or in a single one and half hour session. When two sessions were needed, 
they were completed a maximum of four weeks apart.  Control participants were tested in a 
single one hour session which included a break after 30 minutes.  
Participants completed the test battery in the following order during session one: 
Regret and ACS (Experimental Trial Part 1), Counterfactual Conditional Questions, Regret 
and ACS (Experimental Trial Part 2). During session two the experiments were completed in 
the following order: Agency, Regret and ACS (Baseline Trial Part 1), Simple Regret, Regret 
and ACS (Baseline Trial Part 2). 
A second test battery comprised two experiments: ‘The RGT’ (Chapter 4) and ‘Risk 
Taking’ (Chapter 5). For both patients and controls, two separate 45 minute sessions were 
utilised to complete the second test battery. The two studies were completed no more than 
6 weeks apart. It is important to note that the tests are presented not in the order that they 
were conducted, but in the order that made most logical sense for the thesis. 
Ethical approval for experiments conducted with patients, controls and 
undergraduate students was granted by the University of Birmingham, UK, STEM Ethical 
Review Committee. 
                                                     
1




A total of 17 patients (7 female) aged between 31 and 84 (M = 64.9 years) and 17 
controls (12 female) aged between 28 and 74 (M = 59 years) completed all tests in the first 
test battery. There was no significant difference between the ages of patients and controls; 
t(32)=.21, p = .22.Table 3.0 and 3.1 provide information on demographic information.   
8 patients participated in the second test battery (see top 8 patients listed in table 
3.0). These 8 patients were chosen due to a combination of availability and their responses 
in the first test battery, effort was made to retain the patients whose responses in the first 
battery differed from that of controls, although this was not possible in all cases. 15 patients 
were recruited via the Oxford Cognitive Neuropsychology Centre and 2 patients were 
recruited via the University of Birmingham.  
8 controls participated in experiment examining the use of the RGT (Chapter 4) (see 
top 8 patients listed in table 3.1). There was no significant difference between the ages of 
the patients and controls who participated in Chapter 4; t(14)= -1.41, p = .181. 15 controls 
participated in the experiment examining risk taking (Chapter 5). There was no significant 
difference between the ages of the patients and controls who participated in Chapter 5; 
t(21)= .55, p = .134. 
Throughout my thesis I have opted for the strategy of reporting and discussing only 
the patients who show a pattern of results different to controls. I have chosen to do this as 
one aim of this project is to widen the search for brain areas that support CFT, CMEs and 
DM, thus I am interested in patients who demonstrate different decisional and emotional 
responses to controls and discussing how their brain damage may have contribute to task 
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performance. I have chosen to do this as I did not want to lose differences in patient 
behaviour by grouping them for analysis. I had no justification for grouping patients as I did 
not have a hypothesis regarding how regional damage would affect counterfactual ability, 
additionally through analysing individual patients against a control mean I am able to make 
advanced claims about the specific neurology that supports each task for individual patients. 
I am also able to determine if each patient’s cognitive profile affects their performance. A 
control mean is used to ensure the most accurate behavioural profile of an unimpaired 
individual is used as a bench mark for comparison. The neuropsychological screening of 
patients is discussed later in this chapter and throughout the thesis. I will, in the general 
discussion chapter, compare task performance across all experiments both for individual 




Patient demographic information   
Patient Gender Age at Stroke  Age at Testing Handedness 
PW F 77 79 R 
DJR M 78 80 R 
JB M 66 68 R 
GM F 67 69 R 
JH M 53 55 R 
SAR F 71 74 R 
MP M 66 82 R 
PF F 65 81 R 
TJ M 66 67 R 
PS F 81 83 R 
NB M 53 55 R 
LB F 44 47 R 
RR M 31 34 R 
MG F 69 71 R 
EL M 62 64 R 
MB M 71 72 R 





Control demographic information  
 
Control Gender Age at Testing Handedness 
AP M 72 R 
ME F 74 R 
LS F 62 R 
RD M 61 R 
AD F 60 R 
CP F 59 R 
LAT F 29 R 
BS M 63 R 
LT F 52 R 
AB F 65 R 
CM F 65 R 
MW F 66 R 
SW M 68 R 
EP F 28 R 
TH M 60 R 
JB F 62 R 





3.1.2 Neuropsychological screening of Patients 
The cognitive profile of each patient was derived 6 months post-stroke using the 
Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCoS; Humphreys, Bickerton, Samson, & Riddoch, 2012), an 
extensive cognitive screen designed to detect cognitive impairments in different domains, 
including memory, language, attention and executive functioning, praxis and number 
processing. Within the BCoS there are 22 tests which comprise 32 sub-measures. Individual 
patients’ test scores are compared to age-group specific (50-64 years, 65-74 years or 75+ 
years) cut offs for each test. Each cut off corresponds to the 5th percentile which was 
established from 100 controls stratified following the 2001 U.K population census Age X Sex 
X Education Level distribution (Bickerton et al., 2015). 
The BCoS was designed for high inclusion rates, maximizing the number of stroke 
patients that could be tested. The individual tests were created to minimize the co-
occurrence of language or spatial attention deficits, which have been shown to affect results 
through a co-varying impact on performance which is evident in tests using forced-choice 
tests and vertical layouts with patients who suffer from aphasia and neglect (Chen et al,. 
2016). 
Through using BCoS it is possible to establish what, if any, cognitive domains each 
individual patient has difficulty with. Thus, it is possible to establish if a patient’s results in 
an experiment are due to their cognitive impairment (such as WM) or as a result of their 
brain damage directly. Each patient’s BCoS graphic report is presented with their lesion in 




3.1.3 Lesion Analysis2 
For 13 Oxford based patients Magnetic Resonance Images (MRI) were collected 
using a 3 Tesla TIM Trio scanner at the Oxford Centre for Clinical Magnetic Resonance 
Research. As in Finsterwalder et al. (2017) high-resolution 3D whole-brain T1-weighted 
scans were acquired using magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo sequence (MPRAGE) 
(repetition time 3000 ms, echo time 4.7 ms, flip angle 8 degrees, 1 mm isotropic resolution). 
Additionally, fluid rapid attenuated inversion recovery (FLAIR) scans were also acquired 
(repetition time = 5000 ms, echo time = 397, in-plane resolution 1 mm, slice thickness 1.5 
mm).  
For 2 Birmingham based patients, as in Ultz, Humphreys and Chechlacz (2012), 
anatomical MRIs were created using a 3-T Philips Achieva MRI scanner with an eight-
channel phased array SENSE head coil at the University of Birmingham’s Imaging Centre. T1-
weighted sequence (echo time/repetition time = 3.8/8.4 ms, voxel size 1 × 1 × 1 mm3) were 
used.  
Scan sessions, for 9 patients, were acquired during the chronic stage (> 6 month 
post-stroke). The remaining scan sessions, for 4 patients, were acquired during the acute 
stage (< 6 month post-stroke). For 3 patients (SAR, LB and RP) acute (<1 week post-stroke) 
clinical Computed Tomography (CT) scans, and for 1 patient (MG) clinical MR, were utilized 
in the lesion delineation procedures.  
Using MRIcroN software (www.mricro.com/mricron), all lesions were manually 
delineated, smoothing in the z-direction (5mm full width at half maximum) and binarizing 
                                                     
2 Lesion borders were manually delineated by Jacob Levenstein of The University of Oxford’s 
Physiological Neuroimaging Group. 
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with a threshold of .5. Patients’ anatomical images and lesion masks were then registered to 
2x2x2mm stereotaxic space using normalization scripts available within ‘Clinical Toolbox’ 
(Rorden et al., 2012; http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/CRNL/clinical-toolbox) and 
implemented using SPM8 software (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, 





PW suffered a subacute stroke in 2013 resulting in a left sided cerebella lesion. PW had a 














DJR suffered a left sided partial anterior circulation stroke in 2013 which resulted in a right 







JB had a frontal lobe stroke in 2013. JB’s lesion spans the right insula, frontal inferior 
operculum, heschl gyrus, pallidum, putamen and rolondic operculum. Examination of 
fraction and extension data demonstrates that JB has damage to the OFC. Although this 
damage is hard to see on the below scan, it is likely that the lesion extends to caudal end of 









PS suffered a left middle cerebral artery and a posterior cerebral artery embolic stroke in 
2012. A bilateral lesion in the amygdala was the result. On inspection of the CT scan, 
damage to white matter located in the frontal lobe is identifiable.  This damage maps onto 











NB suffered a left sided posterior circulation infarct in 2013 resulting in lesions covering the 
right middle temporal gyrus, right angular gyrus, bilateral cerebellum, right cuneus, right 








LB suffered a left middle cerebral artery clot in 2012 resulting in lesions in the left insular, 










RR suffered a left middle cerebral artery ischemic stroke at the age of 31 resulting in a large 
lesion to the left temporal lobe, including the inferior, middle and superior temporal gyrus, 
angular gyrus, temporal pole, and extending into insular cortex, supramarginal gyrus, frontal 
and central operculum cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, as well as parietal operculum. The 








MG had a stroke in 2013 which resulted in a primarily right sided cerebellar lesion with a 









EL suffered a right sided lacunar infract in 2013 resulting a putamen lesion. This damage 









GM suffered a stroke in 2013 resulting in left hemisphere damage in the occipital lobe which 
extends to the temporal lobe. The majority of GM’s damage is in the lingual gyrus and 
























SAR suffered a stroke in 2012 causing bilateral cerebella damage as well as occipital lobe and frontal lobe damage. There is also a small amount 






















RP suffered a stroke in 2014 causing damage to the right insular as well as frontal and parietal regions. There is an additional lesion in the left 









MP suffered a right sided aneurysm in 1998. MP’s damage is extensive and affects multiple temporal, frontal and parietal regions. The 
following key brain areas, for CFT and regret, are impaired: right insular, middle temporal gyrus (anterior and posterior divisions) as well as the 
temporo-occipital region and the OFC. Additionally, the damage maps onto the frontal radiation associated with the corpus callosum and 








PF suffered a bilateral stroke in 1999 which resulted in bilateral lesions in the superior parietal gyri. The left sided lesion extends into the left 
angular gyrus and the right sided lesion extends slightly into the right caudate. There is possibly a small lesion in the left thalamus. PF’s stroke 
resulted in extensive white matter damage which may have affected fibres systems associated with the frontal and parietal cortices.  The 


















After the completion of Chapter 2, I decided to use this measure with patients. The 
first aim of the experiment was to compare results from the RGT from a sub-set of patients 
who participated throughout the research reported in this thesis, with reported patients in 
the existing literature. This will allow me to assess if there is any relationship between the 
results from the RGT and the other experiments used throughout my research. The second 
aim was to use the RGT to widen the search for areas of brain damage that result in patients 
reporting emotional responses different to controls. The RGT has been widely used by 
multiple researchers to assess individual’s experiences of regret, quickly becoming the gold 
standard for analysing CMEs. Thus, I will now review the key literature that has used this 
task.  
One such study that has aided our understanding of the role of the OFC was 
conducted by Camille et al. (2004), who developed the RGT. Partial (eliciting 
disappointment) and full (eliciting regret) feedback conditions were created to establish if 
OFC patients’ emotional responses to winning and losing were different from healthy 
controls. It was established that OFC patients, unlike controls, did not report regret over 
disappointment. It is important to note that OFC patients were not emotionally flat. Patients 
did report feeling disappointed when losing and feeling happy after winning. For a full 
description of Camille et al.’s (2004) methodology refer back to Chapter 1 ‘Counterfactually 
mediated emotions’. This task was adapted for the presented study. 
Chua et al. (2009) used the RGT with healthy participants to investigate the neural 
substrates of regret and disappointment. Behavioural analysis showed that during regret 




reported in comparison to disappointment conditions (partial feedback). This resulted in a 
stronger preference for choice switching after experiencing regret. Analysis of fMRI data 
showed that during both regret and disappointment trials the anterior insula and 
dorsomedial PFC was active. However, the activation was observed to be stronger for the 
experience of regret. In addition, enhanced activation in the lateral OFC was recorded for 
regret. These findings demonstrate that both regret and disappointment share a neural 
pathway, although the level of activation is altered in accordance with the magnitude of the 
emotion experienced by the participant.  
Further evidence of shared neural pathways for CMEs has been contributed by 
Canessa et al. (2009). The RGT was utilised to show that in healthy participants the same 
neural network is activated when individuals experience regret and when they observe 
another individual experiencing regret also. The task was manipulated slightly so that 
participants not only chose the wheel they wanted to gamble on (own condition), but the 
participants also observed a third party selecting the gamble wheel and evaluating the 
outcome for 50% of the trials (other condition). The VMPFC, ACC and hippocampus were all 
active during own and other conditions. Canessa et al.’s (2009) research suggests possible 
‘mirror-like’ neural networks that underpin CMEs. 
The RGT has been used, in an Magnetoencephalography (MEG) experiment 
conducted by Giorgetta et al. (2013), to demonstrate that events that typically lead to 
regret and disappointment are differentiated extremely fast at the neural level (between 
190 and 305ms). Similarly to previous research, feedback on gambling trials was 
manipulated; full and partial feedback. In addition to this agency was also manipulated; 




was shown that feedback and agency conditions affected the normal neural responses 
associated with regret and disappointment. Increased brain activation in the anterior and 
posterior regions was observed during feedback regret trials, whereas, increased activity in 
the left anterior region was demonstrated in agency regret trials. Giorgetta et al.’s research 
has highlighted the speed at which neural processing of regret and disappointment occurs.   
Damage to the cerebellar has been shown to inhibit patients’ ability to report 
experiencing CMEs. Clausi et al. (2015) used the RGT to show that cerebellar patients were 
impaired, in comparison to healthy controls, in reporting regret.  However, the experience 
of relief, disappointment, and joy did not differ between the two groups. Skin conductance 
responses (SCR) showed that, despite not reporting regret, patients still had a physiological 
response to this condition. Interestingly, despite cerebellar patients’ inability to report 
regret, both cerebellar patients and controls demonstrated an ability to anticipate regret 
and maximized expected values. Unlike OFC patients, cerebellar patients are able to 
anticipate the most likely outcome of a choice and learn from previous experiences (Camille 
et al., 2004). These results suggest that the cerebellum is required for conscious self-rating 
and recognition of adverse emotions. 
Research comparing the experience of regret and relief, and how this effects future 
decisions, in children and adults has also used the RGT. Habib et al. (2012) analysed 
children’s, adults’ and adolescents’ emotional ratings in regret and relief conditions, finding 
that both the experience of regret and relief are stronger in adults. Additionally, after the 
experience of regret adults were more likely to modify their choices (gradually becoming 
regret averse). However, this was not the case for children, suggesting that the experience 




the difference in emotional capacity and willingness to reconsider decisions is related to the 
late maturation of the OFC. The RGT has also been used to investigate how CMEs affect DM 
in adolescent males. Burnett, Bault, Coricelli, and Blakemore (2010) found that the 
capability to maximise expected outcomes was correlated with age. Interestingly, there was 
no difference in emotional ratings across age groups although young adolescents showed a 
greater difference between complete and partial feedback trials than children.  
 Overall, it is clear that the RGT has produced many interesting findings with various 
participant groups. Camille et al. (2004) demonstrated that damage to the OFC affects the 
experience of regret, Habib et al. (2012) also point to the OFC as important for the 
experience of regret. Chua et al. (2009) showed that regret and disappointment elicit 
activation in the anterior insula and dorsomedial PFC as well as the in the lateral OFC for 
regret only. Canessa et al. (2009) highlighted activation in the VMPFC, ACC and 
hippocampus when individuals experience regret and when they observe another individual 
experiencing regret also. Clausi et al. (2015) shed light on cerebellum activity during regret. 
Overall, there appears to be a network of areas that contribute to performance on the RGT. 
As an exploratory hypothesis I predict that damage to any of these areas will result in the 
patient having difficulty performing some, but possibly not all, counterfactual processes. 
Damage to other brain regions that are connected to those listed may also result in affected 
counterfactual processing through affecting the counterfactual network indirectly.   
It is prudent that this task is used when assessing the group of patients’ ability to 
experience CMEs that are tested throughout my PhD. The patients who took part in this 
experiment were chosen on the basis of their performance on battery 1 (see Chapter 3) and 




findings from other experiments examining CFT and CMEs used in my research. Additionally, 
through using an already established experiment, we can widen the search for brain regions 
that affect reported emotions and thus add to the knowledge about the relationship 
between neural regions and the RGT.  
4.2 Method 
The design of the experiment was closely based upon Camille et al.’s (2004) RGT. In 
the current experiment, a memory check was incorporated on 20% of trials. Participants’ 
memory for the outcome of the chosen wheel or the unchosen wheel was tested by a 
forced answer question which had two numerical responses. Unlike the experiment in 
Chapter 2, the length of time that participants were able to view the outcome of the two 
wheels was not manipulated and a WM load was not incorporated. These manipulations 
were not included because the current experiment was conducted to investigate if any 
patients did not experience regret (as in Camille et al.’s, 2004) or relief, and not to establish 
if how CMEs are processed. 
Participants 
A total of 8 patients (5 female) aged between 56 and 81 (M = 71 years) and 8 
controls (5 female) aged between 28 and 71 (M = 58.1 years) completed this experiment. 6 
patients were recruited via the Oxford Cognitive Neuropsychology Centre and 2 patients 
were recruited via the University of Birmingham. See Table 4.0 for information on the 









Description of the patients who are discussed in this chapter  
Patient DOB Hemisphere Year of 
Damage 
Description of Lesion 
JB  L 2012 Frontal inferior operculum, 
heschl gyrus, insula, pallidum, 
putamen, rolondic operculum 
and OFC 
GM  L 2013 Left sided lingual gyrus  and 
nearby occipital structures 
including the left intracalcarine 
cortex and occipital fusiform 
gyrus 
MP  R 1998 Extensive temporal, frontal and 
parietal damage. Damage 
extends to the right insular, 
middle temporal gyrus (anterior 
and posterior divisions) as well as 
the temporo-occipital region and 
the OFC.  Possible damage to the 





Note: L stands for left, R stands for right and BILAT stands for bilateral  
corpus callosum and anterior 
limb of the internal capsule 
JH   L 2013 Primary lesion in left insular and 
frontal cortex, secondary lesion 
in parietal cortex 
PW  L 2013 Cerebellar 
PF  BILAT 1999 Bilateral superior and inferior 
parietal gyri lesion, left sided 
lesion extends into the left 
angular gyrus and the right sided 
lesion extends slightly into the 
right caudate. Small left thalamus 
lesion. Extensive white matter 
damage to the frontal and 
parietal cortices 
SAR  BILAT  2012 Cerebellar,  occipital lobe, frontal 
lobe,  right insula cortex and 
possible damage to the frontal 
radiation associated with corpus 
callosum and anterior limb of the 
internal capsule 





The design of the experiment was identical to that used in Chapter 2.   
Materials  
Participants rated their emotions using the same scale used in in Chapter 2, however 
the response scale was flipped vertically. As in Chapter 2, the marker started in the centre of 
the response line and could be moved upwards towards the “Extremely happy” anchor, or 
downwards towards the “Extremely sad” anchor. There were 50 interval points on each side 
of the central starting point.  
Procedure  
 Training: Participants were given 4 practice trials before the start of the experiment. 
See Table 4.1 for combinations of available points in full and partial feedback conditions. 
Each participant received the same practice trials in the order shown in Table 4.1.   After 
each trial was completed participants were asked to rate their emotional response to the 
outcome. During the training phase participants were asked a memory question after each 
trial. The memory check asked participants either ‘What was the outcome on your wheel’ or 
‘what was the outcome on the other wheel’. Participants were then given a choice between 
two numbers, one of which was the correct answer to the question, for example ‘-50 or -
200’; the choices were always the values associated with the two portions of the wheel in 




 Table 4.1  
Combination of points available on left and right wheels, including feedback condition, 
during training trials. 
      
Left Wheel Right Wheel Feedback  
-200 / -50 -50 / 50 Partial  
-50 / 200 -200 / 200 Complete 
-50 / -200 -50 / 50 Partial  
-50 / 200 -200 / 200 Complete 
 
Experimental procedure: The experimental procedure was identical to that used in Chapter 
2. Thus there were 60 trials.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 The Effect of Feedback 
Analysis has been conducted for two purposes. Firstly, to establish if participants and 
patients experience a different emotional response to regret and disappointment 
conditions. Evidence for regret is seen when there is a significant interaction between 
unobtained outcome and feedback condition. Secondly, analysis was conducted to 
investigate if the patients who took part in this experiment reported different emotional 






To examine the effect of feedback (complete and partial) on CMEs, a three-way 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with factors: feedback type (partial and 
complete); obtained outcome (-50 and 50), and unobtained outcome (-200 and 200). Figure 
4.0 shows the mean emotion rating following the presentation of the outcome of the trial 
for each combination of trial type, obtained outcome, and unobtained outcome. 
There were two significant main effects and one significant interaction. There was a 
main effect of obtained outcome F(1,7) = 13.87, p = .007, partial 𝜂2 = 0.67. Participants 
reported that they were happier after winning 50 (M = 1.28, SE = .26) points than after 
losing 50 points (M = -.72, SE = .32). There was also a main effect of the unobtained 
outcome, F(1,7) = 16.19, p = .005, partial 𝜂2 = 0.70. Participants reported that they were 
happier after the unobtained outcome was -200 (i.e. worse than their own outcome) (M = 
1.08, SE = .18) than after the unobtained outcome was 200 (i.e. better than their own 
outcome) (M = -.53, SE = .27).  
Separate univariate ANOVAs with 3 factors (trial type, points won and unobtained 
outcome) were run for each of the controls. Due to the small number of trials (1) that LS 
encountered in the ‘partial feedback, -50 obtained and -200 unobtained’ condition, an 
ANOVA could not be used. After LS was removed, 5 out of 7 controls showed the pattern of 
two main effects and one interaction, as demonstrated in the group analysis. However, for 







Figure 4.0: Controls’ mean emotion rating for each combination of obtained and unobtained 
outcomes with complete (top) and partial (bottom) feedback. The slopes of the lines 
represent the effect of the obtained outcomes, and the differences between the red and 
blue lines represent the effect of the unobtained outcomes.  
While there was not a significant effect of feedback (p = .248) there was a significant 
interaction between feedback and unobtained outcome F(1,7) = 12.07, p = .01, partial 𝜂2 = 
0.63. The interaction indicated that control participants were more affected by the 
unobtained outcome when they received complete feedback than when they received 








emotions related to unobtained outcomes are felt more intensely when they were missed 
by choice (regret and relief) than by chance (disappointment and elation). 
In order to unpack the interaction between feedback and unobtained outcome I ran 
four t tests (making a Bonferroni correction for 4 tests, α = .0125) to examine the effect of 
the unobtained outcome. On complete trials participants differentiated between the 
unobtained outcome of -200 (M = 2.33, SD = .60) and 200 (M = -.10, SD = 1.15); t(7) = 4.35, p 
= .003, d = 2.78. On partial trials participants also differentiated between -200 (M = 2.04, SD 
= .629) trials and 200 trials (M = -.49, SD = .52); t(7) = 5.65, p = .001, d = 2.78. Participants 
did not differentiate between complete and partials trials when the unobtained outcome 
was -200; t(7) = -.90, p = .40, d = .47, or when the unobtained outcome was 200; t(7) = -1.38, 
p = .211, d = 0.46. Given the interaction we can infer that the magnitude of the mean 
difference between 200 and -200 trials is greater in the complete condition compared to the 
partial condition. This difference explains the ANOVA interaction and further supports the 
presence of the amplification effect.  
4.3.1.2 Patients  
Establishing which patients’ emotional ratings are different from controls is 
important when attempting to investigate a relationship between lesion site and 
behavioural profile. Moreover, it is important to understand if patients have an isolated 
problem with reporting emotional experiences in certain conditions (complete/partial or 
regret/relief). For each patient I conducted a univariate ANOVA with 3 factors (trial type, 
points won and unobtained outcome) and separate ANOVAs for complete and partial trials 
to establish if the pattern of patients’ emotion responses were different from controls in 




the small number of trials (1) that MP encountered in the ‘partial feedback, -50 obtained 
and -200 unobtained’ condition, an ANOVA could not be used, therefore no data for MP is 
shown in Table 4.2 However, MP’s graph does not imply that there are any obvious patterns 
to his emotional ratings. Each patients’ individual mean emotion rating for each 
combination of obtained and unobtained outcomes with complete (left) and partial (right) 






Results from each patient’s univariate ANOVA 
    Main Effects       Two way Interactions    
Patient Obtained Unobtained Feedback   Feedback*Obtained Feedback*Unobtained Obtained*Unobtained 
DJR .000, 49.21, .61 .000,27.08, .47 
    
.045, 4.38, .12 
PW .000, 16.96, .35 .001, 13.14, .3 
    
.019, 6.15, .17 
GM .001, 14.11, .3 .000, 17.01, .3 
     PF .000, 25.70, .46 .000, 16.77, .66 
     SAR .001, 13.98, .42 .006, 9.69, .34 
   
.037, 5.01, .21 
 JB .000, 142.58, .81 
 
.044, 4.40, .11 
 
.037, 4.72, .12 
  JH .001, 14.29, .36 .000, 18.66, .42           
 












Figure 4.1: Mean emotion rating for each combination of obtained and unobtained 
outcomes with complete (left) and partial (right) feedback for each patient. The slopes 
of the lines represent the effect of the obtained outcomes, and the differences between 








4.3.2 Investigation into the effect of the unobtained outcome  
Establishing how patients are affected by the unobtained outcome is important as it 
sheds light on their experience of regret and disappointment. The amplification effect is 
present when individuals are more affected by the unobtained outcome during complete 
(regret) trials, and can be seen in the results of controls in this experiment and also in 
Chapter 2, compared to partial trials (disappointment). This pattern of responding was 
reversed with OFC patients in Camille et al.’s (2004) investigation; patients were not 
affected by the unobtained outcome in the complete feedback condition.  I investigated the 
effects of the unobtained outcome by taking the average rating for trials where -200 was 
unobtained and subtracting this from the average rating for trials where 200 was 
unobtained.  This calculation was conducted for both partial and complete trials. The 
difference between the average for partial and complete trials produces a figure that is 
either positive or negative. Positive figures represent the amplification effect whereas 
negative figures represent a reversal of this (as reported by Camille et al. 2004 in OFC 
patients). The average unobtained ratings for controls (transformed scores) was calculated 
per participant (see Table 4.3). The standard deviation for these averages was created in 
order to establish which patients’ responses were different from the control population. The 
effects for patients are shown in Table 4.4; patients’ whose responses were 1.5 standard 







 Investigation into the effect of the unobtained outcome in control participants  
 
    Trial Type   
Control Age Complete Partial Difference  
AP 72 2.11 1.39 0.71 
ME 74 1.58 1.77 -0.19 
LS 62 1.36 0.82 0.54 
RD 61 -0.07 0.03 -0.1 
AD 60 0.67 0.52 0.15 
CP 59 2.77 2.59 0.18 
LAT 29 2.89 1.59 1.29 






 Investigation into the effect of the unobtained outcome in patients  
 
          
  
Trial Type 
 Patient Age Complete Partial Difference 
DJR 78 1.15 0.91 0.23 
PW 77 0.46 0.99 -0.52 
GM 67 0.65 1.39 -0.74 
PF 65 0.72 1.32 -0.6 
SAR 71 1.59 0.72 0.87 
JB 66 -0.17 -0.24 0.07 
MP 66 0.6 1.04 -0.45 
JH 53 1.35 0.66 0.68 
 
NB: Coloured rows highlight patients who fall more than 1.5 SDs away from the control 
mean. Those patients who fall 1.5 SDs away from the mean are highlighted as 1.5 SDs 
represent the 95% percentile in the normal distribution curve. Thus, I can be confident that 
the highlighted patients are responding differently from the controls. This technique is used 
here and throughout the rest of my thesis.   
4.3.3 Memory for obtained and unobtained outcomes 
As in Chapter 2 participants' memory for the outcome on the chosen wheel and the 




group on memory accuracy a two-way repeated measure ANOVA was conducted. The two 
factors and their respective levels were as follows: participant group (controls and patients) 
and feedback (complete and partial). Figure 4.2 shows the mean memory accuracy by wheel 
tested and participant group.  
There were no significant effects or interactions; control participants’ and patients’ 
memory accuracy did not differ (p = .47). Feedback did not affect memory accuracy (p = .07) 
and there was no interaction between the two variables (p = .88). The lowest memory 
accuracy percentage for patients was 66% whereas control accuracy, in one instance, was 
29%.  
 
Figure 4.2:  Mean memory accuracy when tested on the outcome of the chosen and 
unchosen wheel for both patients and controls. Standard errors are represented in the 






































I investigated the how the experience of regret differs in a group of patients and a 
group of age matched controls. To do this I used a well-established measure of regret; the 
RGT. Participants made choices between two gambles and rated their emotions in two 
conditions where the feedback of the unobtained outcome is manipulated. The experiment 
was conducted in order to investigate if there is any relation between the patients who 
demonstrate a difficulty experiencing regret on the well-established RGT and the other 
experiments used throughout my research. It should be noted that efforts were made to 
test all patients who demonstrated difficulties with experiencing CMEs during battery 1. 
Through taking this approach I am also able to widen the search for brain areas that, after 
damage, influence emotional ratings on this task.  
Individual analysis showed that 5 patients did not experience sadness more 
extremely in regret conditions compared to disappointment conditions i.e. no amplification 
effect. Only 1 patient showed the same pattern of results to that of the controls (SAR). 1 
patient’s results (MP) could not be individually analysed due to the number of trials and 1 
patient (JB) appears to respond in a pattern which implies he did not understand the task at 
hand. It is important to note that both JB and MP appear to have OFC damage and thus I 
might have expected them to demonstrate the same pattern of behaviour observed in the 
Camille et al. (2004) study. However, this is something I could not investigate. Analysis of 
memory accuracy showed that this pattern of results was not due to poorer memory for 




Analysis of control data on the effect of feedback demonstrated that controls were 
happier after winning 50 points than after losing 50 points (obtained outcome) and were 
happier after the unobtained outcome was -200 than 200. Importantly, there was an 
interaction between feedback and the unobtained outcome. This is the same effect of 
feedback seen in the undergraduate students tested in Chapter 2. This interaction occurs 
because controls’ emotional ratings for the unobtained outcome are influenced by the 
feedback they received; controls are rating their emotions as sadder during complete 
feedback trials compared to partial feedback trials. Thus, the amplification effect is present; 
more extreme emotions are experienced during regret and relief trials (complete feedback) 
compared to disappointment and elation (partial feedback). This pattern of results 
replicates findings from Chua et al. (2009) where controls reported a stronger dislike for a 
loss in complete feedback trials compared to partial feedback trials. The key variable for the 
amplification effect is choice; participants experience regret and relief when their own 
choice results in a negative outcome compared to when chance causes a negative outcome 
(Mellers et al.1999; Zeelenberg et al., 1998).  
Individual univariate ANOVAs were conducted on each patient to investigate if any 
patients responded in a different way to controls. One patient, MP, did not encounter 
enough trials in the ‘partial feedback, -50 obtained and -200 unobtained’ condition for the 
ANOVA to be conducted, thus MP is excluded from further discussion. It was established 
that only one patient’s results matched that of the controls; analysis of SAR’s responses 
revealed an effect of obtained and unobtained outcome and an interaction between 




like control participants. I will now go through each patients’ analysis and explain the 
effects.  
Analysis of JB’s results showed that he was influenced by the obtained outcome but 
not the unobtained outcome. This would suggest that JB is not taking into consideration the 
alternative number of points he could have won; an indication that CFT is not taking place. 
In addition to this, JB rated his emotions as happier during complete feedback conditions 
compared to partial feedback conditions. This is the opposite effect of feedback that has 
been cited in the control literature; regret (a stronger emotion) has been elicited during 
complete feedback conditions in comparison to disappointment (a weaker emotion) during 
partial feedback conditions (Coricelli et al., 2005). The significant interaction between the 
obtained outcome and feedback reflects JB’s elevated emotional response to the obtained 
outcome in the complete feedback condition than in the partial feedback condition. It is 
unclear why JB experiences a more positive emotion after complete trials than partial trials. 
Thus, it is possible that JB did not understand this task. It is hard to relate JB’s responses to 
any literature conducted with patients or controls; it is unlikely that an individual would feel 
happier upon discovering their choice led to a loss in comparison to chance leading to a loss. 
Thus, it is possible that JB did not understand the aim of this experiment (to gain as many 
points as possible) and responded in a manner that reflects this.  
Analysis of results for patients DJR and PW indicate effects of obtained and 
unobtained outcomes. There was also an interaction between both variables. The 
interaction revealed that DJR and PW were more affected by the unobtained outcome when 
the obtained outcome was negative compared to positive. The finding that individuals’ 




outcome is negative has also been described by (Bault et al., 2015). Bault’s task was similar 
to the RGT in that feedback (complete and partial) was controlled during a gambling task 
between two lotteries. Participants’ emotional ratings and eye gaze were recorded. It was 
found that emotional ratings and eye gaze were affected, during complete feedback trials, 
by the alternative outcome of the unchosen wheel more after a loss than a win on the 
chosen wheel. This pattern of results, demonstrated by Bault et al. (2015), has only been 
observed in participants who have initially experienced a differentiation between 
regret/relief and disappointment/rejoice, thus is it surprising that DJR and PW, whose 
emotional ratings do not indicate that he experiences regret over disappointment shows 
this interesting interaction between obtained and unobtained outcomes.  
Also JH, GM and PF revealed an effect of the obtained outcome and of the 
unobtained outcome with no interactions. This suggests that none of these patients are 
experiencing regret over disappointment.  
Additionally, the investigation into the effect of the unobtained outcome 
demonstrated that GM and PF’s responses in partial and complete trials were different to 
controls; GM and PF were more than 1.5 SDs away from the control mean. The difference 
between complete and partial conditions was a negative figure, demonstrating that both 
patients were more affected by the outcome in partial trials over complete. This result is 
similar to the findings from Camille et al. (2004) where OFC patients did not report 
experiencing regret over disappointment. This pattern has also been observed in 
Schizophrenia patients (Larquet et al., 2010).  
Despite demonstrating similar behavioural responses in this experiment, GM and PF 




immediate surrounding areas, whereas PF has bilateral parietal damage which extends to 
the left angular gyrus and right caudate. Although PF’s damage is not sufficiently focused to 
make advanced claims regarding which damaged region is most likely to have caused her 
responses in this task, it is clear that PF and GM do not have overlapping damage and in 
turn the same structures cannot be causing their similar responses.  
Previous research using the RGT has implied that regional specificity is accountable 
for the differentiation between regret and disappointment. The medial OFC has been 
associated with the experience of regret (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005) whereas 
the middle temporal gyrus and dorsal brainstem have been linked with the experience 
disappointment (Coricelli et al., 2005). Although Chua et al. (2009) propose that the same 
neural network is responsible for regret and disappointment; activating the anterior insula 
and dorsomedial PFC, while the lateral OFC showed enhanced activation in regret trials 
alone.  
Through widening the search for brain regions that, after damage, appear to 
influence the ability to distinguish between regret and disappointment, this study has 
shown that several patients are not affected by the availability of counterfactual 
information regarding an alternative choice. Thus, these patients do not experience a 
heightened emotional response in full feedback conditions compared to partial feedback 
conditions. The patients who have shown this pattern of results have mostly differing lesion 
sites from each other and importantly do not have damage to the OFC (reported by Camille 
et al., 2004), the medial orbitofrontal region, the anterior cingulate cortex or the 




  It is important to note that all patients (who we can be confident understand the 
task) respond with appropriate emotional ratings to obtained and unobtained outcomes. 
The pattern of emotional responses indicates the preservation of disappointment where the 
unobtained outcome influences the value rating placed on the obtained outcome. For 
example patients, like controls, are happier upon obtaining 50 points compared to -50 and 
importantly are happier when the unobtained outcome is -200 compared to 200. Thus, no 
patients appear to be emotionally flat, leading me to believe, as demonstrated in Camille et 
al. (2004), that it is the experience of regret that is compromised. I will now discuss the 
lesion sites of the 5 patients who show differing results from controls and relate their 
damage to possible reasons behind this discrepancy.  
Analysis of JH, DJR and PW’s data suggests that none of these patients are 
experiencing regret over disappointment (no amplification effect). JH has a primary lesion in 
left insular and frontal cortex and a second lesion in the left parietal cortex. The insula has 
been cited as an important region for complex DM (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005) and has also 
been shown to have limbic connections to the OFC (Barbas, 2007; Zald & Rauch, 2006). The 
connection between the insular cortex and the OFC may be responsible for JH’s emotional 
responses. It has been demonstrated that the OFC is involved in the experience of regret 
(Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005; Coricelli et al., 2007; Levens et al., 2014; Sommer 
et al., 2009) and so it is reasonable to suggest that damage that interrupts limbic 
connections could cause problems in experiencing regret.  
It is possible that damage to the frontal cortex, even when the OFC is preserved, 
could lead to inhibited CFT. McNamara et al. (2003) investigated patients with Parkinson’s 




CFT; this was interpreted as an effect of reduced frontal lobe activation and dysfunction 
seen in Parkinson’s disease. Developmental research has also linked counterfactual ability 
and the frontal lobe. It is possible that the correlation between children passing 
counterfactual tasks and tasks of executive functioning are due to frontal lobe maturation 
(see Beck, Riggs & Burns, 2011).  
Larquet (2009) used the RGT with Schizophrenia patients and demonstrated the 
same pattern of results seen in OFC patients (Camille et al., 2004); patients in both studies 
failed to report regret over disappointment. It is possible that this phenomenon is caused by 
the frontal lobe dysfunction that is observed Schizophrenia. This suggestion supports 
findings from Hooker, Roese and Park (2000) who suggest that Schizophrenia patients’ 
impaired counterfactual production is due to frontal lobe dysfunction. Therefore, JH’s 
frontal lesion could affect his ability to think counterfactually and as a result his experience 
of regret is impaired.  
Finally, JH has a second lesion in the left parietal cortex. During Coricelli et al.’s 
(2005) investigation into brain activity in healthy adults during the RGT the parietal cortex 
was activated in several conditions. Enhanced activity in the parietal cortex was observed 
during choice selection. The inferior parietal lobe was active when individuals compared the 
outcome of the chosen wheel and the unchosen wheel and also immediately after the 
experience of regret. Whereas the superior parietal cortex is active before a choice of 
maximal expected value. Thus, damage to the parietal cortex could cause a different 
emotional profile in JH compared to that of controls due to the area’s apparent direct 




outcome in the chosen wheel and unchosen wheel (a process that is essential for the 
experience of regret).  
Both PW and DJR have cerebellar lesions. PW’s lesion is in the left cerebellum 
whereas DJR’s lesion is in the right cerebellum. Activation in the cerebellum has been shown 
during DM tasks (Rosenbloom et al., 2012). Its involvement has also been described in the 
experience of regret in autism (Zalla et al., 2014). However, Clausi et al. (2015) were the first 
to investigate the direct connection between cerebellum damage and the corresponding 
consequences for the experience of regret. The RGT was used with cerebella-damaged 
patients and healthy controls. Cerebella patients, like controls, became regret averse; 
avoiding choices where future regret was likely. However, patients were impaired in their 
self-rating of regret; there was no difference in emotional rating for regret and 
disappointment. However, patients were unimpaired in reporting relief. Emotional 
responses from PW and DJR support the findings from Clausi et al. (2015) that cerebellar 
damage inhibits patients reporting the experience of regret.  
Despite the seemingly convincing evidence that cerebella damage affects patients’ 
ability to, at the least, report regret, the only patient to have produced the same pattern of 
results as the controls during this experiment was SAR who also has cerebella damage.  
Therefore, is it unclear as to why PW and DJR are inhibited in this task and SAR is not. It is 
likely that a more fine grained understanding of the cerebellar is needed. Although at this 
point we can conclude that cerebellar damage can lead to a lack of CMEs, but does not 




Analysis of GM and PF’s data demonstrated that both patients were more affected 
by the outcome in partial trials over complete trials. This implies that both GM and PF felt 
stronger emotions during disappointment compared to regret trials.  
This indicates that the amplification effect is reversed. To my knowledge this is the 
only other study (see Camille et al., 2004) which has demonstrated this phenomenon. 
Therefore, it is interesting that neither GM nor PF have OFC damage. Instead, GM has a left 
sided lingual gyrus lesion and damage to the nearby occipital structures including the left 
intracalcarine cortex and occipital fusiform gyrus and PF has bilateral lesions spanning the 
superior and inferior parietal gyri where the left sided lesion extends into the left angular 
gyrus and the right sided lesion extends slightly into the right caudate.  
The lingual gyrus has been linked to various visual functions such as the encoding of 
complex images (Machielsen et al., 2000) and processing parts of human faces (McCarthy et 
al., 1999) as well as playing a role in word processing (Mechelli et al., 2000). However, the 
lingual gyrus, to my knowledge, has not been linked with CMEs. 
It is possible that the connection between the lingual gyrus and the amygdala is the 
reason why GM has a different emotional response compared to controls. Isenberg et al. 
(1999) showed, through using a modified Stroop task, that the both the amygdala and the 
lingual gyrus became active when participants orally rehearsed emotionally charged words. 
This pattern of activation was not seen for neutral non-emotionally charged words, 
Additionally, Kehoe et al. (2012) manipulated the emotional arousal associated with various 
images to investigate the neural correlates of emotional arousal. Stronger activation in the 
amygdala and lingual gyrus (along with other regions) was recorded when participants 




connection between then lingual gyrus and amygdala exists. If this is the case then GM may 
have affected processing of emotional outcomes which influences her emotional appraisal 
through a damaged connection with the amygdala.  
The lingual gyrus has rarely been associated with CFT and CMEs.  DeBrigard et al. 
(2015) demonstrated that the lingual gyrus, along with the VMPFC and lateral temporal 
gyrus are connected to the hippocampal seed. Although this functional coupling was 
detected while participants produced counterfactuals regarding ‘other-based’ 
counterfactuals, it is possible that the lingual gyrus plays a more influential role in 
counterfactual production, including CMEs, than the literature currently suggests.  
Support for this suggestion comes from work by Chandrasekhar et al. (2008) who 
demonstrated that a particular network of brain regions was activated during the feeling of 
relief (referred to as rejoice by the authors). This network included the right lingual gyrus. 
Although GM’s lesion is isolated to the left lingual gyrus, there is a suggestion that the area 
could be involved in the production of CMEs. Further reasons for how GM’s damage, to the 
lingual gyrus, could affect CMEs are discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8.  
PF has bilateral damage to superior and inferior parietal gyri. The left sided lesion 
extends into the left angular gyrus and the right sided lesion extends slightly into the right 
caudate. There is also a small lesion in the left thalamus. Due to PF’s left angular and 
supermarginal gyri and superior temporal gyrus damage she is classified as having damage 
to the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (Samson, et al., 2004). A review on how TPJ 
damage could affect counterfactual reasoning, and as a result affect the production of 




The left angular gyrus has been highlighted as a region of interest by Nicolle, Bach, 
Frith and Dolan (2011). The authors manipulated participants’ experience of responsibility 
over a gamble outcome. The angular gyrus, among other regions, showed increased 
activation during trials where participants lost a gamble that was chosen for them (less 
responsibility) and their own choice would have been different. Thus, the angular gyrus is 
involved in evaluating regret inducing outcomes where an external factor has caused the 
outcome. The activation in the left angular gyrus increased as a result of perceived outcome 
negativity. This was interpreted as the regions not having an association with the experience 
of self-blame. The experience of regret over disappointment is underpinned by the 
individual’s perception of control; regret is felt when there is a choice element and 
specifically where a violation of expectation has occurred (Girotto, Legrenzi, & Rizz, 1991). 
Thus, it is unlikely, after considering findings from Nicolle, Bach, Frith and Dolan (2011), that 
the damage to the left angular gyrus that PF has incurred is responsible for her similar 
emotional responses in regret and disappointment conditions.  
PF’s lesion also extends to the thalamus. Rosenbloom and Schmahman (2012) 
suggest that the thalamus is connected to the PFC and as a result is possibly directly linked 
to successful DM. The PFC is comprised of three regions: the OFC, ACC, and dorsolateral PFC 
(DLPFC) (Crews & Boettiger, 2009). The OFC has been linked with emotionally charged DM. 
However, due to cortico–cortical connections between the DLPFC and the ACC, these 
regions also support DM (Barbas, 2000). Therefore, the connection between the thalamus 
and the PFC could be the cause of PF not experiencing the same CMEs as controls.  
In addition to PF’s damage discussed, PF’s stroke resulted in extensive white matter 




cortices.  Despite fraction and extension data confirming that the OFC is not among PF’s 
affected anatomy, it is clear that her wide spread damage could have affected the 
information relay from the frontal and parietal hemispheres to important structures such as 
the OFC. Thus, it is not possible to draw concrete conclusions as to know PF responds 
differently to controls in this task. See Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 for further discussion of how 
white matter microstructural integrity can affect CFT and DM.  
It is conceivable that failure in this task could be due to problems with visuo-spatial 
deficits, and not impairments in CFT. Visuo-spatial perception allows individuals to process 
visual information regarding the position of objects in space (Pinel, 1993).  Visuo-spatial 
deficits include neglect and extinction. Individuals who experience neglect have impaired 
awareness of events (including objects) in the contralesional visual field. Individuals who 
experience extinction also have impaired awareness in the contralesional visual field but 
when synchronized bilateral sensory stimulation is encountered (Vossel et al., 2013). In 
order to establish if the patients who responded differently to controls in this task were 
doing so due to visuo-spatial deficits, their BCoS results were utilised. BCoS scores show that 
DJR, PW, GM, PF, JB, and JH do not have deficits in neglect or extinction. However, MP has 
visuo-spatial deficits in object neglect (affecting individual objects) and visual extinction 
while SAR has page neglect (affecting the spatial frame of reference). It is not possible to 
rule out MP’s visuo-spatial deficits as the cause of his impairment in this task. However, it is 
interesting to note that the only patient who responses in this task are in line with controls 
also has a visuo-spatial deficit in page neglect. SAR’s success in this task demonstrates that 
her visuo-spatial deficits has not impeded her performance and sheds light on her abilities 




It is important to note that any patient suffering from simultanagnosia would 
present as impaired in the current task. Simultanagnosia is a deficit in visual selection 
characterised by impaired spatial awareness of more than a single object at a time 
(Chechlacz et al.). Simultanagnosia is associated with bilateral parieto-occipital damage 
(Rizzo & Vecera, 2002). A patient with simultanagnosia would likely fail to process both the 
chosen and the unchosen wheel in this experiment, making it impossible for them to 
experience regret and demonstrate the amplification effect in line with controls. The most 
likely candidate for simultanagnosia is PF, due to her bilateral parietal damage. In order to 
rule simultanagnosia out as a cause for PF’s performance, further tests of her visuo-spatial 
abilities would be required as the BCoS is not sufficient to diagnose simultanagnosia.  
Overall, this study showed that control participants demonstrated the amplification 
effect, replicating Camille et al. (2004). However, 5 patients did not demonstrate this same 
pattern of responses, implying the amplification effect was not taking place. Analysis of the 
memory data confirms that this discrepancy between controls and patients is not due to 
poorer memory in one group. Thus, we can conclude that patients tested in this experiment 
do not feel emotions more keenly during regret inducing conditions compared to 
disappointment conditions. Through using the RGT, initially used by Camille et al. (2004), I 
have established that a wider range of patients do not experience CMEs in the same manner 
as control patients. It is unclear due to the extensive damage caused by certain patients’ 
strokes, which lesion sites cause this discrepancy from controls. However, it is safe to 
suggest that a range of patients, with differing brain damage, may experience altered 
emotional responses compared to healthy controls. It is possible that neural connectivity is 











5.1 Introduction  
Regret is an emotion that individuals encounter when considering that the current 
state of affairs would have been better ‘if only’ a different course of action had been taken. 
Experiencing regret is a signal that an individual has negatively evaluated a decision 
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Typically, we make decisions when we do not have factual 
information about how the outcome would have been altered if a different initial decision 
was made; in such circumstances regret is induced by creating and comparing the actual 
outcome to a hypothetical outcome, where we have to imagine what would have happened 
instead. However, there are situations where factual information is available about how the 
outcome would have differed if an alternative choice was made, for example placing a bet 
on a football match; we know which team won, and who we should have placed money on, 
after the match has ended. In these circumstances, regret is caused by comparing the actual 
outcome to the counterfactual outcome. Research with healthy adults has shown that the 
availability of the counterfactual outcome affects behaviour; specifically information 
regarding a missed opportunity affects risk-taking behaviour (Zeelenberg et al., 1996). 
Brassen et al. (2012) describes behaviour after a missed opportunity as ‘regret responsivity’. 
Regret responsivity occurs after an individual realises that a previous decision has resulted 
in a missed opportunity to receive a more desirable outcome. This results in subsequent 
risky taking (i.e. being more likely to task risks). 
Risky behaviour is characterised by choices that probabilistically result in loss and 
adverse consequences. The motivation behind this behaviour is an attempt to maximise the 
potential gain and is typical when individuals focus on the positive outcome that is available, 




phenomenon after brain injury and possibly a consequence of some neuropsychological 
disorders, such as substance use disorders and gambling addiction (Paulus, 2007).  
In order to engage in successful DM, one must incorporate information on the 
expected outcome and actions that may lead to this. This incorporation relies on a series of 
brain networks that facilitate and underpin successful DM. Disruption to any of the relevant 
brain regions may result in maladaptive DM and risk-taking behaviour. 
One brain region that is widely associated with successful DM is the VMPFC. The 
VMPFC is comprised of the medial section of the OFC (Brodmann areas 10, 11, 12) and the 
ventral areas of the medial PFC and ACC (Brodmann areas 24, 25, 32) (Eshel et al., 2007). 
Individuals who have either sustained an acquired brain injury or have suffered from a 
stroke in this area have been reported to act in a way which is indicative of poor judgement 
resulting in riskier DM (Damasio, 1994). 
The first laboratory experiment, examining RDM that was conducted with VMPFC 
patients was the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994). The task required participants 
to learn the associated wins and losses that occur in four decks of cards. Two of the decks 
are ‘risky’; participants receive some large wins yet they unpredictably experience large 
losses that result in accumulated debt. The other two card decks are ‘safe’; participants can 
gain small wins, but also small losses, that overall result in profit. Healthy controls chose to 
select from the safe deck once they had incurred large losses from the risky deck, resulting 
in an overall profit. However, VMPFC patients did the opposite. Patients did not learn from 
the outcome of previous choice and continued to select from the risky deck, resulting in an 




associated with the risky deck and a lack of consideration for the long term consequences of 
their risky decisions, the behaviour was named ‘myopia for the future’.  
The Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994) has been used in many further 
research experiments since the initial study was published. Most research has replicated the 
initial findings that patients with VMPFC lesions behave in a risk seeking manner. Fukui et al. 
(2005) used the task in attempt to investigate the neural circuitry involved in the task. 
Healthy individuals took part in the task while fMRI was used. The risk anticipation 
component of the task induced activation in the medial frontal gyrus. Additionally, during 
risky decisions, a significant correlation between task performance and magnitude of brain 
activation was observed. Medial prefrontal activation correlated with participants’ net 
scores. Evidence for the neural circuitry recruited during the task is an indication that neural 
networks are critical for DM. This evidence suggests that if damage is incurred to the neural 
network, then DM may be affected indirectly. The neural circuitry that allows for adaptive 
DM could be as important as the VMPFC itself when considering RDM. 
Various brain regions could be involved in DM due to their connectivity to the 
VMPFC. For example, the insular cortex is highly connected to the VMPFC (Ongur & 
Price, 2000) as well as being connected to the amygdala and ventral striatum (Reynolds & 
Zahm, 2005). Activation in the anterior insular cortex has been reported in several stages of 
DM, such as prior to risk avoidance (activated precedes a riskless choice) (Kuhnen & 
Knutson, 2005) and risk performance (activation reflects how risk taking an individual is in a 
given task) (Paulus et al., 2003). Lesion studies have also demonstrated the importance of 
the insular cortex. Clark et al. (2008) used four groups of participants in the Cambridge 




of red to blue boxes were altered in each trial. Within the boxes one token is hidden. The 
chances of the token being contained inside a particular coloured box is proportional to the 
number of boxes presented in that colour during that trial.  Participants guess which colour 
box the token is hidden in and are subsequently required to bet a number of points on their 
decision. Patients with VMPFC damage bet larger amounts, compared to that of controls, on 
trials where the odds of winning are low, for example when the numbers of blue and red 
boxes are equal. Patients with insular cortex lesions did not adapt their betting behaviour in 
accordance with the odds of winning. This profile is consistent with the insular cortex’s role 
of coding the probability of negative outcomes. Overall, the insular group incurred the most 
bankruptcies throughout the task and accumulated the lowest point score.   
In addition to evidence that points to differing brain regions being associated with 
the decisional processes, Peters and  Büchel (2009) note that there are domain-general and 
domain-specific valuation networks. The authors argue that a domain-general system is 
required for efficient choice behaviour, which is supported by common neural coding of 
stimulus value. fMRI was used while participants processed immediate, delayed, and 
probabilistic decision options. Participants chose between an immediate retrieval of €20 or 
greater monetary values at a delay, the amount of money gained through accepting the 
delay and the probability of retrieving the delayed money was manipulated. Behavioural 
choices did not differ in the delayed and probabilistic decision conditions, and in accordance 
with this the ventral striatum and the OFC were consistently activated demonstrating a 
domain-general process when coding for value regardless of the condition: delayed or 
probabilistic. In addition to this activation, separate neural regions were implicated 




posterior cingulate cortex was active when participants considered the delayed reward, 
whereas the superior parietal cortex and middle occipital cortex was active when 
participants considered the probabilistic reward. These findings are strong evidence for 
domain-general and domain-specific networks that work alongside one another during 
RDM. 
The aim of the current task is to identify new brain areas that contribute to risk 
taking. It is possible that particular patients with brain damage in specific areas, that have 
previously not been reported to affect DM, engage in risker behaviour.  Previous tasks used 
to judge RDM such as the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994) have a large WM 
component where the participant has to remember which deck of cards is associated with 
wins and losses respectively. In the current experiment executive demands were reduced by 
using a simple task which was based up Feeney et al.’s (2016) research with children. The 
task was adapted from Brassen et al. (2012) (see also Büchel et al., 2011). In this task 
participants are presented with a line of eight boxes which are opened one at a time from 
left to right. Coins are hidden in seven of the boxes, with one box containing a pirate 
(Feeney) or the devil (Brassen). Participants accumulated the coins as they open successive 
boxes, however if the box which contains the pirate/devil is opened all the coins are lost. 
Participants have the choice to ‘bank’ their coins at any point, before finding the 
pirate/devil, saving these coins for the rest of the experiment. Once the participant has 
banked their coins the position of the pirate/devil is revealed (providing information on the 
missed opportunity). 
As in Feeney et al.’s (2016) paper, the presented experiment will examine risk-taking 




experiment to the average number opened by controls. Behaviour on trials following a loss 
will also be explored. Examining these data will allow claims to be made regarding the 
potential differences between patients and controls of the effects of a missed opportunity.  
To my knowledge there are no studies with a patient group that investigate the 
effect of a known missed opportunity on subsequent DM. It is known that healthy adults 
engage in riskier behaviour after receiving information on a missed opportunity (Zeelenberg, 
et al., 1996) thus the current experiment aims investigate risk-taking behaviour and the 
effects of a missed opportunity on a group of brain-damaged patients. As an exploratory 
hypothesis, I predict that some patients will not be affected by the missed opportunity and 
as a result engage in risker DM.  
5.2 Method 
Participants 
A total of 8 patients (5 female) aged between 56 and 81 (M = 71 years) and 15 
controls (9 female) aged between 28 and 74 (M = 60 years) completed this test battery. 13 
patients were recruited via the Oxford Cognitive Neuropsychology Centre and 2 patients 
were recruited via the University of Birmingham. See Table 5.0 for information on the 






 Description of the patients’ information who are discussed in this task  
Patient DOB Hemisphere Year of 
Damage 
Description of Lesion(s) 
JB  L 2012 Frontal inferior operculum, heschl 
gyrus, insula, pallidum, putamen, 
rolondic operculum and OFC 
GM  L 2013 Left sided lingual gyrus  and nearby 
occipital structures including the 
left intracalcarine cortex and 
occipital fusiform gyrus 
MP  R 1998 Extensive temporal, frontal and 
parietal damage. Damage extends 
to the right insular, middle 
temporal gyrus (anterior and 
posterior divisions) as well as the 
temporo-occipital region and the 
OFC.  Possible damage to the 
frontal radiation associated with 
corpus callosum and anterior limb 
of the internal capsule 
JH   L 2013  Left insular and frontal cortex, 




PW 11/12/1936 L 2013 Cerebellar  
PF  BILAT 1999 Bilateral superior and inferior 
parietal gyri lesion, left sided lesion 
extends into the left angular gyrus 
and the right sided lesion extends 
slightly into the right caudate. 
Small left thalamus lesion. 
Extensive white matter damage to 
the frontal and parietal cortices 
SAR  BILAT  2012 Cerebellar,  occipital lobe, frontal 
lobe,  right insula cortex and 
possible damage to the frontal 
radiation associated with corpus 
callosum and the anterior limb of 
the internal capsule 
DJR  R 2013 Cerebellar 
 
Procedure  
Participants were presented with on screen instructions. The experimenter read the 
instructions to the participants then gave the participants an opportunity to ask questions 
about the procedure. The instructions were as follows: ‘In this game you are trying to win as 
many coins as possible. You will see eight boxes. Inside seven boxes there are gold coins. But 




the coins in the boxes you open. You can end the turn and bank your coins by pressing 
RETURN. If you open the box with the thief, he steals all your coins on that turn (see Figure 
5.0 for example trial). First, let’s have a practice. Try to find as many coins as you can.’ There 
were 6 practice trials before the game started; for the first three practice trials the 
experimenter completed the trials for the participant in order to demonstrate how to play 
the game (see table 5.1). The three remaining trials were completed by the participant, if by 
the third and final trial completed by the participant, no coins had been banked, the 
experimenter would encourage the participant to bank before the thief was encountered. 
On trials where participants banked their coins, they were shown the position of the thief in 
the box array, thus providing the participant with information on the size of the missed 
opportunity on that trial. The experiment was designed in 4 blocks of 20 trials. This design 










        
Condition Thief Box Boxes Opened Coins Won 
 
1 1 0 
Experimenter Demonstration 5 5 0 
 
2 1 1 
    
 
4 3 1 
Participant Choice 3 2 1 
 
2 2 0 
    NB: during the participant choice condition, the number of coins won is dictated by the 
participant’s choice of how many boxes to open and when to bank. The table above is an 






Figure 5.0: Example trial where participant has failed to bank before opening the safe where 
the thief is hidden. If the participant had banked on opening the fourth safe then they 
would have collected four coins. However, the participant opened five boxes in this trial and 




Keep trials were trials where participants chose to bank before encountering the 
thief. Bust trials were trials where the participant opened the thief box without banking and 
thus lost their coins for that trial. Four different conditions were calculated based on two 





5.3.2 Data Coding 
The analysis conducted by Büchel et al. (2011) which established the predictive 
effect of losses and missed opportunities was replicated. The aim was to predict the number 
of boxes opened (an indicator of risk taking) in trial t by examining trial t-1, that is, whether 
it contained a large and small missed opportunity. Missed opportunities were defined as the 
difference between the number of coins won and the number of coins that could have been 
won (dependent on the location of the thief).  Missed opportunities could only happen on 
keep trials. A large missed opportunity was defined as there being 3 or more boxes that 
could have been opened before finding the thief, while a small missed opportunity meant 
there were only 2 or fewer boxes that could have been opened. 
It was hypothesised that a large missed opportunity would lead to riskier behaviour 
in control participants (Büchel et al., 2011). The aim of the experiment was to investigate if 
this phenomenon held in the patient population. In order to investigate this, keep_keep 
trials were analysed to establish if the size of the missed opportunity in trial t-1 affected the 
number of boxes opened in trial t. The first trial in each block was not used in analysis 
because there was no t-1 trial due to the break between blocks.  
The Number of Boxes Opened  
The number of boxes opened by both patients and controls was examined as a 
measure of general risk taking. Büchel described the point at which an individual is equally 
likely to continue opening boxes or bank as the ‘individual indifference point’. The overall 
mean group indifference point for controls was 3.05 ±0.08 (mean ± sem), demonstrating 
that up to 3 boxes controls were likely to continue but after which they were likely to stop. 
During trials where participants banked before hitting the thief, the average number of 




The overall mean group indifference point for patients was 3.39 ± 0.18 (mean ± 
sem), demonstrating that, as for controls, up to 3 boxes patients were probabilistically likely 
to continue but after which they were likely to stop. During trials were patients banked 
before hitting the thief, the average number of boxes opened was 3.71, during bust trials 
the mean number of opened boxes was 3.15. The comparison between the number of 
boxes opened on average between controls and patients suggests that patients were 
engaging in risker behaviour, thus this was further investigated  
In order to establish if specific patients were choosing to bank more or less 
frequently than controls, the average number of boxes patients opened and the percentage 
of boxes opened on keep trials was calculated. The number of boxes patients opened was 
compared to the control mean (M = 3.07). Patients who were more than 1.5 standard 
deviations (1.5 SDs = .43) away from the control mean are considered to be engaging in 






Number of boxes opened and percentage of boxes opened by controls  
 
Control 
Total Average of Boxes 
Opened Percentage of Boxes Opened on Keep Trials 
LAT 3.20 48% 
AD 2.76 58% 
RD 3.09 45% 
CAP 3.48 33% 
EP 3.49 47% 
AB 3.23 43% 
ADP 3.12 43% 
BS 2.65 57% 
CM 2.68 62% 
JB 3.03 52% 
JM 3.09 56% 
LS 3.08 40% 
ME 2.98 47% 
MW 3.16 56% 







Number of boxes opened and percentage of boxes opened by patients  
 
Patient 
Total Average of Boxes 
Opened 
Percentage of Boxes Opened on Keep 
Trials 
DJR 3.35 43% 
GM 2.5 68% 
JB 3.45 34% 
JH 2.9125 40% 
MP 4.1375 35% 
PF 2.9 55% 
PW 3.375 60% 
SAR 3.925 19% 
 
Table 5.3 shows that 2 patients are more than 1.5 standard deviations above the control 
mean (MP and SAR) whereas 1 participant was more than 1.5 standard deviations below the 
control mean (GM). No controls were above or below 1.5 standard deviations of the control 
mean.  
5.3.3 Effect of missed opportunity  
A paired t test was conducted on control data to establish if the size of the missed 
opportunity in trial t-1 affected the number of boxes opened in trial t. The data indicated 
that after a large missed opportunity, controls were significantly more likely to open more 




opportunity (M = 3.57, SD = .61);  t(14) = 2.79, p = .014. Figure 5.1 represents the significant 
difference.  
 
Figure 5.1: Effect of the missed opportunity in controls participants  
 
A t test was not appropriate to run on the patient data due to the limited number of 
big missed opportunities that were encountered. This was the case because, as previously 
explained, at least some patients were considerably more risky than controls resulting in 
more boxes being opened each round, thus creating fewer keep_keep trials to analyse, and 
in the case of three patients no keep_keep trials that resulted in a large missed opportunity. 
Table 5.3 demonstrates this; the blank spaces represent the patients who did not encounter 





















Missed Opportunity (t-1) 
Effect of Missed Opportunity in Controls  
p = . 014 




patients who do not encounter any large missed opportunities; these two patients were 
previously highlighted as being more risky than the control group. Table 5.5 has been added 
as a comparison between the number of trial encountered in the large and small missed 
opportunity conditions.  
Table 5.4 



















NB: The number in brackets is representative of how many trials in that condition were 
encountered and thus how many trials were used to calculate the average. 
 
 
      
 
Missed opportunity 
Patient Large Small 
DJR 2.5 (2) 3.29 (14) 
GM 2.375 (8) 2.73 (26) 







PF 4 (1) 3 (17) 
PW 4 (2) 3.75 (24) 





The average number of boxes opened in trial t after a large and small missed opportunity for 
controls  
      
 
Missed opportunity 
Control Large Small 
LAT 3 (6) 3 (12) 
AD 3 (9) 3 (16) 
RD 3 (6) 4 (11) 
CP 5 (2) 5 (12) 
EP 5 (6) 4 (11) 
AB 5 (6) 4 (11) 
AP 4 (7) 4 (9) 
BS 3 (11) 3 (22) 
CM 3 (14) 2 (19) 
JB 4 (3) 3 (19) 
JM 5 (3) 4 (17) 
LS 5 (2) 4 (13) 
ME 3 (5) 3 (11) 
MW 5 (10) 4 (15) 






Of the 5 patients who encountered large missed opportunities, 3 exhibited 
behaviour that matched that of controls; JB, PF and PW all opened more boxes after a large 
missed opportunity compared to after a small missed opportunity. It should be noted that 
these patients had a maximum of 2 (PW) large missed opportunities, thus it is not possible 
to make concrete claims regarding these patents’ behaviour after large missed opportunity. 
Additionally, the small number of trials encountered in this condition may be indicative of 
RDM. Patients DJR and GM demonstrated the opposite pattern of behaviour; opening more 
boxes after a small missed opportunity. This suggests that patients DJR and GM are not 
affected by the missed opportunity and thus their behaviour does not demonstrate a 
willingness to ‘make up’ for their previous loss. In order to establish if this is indeed the 
case, a Mann-Whitney test was used on GM’s results. The number of boxes opened after a 
small missed opportunity (Mdn =18.5) was not significantly more than the number of boxes 
opened after a large missed opportunity (Mdn =14.25); U = 78, p =.307. DJR has only 2 
instances when a large missed opportunity is recorded thus it is not appropriate to run a 
statistical test to determine if there is a significant difference between the numbers of boxes 
opened after a large or small missed opportunity.   
5.4 Discussion 
Research has shown that healthy adults attempt to make up for previous missed 
opportunities by engaging in risky behaviour (Brassen et al., 2012). Information about what 
could have been gained, the counterfactual, needs to be accessible to the individual for a 
missed opportunity to be apparent (Zeelenberg, et al., 1996). The current experiment aimed 
to investigate the effects of a missed opportunity on a group of brain-damaged patients. 
Task performance was compared to that of healthy age matched controls. It was 




participants (Büchel et al., 2011. The aim of the experiment was to investigate if this 
phenomenon held in the patient population.  
5.4.1 Risk-Taking Behaviour  
Examining the behavioural data from the task allows us to compare the performance 
of controls and patients. This is important as it highlights which patients show an unusual 
pattern of behaviour compared to controls.  
To establish if any patients were engaging in risker behaviour than controls I 
calculated the mean number of boxes opened and compared this to the number of boxes 
opened by controls. The averages showed that MP and SAR are more risky compared to the 
control group as a whole, whereas GM is more cautious than the control group.  
MP has extensive damage to the temporal, frontal and parietal regions. Due to the 
size of MP’s lesion it is not possible to be confident when drawing claims regarding the 
damage that may have caused his RDM. Despite this, MP’s damage includes the right 
insular, middle temporal gyrus as well as the temporo-occipital region and the OFC, all of 
which have been previously cited as key brain areas for CFT, DM and CME production. I will 
describe the most relevant research which could explain how damage to these areas can 
result in more risky behaviour than seen in controls. 
Research has shown that temporal and frontal regions are involved in tasks 
containing a risk element. Fukui et al. (2005) used the Iowa Gambling Task to demonstrate 
that the risk anticipation component of the task induced activation in the medial frontal 
gyrus. Thus it is possible that MP fails to anticipate the repercussions of his choices and 
therefore does not act to avoid a negative outcome. In addition, Paulus and Frank (2006) 




superior temporal gyrus (other areas were also activated) during high probability prospects 
relative to low probability prospects in a decision weight task. Knuston et al. (2008) showed 
that anticipation of viewing rewarding stimuli increased financial risk taking. Activation 
correlated with exposure to positive versus negative stimuli while participants anticipated 
switching between high-risk options to low-risk options. Activation in the right middle 
frontal gyrus, right inferior frontal gyrus, left middle temporal gyrus, right middle temporal 
gyrus, left middle occipital gyrus, left precentral gyrus and right lingual gyrus was observed 
(other areas were also activated).   
The parietal and frontal damage which MP has incurred could be affecting the 
fronto-parietal network described by Van Hoek (2015). The network is thought to play a role 
in cognitive control when individuals swap between the current world and the hypothetical 
world. It is important to consider that disruption to neural circuitry could lead to RDM. 
Bechara et al. (1994) claim that damage to the neural circuitry that facilitates adaptive DM 
could be as important as the VMPFC itself when considering RDM.  
In addition to MP, SAR also has frontal lobe damage. Thus, the reasons for frontal 
damage affecting risk taking described above, can also be applied when attempting to 
explain SAR’s performance on this task. This shared damage to the frontal lobe could imply 
that this is the cause of MP and SARs performance on this task. However, patients who do 
not demonstrate risker behaviour than controls also have damage to the frontal lobe (JB 
and JH), thus it is not possible to make strong claims regarding damage to the frontal lobe 
causing MP and SAR’s risky DM in this task. 
MP’s damage to the right insula and temporo-occipital region and the OFC could 




affect the experience of regret (most famously reported by Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et 
al., 2005) and the role of the insula has been linked to DM and CME production also (Chua 
et al., 2009; Kuhnen & Knutson., 2005). The limbic connections between the two regions 
could also influence risk taking (Barbas, 2007; Zald & Rauch, 2006). See Chapter 4 for a 
discussion of how the insula could result in an inability to anticipate risk, due its possible 
involvement in anticipatory outcomes, or induce a higher rate of risk-aversion mistakes. 
SAR also has damage to the right insula cortex. MP and SAR’s risky behaviour in this 
task is in line with findings from Clark et al. (2008) who found that patients with insular 
cortex damage, during the Cambridge Gamble Task, did not adapt their betting behaviour in 
concordance with the odds of winning. This resulted in insular patients, in comparison to 
VMPFC patients, incurring the most bankruptcies throughout the task and accumulated the 
lowest point score. Thus, it is possible that MP and SAR’s insula damage has resulted in their 
risky behaviour in this task. 
Both MP and SAR’s damage to the white matter located in the frontal lobe maps 
onto the frontal radiation associated with the corpus callosum and anterior limb of the 
internal capsule. White matter is crucial for relaying information between grey matter 
areas; the efficiency of this transfer is reliant on white matter microstructural integrity 
(Hagmann et al., 2008).  Therefore if the white matter that relays information between the 
two hemispheres is damaged then it is likely that signal transfer is affected and thus atypical 
behaviour may be exhibited.  
The relationship between deficits to the corpus callosum and RDM has been directly 
investigated by Brown et al. (2012). Individuals with agenesis of the corpus callosum took 




the corpus callosum does not develop before birth (Jinkins, Whittemore, & Bradley, 1989).  
Participants with agenesis of the corpus callosum had a lower net gain throughout the 
experiment while typically showing less consistency in their choice strategy and were more 
influenced by previous trial, compared to controls. Thus it would appear that the DM 
process in individuals with agenesis of the corpus callosum is affected. This finding shed light 
on how the disruption of information between the right and left hemisphere could result in 
RDM observed in SAR and MP’s choices in this task. 
The Iowa Gambling Task has also been used with patients with multiple sclerosis 
(MS). Kleeberg et al. (2004) showed that MS patients have impaired DM. MS has been 
associated with white matter damage located in the corpus callosum (Schnider et al. 1993). 
Kleeberg et al. (2004) concluded that areas outside of the amygdalar-orbitofrontal loops are 
important in DM and damage resulting in functional disconnection that interrupts prefrontal 
signal transfer (which may result from corpus callosum damage) may result in impaired DM. 
Therefore, it is possible that the damage to the frontal radiation, described for SAR and MP, 
is causing their risky behaviour in this task. 
The overlapping areas in which patients have shared damage are as follows: MP and 
SAR have damage to the white matter located in the frontal lobe. PS also has damage to this 
area but unfortunately, due to availability, did not participate in this task. Future research 
should look to further investigate if damage to the white matter located in the frontal lobe 
affects task performance in similar experiments. MP and SAR also have shared damage to 
the right insula cortex. The insula has been cited as important for counterfactual reasoning 
in multiple investigations (Berntson et al., 2011; Canessa et al., 2009; Chua et al., 2009; Clark 




possible that this damage directly affected MP and SAR’s performance in this task. However, 
it should be noted that JB also has right insula damage and does not engage in risker DM 
than controls. In addition MP and SAR also have frontal lobe damage. However, as explained 
previously, patients who do not demonstrate risker behaviour than controls also have 
damage to the frontal lobe (JB and JH). As a result of the overlapping regions of damage in 
impaired and unimpaired patients it is not possible to make strong claims regarding how 
damage to the frontal lobe affects DM.  
SAR also has bilateral damage to the cerebellum. Although the cerebellum is not 
traditionally cited as an important brain region when considering DM, Cardoso et al. (2014) 
have used the Iowa Gambling Task to highlight its potential importance. The authors 
compared performance from patients with cerebellar lesions, frontal lesions, and healthy 
controls. Despite a wealth of research suggesting that the frontal regions are important for 
DM (Canessa et al., 2009; Nicolle et al., 2011) the cerebella and frontal patient groups’ net 
scores (overall score) were not significantly different to one another. Furthermore, the 
controls’ net scores were significantly better than both clinical groups. This result suggests 
that the cerebellum might play an active role in successful DM and supports the finding that 
SAR, with cerebella damage, engages in riskier DM in the presented task. 
Although seemingly convincing evidence that suggests SAR’s cerebellum damage 
might play an active role in her risky DM, it is important to note that both PW and DJR also 
have cerebellum damage. Neither PW nor DJR demonstrate risker behaviour in comparison 
to controls. Therefore, it is unclear why SAR demonstrates a pattern of responses that is 
different from controls and PW and DJR do not. It is possible that due to the size of the 




mentioned in Chapter4, a more advanced understanding of the cerebellum is required in 
order to make advanced claims about how damage to this area affects behaviour.   
Schmahmann and Sherman (1998) coined the term “cerebellar cognitive-affective 
syndrome” for patients who suffered from impairments in spatial cognition, dysprosody, 
and anomia. Additionally patients had difficulties in executive functioning, specifically in 
planning, set-shifting, abstraction, WM, and verbal fluency. These symptoms were mainly 
observed in patients with abnormalities in the posterior cerebellum. Patients with bilateral 
damage were more likely to suffer from cerebellar cognitive-affective syndrome. The 
authors suggest that the impairments observed in the syndrome are caused by disruptions 
in the neural circuitry that links the cerebellum to prefrontal, temporal, and posterior 
parietal areas, as well as to the limbic system.  
It is possible that damage to the cerebellum affects DM because of its connectivity to 
other brain regions. Cardoso et al. (2014) explain that the cerebellum has efferent and 
afferent connections to multiple brain regions; dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortices, areas of the posterior parietal cortex, the superior temporal region, the thalamus, 
and the limbic system (Middleton & Strick, 2000; Krienen & Buckner, 2009). In sum, it is 
likely that the cerebellum has an influence on emotional abilities (Rapoport et al., 2000) and 
damage to this area could account for differences in the experience of CMEs, compared to 
controls, which may in turn affect RDM.  
5.4.2 The effect of a missed opportunity  
The hypothesis that a large missed opportunity would lead to riskier behaviour in 
control participants was tested. The number of boxes opened following a small missed 




opportunity. The data indicated that after a large missed opportunity, controls were 
significantly more likely to open more boxes. This result replicated the finding by Büchel et 
al. (2011) that the size of a missed opportunity predicted subsequent risk taking on the next 
trial.  
It was not possible to conduct a comparison between the number of boxes opened 
after a small and large missed opportunity in the patient group as too few instances where a 
large missed opportunity was followed by a ‘bank’ were encountered. Thus, further 
investigation with patients into RDM should incorporate, where possible, more trials than 
were used in the described experiment; this would permit analysis of the missed 
opportunity as was conducted with controls and also individual investigation into if the 
number of boxes opened in small and large missed opportunity trials is significantly 
different (as conducted with GM).  
Throughout the entire experiment for all 8 patients, only 14 large missed 
opportunities were recorded. 3 patients, SAR, MP and JH did not encounter two consecutive 
‘keep’ trials where a large missed opportunity was present. This is indicative of high risk 
taking. Additionally, all but 1 patient have very few large missed opportunities. The only 
patient who has more than 2 trials in this category is GM (N=8). Large missed opportunities 
occurred when there were 2 or more safes must be between where the participant ‘banked’ 
and the location of the thief. For high-risk takers this situation never occurs because a high 
number of safes are opened each round. Thus only small missed opportunities are created 
or the thief is found, creating a ‘bust’ trial. This was confirmed by determining the 
percentage of bank trials for each participant (Table 5.2: column 3).  Patient SAR banked in 




percentages out of all patients. Thus, it is not surprising that these two patients did not 
record any large missed opportunities. 
In conclusion, the aim of this investigation was to establish which, if any, patients 
showed different behaviour to controls in a risk taking experiment. To my knowledge there 
are no studies with a patient group that investigate the effect of a known missed 
opportunity on subsequent DM. Analysis was split into risk-taking behaviour and the 
behavioural effect of a missed opportunity. Analysis into risk taking behaviour highlighted 
that two patients were demonstrating risker behaviour than controls. The effect of the 
missed opportunity on controls demonstrated the size of the missed opportunity in trial t-1 
affected the number of boxes opened in trial t. 1 patient demonstrated that the missed 
opportunity did not affect the number of boxes opened in the following trial (GM) although 
it was not possible to conduct this investigation with other patients who took part in this 
experiment. These results have shown that two patients with differing neurological damage 











6.1 Introduction   
The experience of regret is thought to be beneficial and of significant importance to 
learning. Due to the experience of regret adults are able to learn from our mistakes and 
make more informed decisions creating desirable outcomes in the future (Roese, 1997). It 
also seems that anticipated regret plays a role in DM; we act in a way that will avoid 
negative outcomes (Zeelenberg, 1999). The development of regret has been widely 
researched in children and healthy adults; however, few studies have been published that 
examine the experience of regret in brain-damaged patients. I look to establish if regret and 
relief are preserved in individuals who have suffered a stroke. The patients tested have 
varying lesion sites. Through testing brain-injured patients who have a wide range of lesion 
sites I hope to establish if damage to a number of different areas results in patients’ inability 
to experience regret and or relief. 
The neurological connections between CMEs and DM have been investigated; 
research focusing on the relationship between the VMPFC and DM has highlighted the 
distinct activation patterns in the lateral and medial OFC when regret is experienced 
(Sommer et al., 2009). Coricelli et al.’s (2005) results showed that the activity in the medial 
OFC increased during initial regret experienced post gamble and also as a result of 
cumulative regret accumulated through the experiment. The lateral OFC activity increased 
as a result of the immediate regret experienced caused by the gamble outcome.  
Levens et al. (2014) investigated how damage to the VMPFC and the lateral OFC 
(LOFC) affects DM and the CMEs. Patients with VMPFC and the LOFC damage were tested. 
The authors used an adaptation of Camille et al.’s (2004) gambling task. After each gamble 




Unhappy”) to 50 (“Extremely Happy”). Control subjects showed responses that were 
sensitive to regret comparisons. It was established that VMPFC patients made financially 
worse gambling choices than controls while reporting emotions that were sensitive to regret 
comparisons and similar to the emotions reported by controls. Contrastingly, LOFC patients 
made financially good gambling choices but their reported emotions were insensitive to 
regret. The authors conclude that the VMPFC has a role in the relationship between DM and 
anticipated emotions; whereas the LOFC is involved in experiencing emotions after a 
decision has been made, influencing subsequent behaviour.  
Research conducted into the role of the PFC in the experience of CFT has been 
conducted by Gomez-Beldarrain (2005).  The generation of counterfactual thoughts by 18 
patients with strictly PFC lesions and 26 controls was recorded in a task comparing 
spontaneous counterfactuals and counterfactual responses to cued questions (see Chapter 
1 for detailed methodology). Analysis of participants’ responses showed that PFC patients 
produced significantly fewer spontaneous counterfactuals. Further to this, no relationship 
between counterfactual production and lesion site within the PFC was observed. There was 
no difference, between groups, in counterfactual generation in the cued condition. The 
authors suggest that impaired CFT may be linked to the lack of regret observed in frontal 
lobe-lesioned patients. 
Through using the developmental literature to establish when counterfactual 
abilities develop, we can gain an understanding of the developmental trajectory that results 
in functional counterfactual reasoning skills that can be observed in healthy adults. Thus, it 
is possible to break down different stages that occur through childhood and draw 




that suggests children are able to experience regret at 5 years but do not experience relief 
until 7 years.  My project aims to use a simple non-verbal task, like the one used by 
Weisberg and Beck, to establish patients’ experience of CMEs.  
Weisberg and Beck (2010) found evidence of a developmental dissociation between 
experiencing regret and relief. The authors devised a task where children chose one of two 
coloured boxes and a number of stickers was won according to the box chosen. Children 
rated their emotions before and after opening the second box, which contained more, less, 
or equal number of stickers. Children were deemed to experience regret if they rated their 
emotions as less happy after seeing the counterfactual alternative was better than reality. 
Relief was attributed when children felt happier after seeing the counterfactual alternative 
was worse than reality. Regret was reported at 5 years of age, but relief was not reported 
until 7 years of age. Therefore the authors claim that there is a difference in the 
development of experiencing regret and relief. The finding that 7 year old children do 
experience regret and relief themselves, suggests that a development in understanding 
CMEs develops in between the ages of 5 and 7 (Amsel & Smalley, 2000).  
The development of regret has also been investigated by O’Connor, McCormack and 
Feeney (2012) who built on Weisberg and Beck’s (2010) boxes game methodology. The 
authors used regret and baseline conditions to investigate 4 to 9 year olds’ ability to report 
regret. Regret trials were characterised by the unchosen box containing a better prize than 
the chosen box. Baseline trials were created by both the chosen and unchosen box 
containing the same prize. Children were deemed to have experienced regret if they 
reported feeling sadder in the regret condition only. There was no evidence that children 




years. The emergence of regret at this age has been linked the children’s development of 
executive function, in particular attentional flexibility (Burns, Riggs, & Beck, 2012). Weisberg 
and Beck (2012) and O’Connor et al. (2012) used an improved methodology to investigate 
children’s regret, which avoided participants being asked to use the same scale repeatedly.  
Having used a five point smiley face scale ranging from very happy to very sad to rate their 
emotional response after opening their chosen box, children used a three pronged 
moveable arrow; one arrow pointed left to indicate feeling sadder, one arrow pointed right 
to indicate feeling happier and the final arrow pointed upwards vertically to indicate the 
same emotional response after the alternative box was opened. O’Connor, McCormack and 
Feeney (2012) found evidence of regret at 6 years and Weisberg and Beck (2012) found 
evidence of regret in children as young as 4 years (n.b. some authors claim that regret is not 
seen in children until 9; Rafetseder & Perner, 2012). 
Previous work with brain-damaged patients (Camille et al., 2004; Levens et al., 2014; 
Clausi et al., 2015;) and healthy controls (Coricelli et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2007; 
Chandrasekhar et al., 2008; Chua et al., 2009) have used complex gambling tasks in order to 
induce regret and relief. I present a task that builds upon Weisberg and Beck’s (2010) and 
O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney’s (2010; 2014) work to establish if patients with varying 
lesion sites can report regret and relief in a simple regret task. As in previous research, two 
boxes will be used in regret, relief, and baseline conditions. The discrepancy between tokens 
won and lost will be manipulated; small, medium, and large. I predict that some patients will 
have problems in experiencing CMEs. I am using this simple experiment as a tool to further 
understand the neural underpinnings of regret and relief and thus at this point I am unsure 






A total of 17 patients (7 female) aged between 31 and 84 (M = 64.5 years) and 17 controls 
(12 female) aged between 28 and 74 (M = 59 years) completed this test battery. 15 patients 
were recruited via the Oxford Cognitive Neuropsychology Centre and 2 patients were 
recruited via the University of Birmingham. For the purpose of this paper I will discuss 6 
patients who demonstrate difficulty in experiencing CMEs (see Table 6.0).  
Table 6.0 
 Description of the patients’ information who are discussed in this task 
Patient DOB Hemisphere Year of 
Damage 
Description of Lesion 
MG  R 2013 Cerebellar  
LB  L 2012 Amygdala, hippocampus, palidum, 
putamen and thalamus 
RR  L 2012 Left temporal lobe, including the 
inferior, middle, and superior temporal 
gyrus, angular gyrus, temporal pole, 
and extending into insular cortex, 
supramarginal gyrus, frontal and 
central operculum cortex, inferior 
frontal gyrus, as well as parietal 




GM  L 2013 Left sided lingual gyrus  and nearby 
occipital structures including the left 
intracalcarine cortex and occipital 
fusiform gyrus 
MP  R 1998 Extensive temporal, frontal and 
parietal damage. Damage extends to 
the right insular, middle temporal gyrus 
(anterior and posterior divisions) as 
well as the temporo-occipital region 
and the OFC.  Possible damage to the 
frontal radiation associated with 
corpus callosum and anterior limb of 
the internal capsule 
 
Design 
Participants completed 42 trials. 18 regret, 18 relief, and 6 baseline trials. In baseline 
trials, the chosen and alternative boxes contained the same number of tokens; 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
and 10. Regret trials were created by engineering the trial so that the chosen box always 
contained fewer token than the alternative box. Conversely, in relief conditions, the chosen 
box always contained more tokens than the alternative box. Within the regret and relief 
conditions, the discrepancy between the tokens won and lost was altered, therefore 




medium trials had a difference of 3 tokens and large trials had a difference of 7 tokens. An 
overall of 6 trials in each condition were created. For examples of trials see Table 6.1.   
Table 6.1 
 Example trials in both control, regret and relief conditions for small medium and large 
token discrepancies  
















































Note. These examples were 7 out of the 42 trials used in the Simple Regret task 
Materials 
Square cards (10x10cm) were used to indicate the number of tokens; which ranged 
from 1-13. The card value was identifiable by the equivalent number of dots. A set of 
identical white matchboxes was modified to include a divide, which was only visible when 
the entire matchbox had been pushed through its rectangular ‘sleeve’. Each matchbox 
contained the same two cards (one either side of the divide) with differing values. The 
match boxes could be opened at either end, by sliding the sleeve to either the left or right, 
without revealing the second ‘hidden’ card. This allowed for the experimenter to control the 











A 5-point scale was used to rate emotions which ranged from very happy to very sad. 
The scale comprised 5 black and white images of faces (14x17cm) presented on a white A4 
sheet of paper (see Figure 6.1). A separate rectangular (50x40cm) piece of paper with a 
pointer was used. The pointer was created by using three arrows, an upward, downward 



















Figure 6.1: Left: A scale of 5 faces ranging from very happy (top) to very sad 






Training: Each participant heard a scripted explanation and was trained to use the 5-
point emotional rating scale. This ensured that each participant had experience of the scale 
and demonstrated their understanding of how to use it before completing the task. 
Participants heard these instructions. “This is a scale of very happy to very sad faces; the 
faces are used to show how you are feeling. When this arrow points to one of the faces 
[pointing to left facing arrow] this means that you are feeling the emotion of that face.” 
Subsequently, it was explained that participants could use the upward (feeling happier) and 
downward (feelings sadder) arrows to indicate how their feelings might change. “If 
something else happens, you can use these arrows to show how your feelings have 
changed. This arrow [referring to upward pointing arrow] always means that you are feeling 
happier than you were before. This arrow [referring to downward pointing arrow] always 
means that you are feeling sadder than you were before.” Participants were told that if they 
had previously placed the leftward facing arrow at the happiest or saddest face, it was 
permissible to be ‘off the scale’ happy or sad by selecting either the corresponding upward 
or downward arrow. “When this arrow [referring to leftward arrow] is pointing to the 
saddest face, you can use this arrow [referring to downward pointing arrow] to show that 
you feel even sadder than before. When this arrow [referring to leftward arrow] is pointing 
to the happiest face, you can use this arrow [referring to upward pointing arrow] to show 
that you feel even happier than before.” Participants were required to point to the very 
happy, the very sad and the neutral face in order to ensure they understood which emotion 




Experimental procedure: Participants were presented with two identical white match 
boxes (5cm x 4cm x 2cm). The experimenter explained the rules of the task to the 
participant. “We are going to play a game with these boxes. Inside the boxes are different 
amount of tokens. If you win enough tokens by the end of the game, then you can take 
home this prize [a pen]. You are allowed to choose one of the two boxes to open and you 
win the amount of tokens inside that box.” After the participant chose one of the two boxes, 
the experimenter pushed the match box halfway out of its sleeve, the matchbox was either 
pushed to the right or the left. Both matchboxes contained the predetermined winning 
number of tokens on the left and the alternative number of tokens on the right. Therefore, 
the experimenter controlled the number of tokens shown to the participants in each box. 
Participants were told how many tokens they had won and asked to rate how they felt 
about their selected box. The card contained within the chosen match box was given to the 
participant. The experimenter then opened the unchosen box revealing what the participant 
could have won. The participant made a second rating, “This is what you could have won, 
how do you feel about your prize now? Please point to an arrow.” The expected response 
on regret trials was to point to the downward facing arrow, demonstrating a more negative 
response to the chosen box, whereas on relief trials, the expected response was to point to 
the upward facing arrow, demonstrating a happier response to the chosen box. It is not 
clear how either healthy adults or patients will rate their emotions during the baseline 
condition.  
6.3 Results 
Participants are categorised as passing a set of trials (e.g. regret medium) if they 




sadder in regret conditions), than would be predicted by chance. This was calculated from 
the binomial distribution where the probability of scoring 5/6 correct by chance was .018%. 
To avoid overestimating patients’ difficulties a cut off of 4/6 for success was used i.e. 
anyone responding to 4 or fewer trials with the expected response in a set was categorised 
as failing the set. The number of expected responses was totalled for each condition (see 
tables 6.1 and 6.2). There were 6 questions in each of the conditions; therefore the reported 
figures are out of 6. 
Through closer examination of the control participants’ data, only 6 participants 
responded with the expected emotional response (i.e. rating their emotions as sadder on 
regret trials and happier on relief trials) in the small valance condition. This demonstrated 
that control participants were not experiencing or at least not reporting, CMEs. It was 
decided that no further investigation into the small valance condition would take place for 
patient data. In comparison, controls did show the expected emotional reaction to regret 
and relief conditions in the medium and large valance conditions; all control participants 
pass every condition (i.e. rating their emotions as happier on regret trials and sadder on 
relief trials). Therefore, for medium and large valance conditions, controls and patients are 
compared. 
During the baseline condition all three responses of higher, lower, and the same can 
be explained though a logical thinking pattern. Participants’ response of ‘higher’ can be 
explained through participants experiencing relief due to the second box not containing a 
higher number of tokens. A response of ‘lower’ is justified by participants feeling regret that 
there was not more in their box than in the alternative box. Finally a response of ‘same’ 




tokens being equal. However, on closer inspection of controls’ responses it appears that all 
participants respond with the ‘same’ emotional rating after the alternative box is opened. 
As a result, I evaluated patient responses in the baseline condition by categorising the 
‘same’ emotional rating after the alternative box is opened as the correct response. Only 
one patient, MP, answered fewer than four baseline questions as the ‘same’. MP 
demonstrates a pattern of results in that he passes all three size conditions in both regret 
and relief. However, he fails to pass during baseline conditions. MP is the only patient to fail 
on the baseline condition alone (see table 6.2). He answered ‘same’ on 3 occasions, and in 
the remaining 3 cases MP reported feeling happier after the alternative outcome had been 
revealed. As explained, this pattern of results could be explained by MP feeling relief that 
the second box did not contain more points than the initial chosen box, because of this 
possible explanation I will not discuss MP further.  
After an examination of regret and relief trials in medium and large valance 
conditions, results showed that 5 out of the 17 patients tested failed in at least one 
condition. Table 6.2 shows the 5 patients who did not answer enough questions correctly 
(N=4) in order to pass in at least one condition (as well as MP). The remaining 12 patients 






 Results of each patient in each of the 6 main conditions and the control. The maximum 
score in each condition was 6 
Patient Regret M Regret L Relief M Relief L Control 
RR 1 1 0 1 5 
LB 1 2 0 0 5 
GM 5 5 1 3 6 
MG 2 0 5 5 5 
MP 5 6 6 6 3 
PF 6 6 6 6 5 
JH 5 6 5 5 5 
MB 5 6 5 6 5 
RP 5 6 5 6 6 
SAR 5 6 5 6 6 
DJR 6 6 6 6 6 
PW 6 5 6 5 4 
TJ 5 6 5 6 6 
PS 5 5 6 6 6 
JB 5 5 5 6 6 
NB 5 5 5 6 6 
EL 5 6 5 5 6 
NB: Conditions where patients failed are highlighted in the first panel  
6.4 Discussion 
I set out to explore if regret and relief are preserved in the patient population and if 




widely investigated in the developmental research. However, the effect that brain damage 
has on the experience of regret had not been researched. I aimed to explore this gap in the 
literature by building upon Weisberg and Beck’s (2010) and O’Connor, McCormack and 
Feeney’s (2010; 2014) work to establish if patients with varying lesion sites can report regret 
and relief in a simple regret task and if the experience of regret correlates with a second 
task focusing on adaptive choice switching.  
Analysis revealed 3 interesting patterns of behaviour among patients. RR and LB 
failed both medium and large conditions for both regret and relief trials.  Second, patient 
MG failed both medium and large conditions for regret trials. Third, patient GM failed both 
medium and large conditions for relief trials.   
6.4.1 RR and LB 
The results suggest that the patients who fail both medium and large conditions for 
regret and relief trials (RR and LB) are unable to experience CFE. Their responses indicate 
that they do not express regret when the unchosen box contains more tokens than the 
obtained box and do not express relief when the unchosen box has fewer tokens than the 
chosen box. 
Patient LB has damage that spans the amygdala, hippocampus, palidum, putamen 
and thalamus. It is known that the hippocampus is involved in discriminating between the 
obtained and the unobtained outcome of a choice and that this region may, as a 
consequence, be involved in the experience of regret (Coricelli et al. 2005). The amygdala is 
commonly linked with emotional arousal and evaluative judgments (Berntson et al. 2007; 




paradigm which focused on the experience of regret following high and low levels 
responsibility after a choice; amygdala activation corresponded with conditions of high 
responsibility and poor outcome (also see Sander et al., 2003; Li et al., 2011).  
Evidence also suggests that the amygdala and the hippocampus could be linked 
through their influence on one another during encoding. Phelps (2004) reviewed the 
interactions of the amygdala and hippocampal complex during emotional processing and 
memory. Phelps claims that the two medial temporal lobe structures interact when 
emotional stimuli are encountered. The amygdala is thought to modulate the encoding and 
storage of hippocampal-dependent memories.  The hippocampus is claimed to influence the 
amygdala’s response by creating signals that code for the emotional significance of an 
outcome.  This evidence implies that damage to either the amygdala or the hippocampus 
could cause the responses demonstrated by LB. 
Van Hoeck, Watson and Barbey (2015) claim that CFT is reliant on a combination of 
information processing networks that facilitate adaptive behaviour and goal-directed DM. 
Within the emotion and value processing network, the authors cite the VMPFC (including 
the medial OFC), amygdala, basal ganglia, LOFC and lateral PFC as the associated regions. 
Thus it is clear from previous research that damage to either the amygdala or the 
hippocampus could cause the lack of emotional response seen in LB. RR’s performance on 
this task could also be due to amygdala damage.  
However, two patients who performed in line with controls in this task (PS and JB) 
also have damage to the amygdala. As a result one must be cautious when making claims 
regarding damage to this area affecting performance on this task. Although, it is important 




determine how extensive each respective patients’ damage is and how this relates to 
counterfactual abilities and CMEs. Thus, I cannot rule out brain areas that are damaged in 
patients who are not impaired during tasks and apply this to patients who have similar 
damage and who are impaired. 
RR suffered large left temporal lesions extending into his frontal and parietal cortex. 
Lesions to the left temporal lobe typically result in the patient struggling with: auditory 
sensation and perception, attention, visual perception, general language comprehension 
and production, long-term memory, personality changes and altered sexual behaviour (Kolb 
& Whishaw, 1990; Poeppl et al., 2016). As a result of the stroke, RR presents with Broca’s 
aphasia and when initially seen two weeks post-stroke, RR experienced complete expressive 
aphasia and some problems comprehending complex instructions (Puvanendran, Dowker & 
Demeyere, 2015). It is unlikely that RR’s damage to the left temporal lobe caused his 
inability, in this task, to experience CMEs. However the frontal cortex has been linked to CFT 
in Parkinson’s patients (Brown & Marsden, 1990; McNamara et al., 2003) and in patients 
with Schizophrenia (Larquet, 2009; Hooker, Roese & Park, 2000) as well as lesion studies 
(Gomez- Gomez-Beldarrain et al., 2005). The link between the frontal cortex and CMEs has 
also been extensively researched in healthy adults (Canessa et al., 2009; Nicolle et al., 2011) 
and patient studies (Coricelli et al.’s., 2005; Levens et al., 2014; Studer et al., 2015). The 
parietal cortex has also been associated with counterfactual production; the inferior parietal 
cortex (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Van Hoeck et al., 2013), 
medial parietal and lateral parietal regions (Addis et al., 2009). 
It is known that areas such as the right anterior insula, left insula/superior temporal 




the experience of regret compared to disappointment (O’Doherty et al., 2003; Chua et 
al., 2009). The anterior insula and the posterior lateral OFC have been associated with relief 
(Berntson et al., 2011; Palminteri et al., 2012). Van Hoeck et al. (2015) cite these areas, 
among others, in the emotional and value processing network; the network is responsible 
for reward signals that underpin emotional and value processing.  This would therefore 
suggest that damage incurred to these areas, which RR has sustained, could disrupt the 
process of feeling both regret and relief.  
The inferior frontal gyrus was active during Coricelli et al.’s (2005) gambling task that 
monitored neural activity during regret avoidance. Activity in the right dorsolateral PFC was 
correlated with the immediate experience of regret. Specifically, the border between middle 
and inferior frontal gyri was activated. This implies that the inferior frontal gyrus is involved 
in the immediate production of a CME. During the current task participants are required to 
rate their immediate emotional response to the outcome of positive and negative stimuli. 
Thus damage to this area may cause disruption in experiencing CMEs that are observed in 
the control group.  
In addition, Van Hoeck et al. (2015) discuss the importance of the Cingulo-Opercular 
Control Network in the process of experiencing CMEs. The network consists of the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex, the posterior medial frontal cortex, anterior insula, frontal 
operculum and the anterior PFC. The authors state that the control network directly 
influences behavioural regulation through the experience of regret. Through the experience 
of regret, the Cingulo-Opercular Control Network updates the outcome that has been 
encountered and signals when the counterfactual would have produced a more desirable 




al., 2013). RR’s damage to the frontal operculum could have resulted in a lack of regret 
when presented with a more advantageous counterfactual.  
Although suggesting that fontal damage is the cause of RR’s emotional responses is 
logical, it is interesting that RP (right hemisphere), JH (left hemisphere) and PS (bilateral) 
also have frontal damage yet report emotional responses in line with controls. Thus, it is 
possible that RR’s responses in this task are not caused by frontal damage. Unfortunately 
RR’s damage is extensive. As a result it is extremely difficult to pin point the most likely 
region, where damaged, that has resulted in his performance. It is possible that frontal 
damage contributes to RR’s performance, however, I cannot be confident in claiming this.  
6.4.2 MG 
Patient MG does not report experiencing regret while her experience of relief 
remains intact. Previous research with patients, who have OFC lesions, has shown that the 
experience of regret can be inhibited after a stroke (Camille, et al., 2004). Camille et al.’s 
(2004) OFC patients did report disappointment; patients rated themselves as happier after 
winning and sadder after losing, although these emotions were not moderated by full 
(regret) and partial (disappointment) feedback conditions. Thus, it would be interesting to 
utilise the task used in this chapter with OFC lesion patients to establish if patients would 
rate their emotions as lower upon realising they could have won a greater number of 
tokens.  
The finding that MG, who has a cerebella lesion, does not experience regret when 
presented with information regarding the counterfactual possibility suggests that it is not 
only OFC patients that experience behaviour demonstrated in Camille et al.’s (2004) study. 




also implicated. The finding from this investigation establishes that patients without OFC 
lesions have problems in experiencing regret and thus have highlighted that the OFC is not 
solely responsible for the mediation of CFE. However, it could be the case that the OFC is 
one of a few brain regions that play a pivotal role in experiencing regret and once one of 
these areas is damaged, the individual will experience significant problems in experiencing 
CFEs.  
Recently, neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies have begun to examine the 
role of the cerebella in DM (Rosenbloom et al., 2012). The cerebellum has been implicated 
in the pathology of autism, a condition where the experience of regret is dulled (Zalla et 
al., 2014). The specific involvement of the cerebellum in experiencing regret was not 
explored until Clausi et al. (2015) investigated how cerebellum damage affects reporting 
regret and the incorporation of regret into adaptive DM for future DM. The authors used 
the RGT (Camille et al., 2004; Mellers et al., 1999) to demonstrate that patients were 
unhindered in their ability to avoid choices that predicted regret in future trials, however, 
the same patients were significantly impaired when required to self-rate the experience of 
regret. The self-rating scores for other emotions, such as relief, were unimpaired. The 
results from the current study support the findings from Clausi et al. (2015) that cerebella 
damage causes patients to respond as though they do not experience regret while the 
experience of relief can be unaffected.  
Clausi et al. (2015) suggest that their findings, that the cerebellum is involved with 
the self-rating of regret, support Coricelli et al.’s (2007) model. The model describes the 
circuitry of regret comprised of the medial OFC, anterior cingulated cortex, and 




state by comparing the internal state and the state that is created by an uncontrolled 
external event (the outcome of a gamble).  
Although MG presents with cerebella damage and does not report experiencing 
regret there are several other patients who participated in this experiment who also have 
cerebella damage yet do experience both regret and relief. DJR has right cerebella damage, 
PW has left cerebella damage and SAR and NB have bilateral cerebella damage. This pattern 
of results would imply that cerebella damage can but does not always lead to disrupted 
emotional experiences and responses. As highlighted in Chapter 4 and 5, it is not possible 
too determine how damage to the cerebella affects CMEs, decision making and adaptive 
choice switching, yet it is clear that further research is needed to determine the relationship 
between these processes and the cerebella.  
6.4.3 GM 
In the opposite pattern to MG, GM demonstrates a pattern of results that suggest 
only the experience of relief is affected, leaving the experience of regret preserved. Previous 
developmental research has shown that there is lag in the development of regret and relief. 
Weisberg and Beck (2010) showed that children at the age of 5 reported feeling regret but 
not relief. Children at the age of 7 not only reported feeling regret but also the experience 
of relief. This evidence suggests that experiencing and reporting relief is more complex than 
regret and thus could explain why some patients have difficulty experiencing relief while the 
ability to experience regret is preserved.  
The reason behind the apparent lag between experiencing regret and relief was 




for children’s late experience of relief. Firstly, that there is a real lag in experiencing CMEs 
and regret genuinely develops earlier than relief. Secondly, previous studies used 
methodologies that make thinking about and experiencing relief harder than experiencing 
regret. Thirdly, the finding that relief is harder to experience than regret is a false positive. 
The experiments were created by presenting trials with initially positive or negative 
outcomes. However, the alternative option was either more positive (regret) or more 
negative (relief).  The children played two versions of the game, one where they lost or won 
the tokens for themselves and another where the child’s responsibility for the choice was 
manipulated. Experiment 1 produced results that reduced the lag in reporting regret and 
relief by incorporating trials where the outcome of the child’s choice was negative, i.e. they 
lost tokens. Therefore, the authors concluded that previous findings that relief is harder to 
experience than regret were caused by previous studies using methodologies that make 
experiencing relief harder than experiencing regret. If this suggestion is correct and relief is 
not developmentally experienced later than regret then it is no more surprising that GM 
does not experience relief compared to MG who does not experience regret.  
GM’s lesion lies within the left lingual region and surrounding structures. Van Hoeck 
et al. (2014) found activation in the lingual gyrus (along with the cuneus and left occipital 
gyrus) when an overlap between false belief, counterfactual and basic conditional reasoning 
was investigated. The authors suggest that the activation in the three additional regions 
could be a result of increased mental imagery. Additionally, Van Overwalle, D’aes and 
Mariën (2015) conducted a meta-analytic connectivity modelling study to investigate the 
functional connectivity of the cerebellum with the cerebrum in social cognitive processes. 




lingual region has not been exclusively investigated in studies that focus on the experience 
of CMEs. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first evidence that directly implicated the 
left lingual region in experiencing CMEs, specifically relief.  
An interesting finding of this experiment is the double dissociation between GM and 
MG in that MG experiences relief but does not experience regret while GM experiences 
regret but does not experience relief. This finding could be interpreted as contradicting the 
developmental literature, where one would expect regret to precede relief such that you 
would not expect to find a child who would experience relief but not regret (Weisberg & 
Beck, 2012). 
There is an interesting distinction in the literature between the concepts of brain 
region specialisation (such as Camille et al.’s (2004) suggestion that the OFC is responsible 
for the experience of regret) and that of brain interconnectivity. In the case of Theory of 
Mind (ToM), some research has demonstrated that brain areas such as the right TPJ, left 
TPJ, and posterior cingulate have specific and selective roles (Saxe & Wexler, 2005) when 
considering a protagonist’s thoughts or beliefs; these areas were not recruited when 
participants read about subjective feelings or other socially relevant information. These 
highlighted regions are also thought to be recruited in early developing ToM and have 
continued importance into adulthood. This evidence demonstrates that it is possible that 
some brain regions are adapted for specific cognitive roles. While it is possible that the 
experience of regret is solely reliant on the OFC and this region alone is responsible for the 
CFE that guides behavioural modification it is important to consider that interconnectivity 




cognitive functions rely on distributed networks of brain regions, each of which participates 
in more than one function”. 
Overall, three patterns of results were observed in a simple task that assessed 
patient counterfactual responses to winning and losing. Two patients did not experience any 
CMEs. One patient did not experience regret and one patient did not experience relief while 
all control patients responded as expected. RR did not report regret or relief. It is not clear 
which element of his extensive damage causes this lack of emotional response in this task. It 
is entirely possible that RR’s amygdala damage is the sole reason for his lack of regret and 
relief (Berntson et al., 2011). Although it is important to consider how neural connectivity 
has been damaged as a result of his wide spreading lesion. When considering the other 
three patients discussed their lesion sites paired with their behavioural profile lend support 











6.5 Introduction  
After the completion of the Simple Regret experiment, I decided that I would 
conduct a second experiment that has previously been used to demonstrate the 
relationship between the experience of regret and the ability to engage in ACS. The aim of 
this experiment was to investigate how the experience of regret directly impacts on future 
DM and underpins adaptive behavioural change.  
Regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982) states that we, as rational adults, 
are able to anticipate our emotional responses (such as regret and relief) to the outcome of 
our decisions. Furthermore, we are able to use the predicted emotional response to guide 
our future choices (Mellers, Schwartz & Ritov, 1999) which will avoid the negative 
experience of regret which is experienced after a poor choice (Loomes & Sugden, 1987). 
Research has shown that individuals anticipate regret as a consequence of their actions and 
will make choices in an attempt to minimise the experience of regret and thus avoid similar 
mistakes in the future (Zeelenberg, 1999; Mellers Schwartz & Ritov, 1999). 
The concept that regret facilitates ACS is supported by research suggesting that 
healthy adults behave in a regret-averse manner; spontaneously anticipating regret and 
selecting a course of action that avoids this negative emotion (Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der 
Pligt, & de Vries, 1996).  Furthermore, economic models of DM have been investigated. 
Research on how the experience of regret effects behavioural decisions in an economic 
context such as negotiation and bidding has been conducted. Creyer and Ross (1999) asked 
participants to imagine they were a salesperson and faced several economic decisions e.g. 
bidding. Participants were assigned to one of four conditions: lose/minimal, 




Results suggested that participants who were provided with negative outcome feedback 
were more risk averse than participants who received positive outcome feedback. Outcome 
feedback affected participants’ DM in a subsequent trial; after negative outcome feedback, 
participants’ bids were lower compared to when positive outcome feedback was provided. 
This finding providing evidence that the experience of regret affects subsequent DM.   
A similar study to the current experiment has been conducted in the developmental 
literature by O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney (2014). The authors examined the 
behavioural consequences of experiencing regret in children over two days. On day 1 
children were given the boxes task (see O’Connor et al., 2012 for methodology, and also 
Chapter 6a). On day 2 children were presented with the same boxes from day 1. They were 
given the opportunity to make the same choice as they did on day 1 or to swap the original 
box they opened for the alternative box. If the child wanted to change the box they opened 
from the day before, it would cost them one token (tokens could later be exchanged for 
stickers). Due to this deterrent, a rational decision maker should only switch boxes during 
regret trials and not baseline trials. This was termed ACS. Children who reported regret on 
day 1 were significantly more likely to show ACS on day 2 compared to children who did not 
report regret on day 1. In other words, these children switched boxes during regret trials, 
but did not switch boxes during baseline trials, demonstrating that children’s ability to 
experience regret helps children modify their behaviour in similar future situations. This 
behaviour was exhibited at about 7 years.  
Developmental research, such as O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney (2014), focusses 
on the experience of regret, while the adult literature focusses on regret anticipation. 




facilitate choice switching when faced with the same decision a second time. As noted by 
O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney (2014), the process by which this behavioural 
modification occurs is not fully specified. However, Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) do state 
that experiencing regret, in addition to facilitating choice switching, encourages individuals 
to remember mistakes and missed opportunities. In addition, regret is said to motivate 
individuals to make up for their mistake and possible losses. Though re-living our mistakes 
we become more equipped to deal with the same situation the second time it is 
encountered and allows for the continuation of reward inducing decisions.  
Overall, there are three explanations of how regret affects DM (see Figure 6.2 for 
visual representation). First, that the experience of regret leads to anticipated regret and 
through this anticipation, we choose to avoid actions that could lead to regret. Previous 
work conducted by Coricelli et al. (2005) supports this explanation. Activity in the medial 
orbitofrontal region, the ACC and the hippocampus was observed during the experience of 
regret. Throughout the experiment, participants became increasingly regret averse which 
was reflected in the activity within medial OFC and amygdala. The same pattern of brain 
activity was also observed just before participants made a choice. Therefore, the same 
neural network was active during the experience of regret and also the anticipation of 
regret. In line with the notion that the experience of regret leads to anticipated regret and 
through this anticipation, we choose to avoid actions that could lead to regret. 
The second possibility is that regret facilitates the memory that particular choices 
were poor and lead to negative outcomes and as a result we modify our behaviour. 
O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney (2014) investigated the link between experiencing regret 




between a low value and a high value box). The results showed that irrespective of 
experiencing regret, children engaged in ACS after answering a memory question regarding 
the boxes’ contents. Thus, those children who do not spontaneously choose to switch boxes 
(and have not reported experiencing regret) seem not to have access to evaluative 
information about the outcome of their choice (winning a better prize as an outcome of the 
initial cost) without being prompted. In addition to this, when children were asked why they 
chose to switch their box, those children who reported regret gave explanations based on 
adaptive switching whereas the children who did not experience regret initially only gave 
similar adaptive type explanations after they were asked the memory question. These 
results suggest that the experience of regret elicits a memory, and it is through activating 
the memory that individuals are able to engage in ACS.  Thus the link between experiencing 
regret and ACS is retrieval of the negative memory.  
It is also possible that the experience of regret is directly linked to adaptive switching 
and anticipated regret is not required in this process. Developmental evidence has produced 
interesting findings dissociating the experience of regret and anticipated regret. O’Connor, 
McCormack, Beck and Feeney (2015) invited 6 and 7 year old children to take part in a two 
day experiment that investigated the experience of regret and anticipated regret on ACS 
(while manipulating the child’s experience of responsibility). On day 1 the children played 
the boxes task (see O’Connor et al., 2012 for methodology) to investigated their experience 
of regret. Children were classified as experiencing regret if they rated their emotions as 
sadder upon finding out that the alternative prize they could have won was more desirable 
than the actual prize they did win. On day 2 children’s ACS was examined using the same 
methodology as O’Connor et al. (2014). Children were categorised as showing ACS if they 




(where the number of tokens was the same in each box). Children were then given a third 
task which examined their anticipated regret. Anticipated regret was tested using three 
boxes. Children were told that each box contained one prize of low, medium or high value. 
In reality, all boxes contained a medium prize. Children were asked to remove one of the 
three boxes out of the game. Children then chose to open one of the two remaining boxes, 
winning a medium prize. Children rated their emotional response to their prize (and thus 
their chosen box) on a 5 point smiley face scale. Children were then asked to rate how they 
would feel about their chosen box if the unchosen box contained the high value prize. 
Children were classified as anticipating regret if they predicted their emotions to be sadder 
if the alternative box contained the high value prize. Results showed that the children who 
experienced regret in the boxes task were more likely to engage in ACS. Additionally, the 
same children who engaged in ACS did not accurately predict their emotional response in 
the anticipated regret trial. This suggests that it is the experience of regret that predicts ACS 



























Figure 6.2: Three visual models representing differing opinions on how the experience of 
regret and anticipated regret affect ACS. Top: model representing Coricelli et al.’s (2005) 
explanation. Middle: model representing O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney’s (2014) 
suggestion. Bottom: model representing O’Connor, McCormack, Beck & Feeney’s (2015) 
findings. 
This experiment was run to establish if the same patients who did not experience 
regret in the previous study (RR, LB and MG) would follow the developmental pattern 




experience of regret was preserved in the previous study but her experience of relief was 
impaired. If the developmental pattern (children who experience regret also engage in ACS) 
is observed in brain-damaged individuals, then patient GM should engage in ACS. If the 
developmental pattern is not observed in the patients tested then this finding would 
suggest that memory of the initial task is sufficient to engage in ACS and the experience of 
regret is not required.  
One group of individuals who have been shown to report no differing emotional 
responses for regret and disappointment trials in a gambling task are individuals with High-
Functioning Autism or Asperger syndrome (HFA/AS). However, these same individuals, 
regardless of their lack of experienced regret, still chose in accordance with maximizing 
expected values and anticipating regret (no difference from controls). The experiment 
conducted by Zalla et al. (2014) used partial and full feedback on a gambling task with two 
wheels/lotteries that offered differing number of points. The finding that emotional ratings 
for the group with HFA/AS only differed in regret evaluations and not in disappointment, joy 
or relief conditions suggests that the experience of regret alone is compromised and is 
described as a diminished self-report emotional awareness. However, the HFA/AS group 
showed a similar pattern to controls in their choice behaviour, through avoiding a high risk 
regret possibility (risky wheel) following a regret event, suggesting that HFA/AS individuals 
can anticipate regret. These findings suggests that the experience of regret is not required 
for anticipating regret and choice behaviour in line with avoiding possible regret. Thus, it is 
possible that the patients who did not experience regret in the previous study (RR, LB and 
MG) may still engage in ACS. See Nicolle, Ropar and Beck (2014) for commentary.  
During this experiment, as in O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney’s (2014) paper, 




the same box in an ACS task. Adaptive choice switchers are categorised as participants who, 
after receiving an undesirable outcome, switch their choice when given the opportunity to 
do so at a later time. A cost of switching was incorporated (half the initial winnings) to 
ensure that participants were not switching purely because they have been asked if they 
want to. A memory check was also incorporated to ensure that participants recall their 
initial winnings and thus make the decision to switch boxes based upon the desire to gain 
the greatest reward and not because of alternative reasoning. The memory check simply 
requires participants to recall images previously shown to them, one from a box they chose 
to open and one from the alternative box they did not chose to open. However, the memory 
check used by O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney’s (2014) required participants, on day 2, to 
recall the contents of both the alternative and their chosen box. The authors found that if 
children were asked to recall the contents of the boxes they were more likely to engage in 
ACS. Therefore I chose to use an alternative memory check as I aimed to investigate if regret 
plays a role in ACS and thus did not wish to remind patients (as in O’Connor, McCormack 
and Feeney) of the boxes’ contents.  
The ability to demonstrate ACS is of particular interest as it sheds light on which 
participants have learnt from their previous actions and modified their behaviour in order to 
increase their gains (O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2014). To my knowledge this is the 
first experiment that examines neurologically damaged patients’ ability to engage in ACS.  
I will refer to the experiment in Chapter 6a, Simple Regret, as Experiment 1 and refer 









The ACS task comprised two trials, an experimental trial in which the boxes 
contained different amounts and the participant always won 20p and missed winning £1 
and a baseline trial in which both boxes contained 20p. The task was split into 4 parts that 
were completed; Experimental Trial Part 1 and Experimental Trial Part 2 were completed in 
the first session, whereas Baseline Trial Part 1 and Baseline Trial Part 2 were completed in 
the section session. Thus, participants answer four questions, one for each condition. 
Session 1: Experimental Trial Part 1 contained the first section of the memory check 
followed by the first section of the regret DM task. Experimental Trial Part 2 was completed 
after the counterfactual conditional questions task and included the second section of the 
regret DM task, followed by the second section of the memory check.  
Session 2: Baseline Trial Part 1 was the first session of the baseline trial and Baseline 
Trial Part 2 was the second session of the baseline trial. 
Materials 
Four distinctively different patterned boxes (20x16x27cm) were used as stimuli. Two 
boxes were used for the baseline trial and the other two boxes were used for the regret trial 
(DM 1 and 2). Each of the baseline boxes contained a square section of card (20x20cm) with 
20p written on each card. Each of the experimental boxes contained a square section of 
card (20x20cm) with 20p written on one side and £1 written on the other side.  Two 
different coloured draw-string pouches were used in the memory check. One pouch 





Session 1: Participants completed Experimental Trial Part 1. Participants initially 
completed the first section of the memory check. Two boxes were placed in front of the 
participant. The participant heard “We are going to play a game with these two boxes. You 
can open one of the boxes now. Please choose a box.” Once the participant had selected a 
box, the experimenter removed the lid and revealed either a picture of a dog or a hammer, 
the participant was given the corresponding picture. The experimenter then opened the 
second box, saying “We are now going to see what is inside the other box, this box contains 
a picture of a…” and revealing either the hammer or the dog. 
The regret DM task (part 1) was then administered. A pair of new boxes replaced the 
previous ones. The participant was informed that these boxes contained money instead of 
pictures, “like before you are allowed to choose one of the two boxes and you can keep the 
prize that is inside the box- this time the boxes have money inside them.” The experimenter 
would always show the participant the side of the card, which had 20p written on it. The 
alternative box was subsequently opened. The experimenter always showed the side of the 
card which had £1 written on it.  
During the same session Experimental Trial Part 2 was completed; the second 
section of the regret DM task was administered. The same pair of boxes used in the first 
section of the regret DM task was placed in front of the participant. The participants were 
informed that the boxes contained the same prizes as previously “These are the two boxes 
from before, I have set them up so they contain the same prizes as they did before you 
opened them last time.” The participant was then handed their 20p winnings - in two 10p 




worked: “You can keep the 20p that you won from before and open the same box for free, 
or you can pay 10p and swap your box to the one you didn’t choose earlier”. The 
participant’s decision was recorded. The economically rational response would be to pay the 
initial 10p in order to open the alternative box and win £1.  
The second section of the memory check was then set up. The two sections of the 
memory check were completed first and last in order to maximise the reliability of passing. 
Thus, it could be inferred that those patients, who were successful on the memory check, 
would also be able to recall the boxes’ content in the test phase of the experiment. The 
same pair of boxes used in the first session was placed in front of the participant. The 
participant was asked to point to the box that they chose last time (with the image of the 
dog/hammer in front of them and then asked “Do you remember what was inside the other 
box?” Participants’ responses were recorded. In order to pass the memory check, the 
participant must recall which box they chose in the first section and also recall the image in 
the alternative box.  
Session 2:  Participants completed the Baseline Trial Part 1 at the start of their 
second session. The experimenter placed two different coloured bags in front of the 
participant, informing them that they could choose one of the two bags: “You are allowed to 
choose one of the two bags and you can keep the prize that is inside of it- there is money 
inside the bags. Please choose a bag.” The participant was shown that their chosen bag 
contained 20p; which was given to them in two 10p coins. The participant then saw that the 
alternative bag also contained 20p. 
After the simple regret experiment was completed, the Baseline Trial Part 2 was run. 




were informed that the bags contained the same contents as earlier in the experiment. The 
participants were then given the opportunity to open the same bag as previously for free, or 
pay 10p of their initial winnings to open the alternative bag and win the prize. The 
economically rational response in the baseline trial would be not to pay to switch bags.  
6.7 Results 
I created a profile for each individual over the whole ACS task taking into account the 
regret DM task, the memory check, and the baseline trial. To pass the memory check, the 
patient must first identify which box their image of a hammer/dog came from. They must 
then recall the image of the alternative picture. The patients who failed the memory check 
(PW and MP) recalled their previous chosen box correctly, but did not recall the alternative 
image. All other patients passed both sections of the memory check.  
In order to pass the choice switching condition, the patient must swap the box they 
originally chose, containing 20p, for a cost. The patient must give away half of their 
winnings, 10p, in order to open the alternative box and win the corresponding prize. The 
incorporation of an initial financial loss from swapping boxes discourages participants from 
choosing the alternative box simply because they have been presented with the opportunity 
to do so. This ensures that patients who do show a change of behaviour are demonstrating 
ACS and not just a preference for switching itself. Patients NB and GM failed this condition 
as they did not agree to incur the initial cost of 10p in order to open the alternative box and 
win the £1 that was contained inside.  
The base line condition is used as a ‘control’ condition, to check that the patients are 




option to do so. For patients to pass this condition, they must not take an initial loss of 10p 
in order to open the alterative box. This is the case because the previously chosen and the 
alternative box contain the same monetary value. Only patient MP chose to switch on the 
baseline condition. All control participants passed each of the three conditions. For a full 






Results for patients in each of the three conditions 
  Condition 
Patient Memory check Choice switch Baseline 
NB Pass Fail Pass 
MG Pass Pass Pass 
DR Pass Pass Pass 
PW Fail Pass Pass 
TJ Pass Pass Pass 
RR Pass Pass Pass 
PS Pass Pass Pass 
JB Pass Pass Pass 
GM Pass Fail Pass 
LB Pass Pass Pass 
EL Pass Pass Pass 
MP Fail Pass Fail 
PF Pass Pass Pass 
JH Pass Pass Pass 
MB Pass Pass Pass 
RP Pass Pass Pass 
NB: The rows highlighted in yellow show the patients who failed at one of the three 
conditions. For the choice switching condition, swapping boxes is labelled as ‘pass’. In the 





I set out to establish if there is a relationship between experiencing regret and ACS.  
Developmental research (O’Connor et al., 2014) has shown that that children’s ability to 
experience regret facilitates children’s learning and behavioural modification; the aim of 
experiment 2 was to investigate if this relationship is present in a group of patients, some of 
whom have problems in experiencing regret, relief, or both. 
Results show that 4 out of the 17 patients show a different pattern of results from 
the other 13 patients and all 17 control participants. Patient PW failed the memory check. 
Patient MP failed the memory check and the baseline trial. Patients GM and NB failed the 
choice switching trial only. Patients who fail the memory check are discounted from being 
classed as adaptive choice switchers, because we cannot be certain that they choose the 
alternative box, during the test phase, to increase their gains and thus make an adaptive 
choice switch (it could be due to non-systematic answering or the preference for switching). 
Also, patients failing the baseline condition are removed as possible adaptive choice 
switchers (O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2014). 
BCoS results for GM, PW and MP do not highlight a cognitive impairment that may 
have impacted on their performance during this task. These patients are not impaired in any 
of the following:  number calculation, language comprehension or long term verbal 
memory: free recall and recognition. This suggests that these patients, whose performance 
was different from controls, are affected by their brain lesion directly. NB’s BCoS results are 





Patient GM and patient NB failed only during the choice switching trial. This suggests 
that these two patients cannot perform an adaptive choice switch and thus are not learning 
from their mistakes in a previous trial. As previously reviewed, patient NB reports both 
regret and relief in Experiment 1. GM failed both medium and large size conditions for relief 
trials in Experiment 1 yet passes regret trials. This pattern of results is different to what is 
observed in the developmental literature where children only engage in ACS if they have 
previously experienced regret.  
GM has damage to the left sided lingual gyrus and the surrounding areas. The link 
between the lingual gyrus and the VMPFC, lateral temporal gyrus and the hippocampus has 
been highlighted by DeBrigard et al. (2015) could explain GM’s failure to engage in 
behavioural modification in this task. Van Hoek et al. (2015) describe a reward network 
which incorporates the VMPFC, suggesting that the VMPFC and the lingual gyrus could be 
connected. If GM’s lesion has disrupted this connection and thus interrupted the reward 
network, then GM may not compute that encountering an initial lose (half the participant’s 
winnings) would result in an overall greater gain. However, to my knowledge this is the first 
study that directly links the left lingual gyrus to adaptive learning.  
NB has lesions covering the right angular gyrus, left cerebellum, right inferior 
occipital lobe and right inferior parietal lobe. The literature does not shed light on reasoning 
for NB failing this task. It is possible that damage to any of these areas has resulted in this 
pattern of behaviour. It becomes increasingly difficult, when multiple regions have been 
compromised, to establish the reason behind a patient failing a task, especially when the 




At this point I will briefly discuss the regions which I believe are most likely to have caused 
NB’s behavioural pattern.  
The angular gyrus is commonly associated with arithmetic problem solving and 
mental calculation (Cowell et al., 2000; Delazer et al., 2003; Prabhakaran et al., 2001; Zago & 
Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2002). Dehaene et al. (1999) specifically linked the angular gyrus with 
exact, in comparison to approximate, arithmetic. Thus it is possible that NB only fails the 
choice switching exercise on the basis of a miscalculation. BCoS results demonstrate that NB 
does indeed have impaired number calculation. As a result it is possible that NB is able to 
engage in adaptive choice switching but the current task did not allow for him to 
demonstrate his ability to do so. 
This interpretation sheds light on a possible limitation of the presented study; 
participants should be given simple mathematical sums to calculate in order to establish 
that they are failing this task on the basis of impaired choice switching and not a calculation 
error. Combining simple tests of arithmetic and BCoS scores would allow for confident 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the cause of a patient’s difficulties on this task. 
However, it should be noted that Venkatraman et al., (2005) suggested that exact 
arithmetic, and the angular gyrus, is only responsible for retrieval of arithmetic facts, 
suggesting that the system would not be active during the current experiment. Studies 
investigating exact arithmetic have shown that multiplication problems are solved from fact 
retrieval rather than the subtraction and addition which are required in the current 




I will now discuss how patient performance on the simple regret task (reported in 
Chapter 6a) relates to the ACS task presented in this chapter. As previously explained, there 
are three explanations of how regret affects DM and ACS. First, that the experience of regret 
leads to anticipated regret and it is this anticipation that is at the root of adaptive DM 
(Coricelli et al., 2005). Second, that the experience of regret creates a negative memory and 
recollection of the memory that particular choices were poor dictates behaviour 
modification (supported by O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney., 2014). Third, that the 
experience of regret is directly responsible for adaptive switching; anticipated regret is not 
required (O’Connor, McCormack, Beck & Feeney, 2015).  
O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney (2014) found that children who participated in a 
similar experiment demonstrated a relationship between experiencing regret and ACS. 
Those children who reported experiencing regret in Experiment 1 were able to pass 
Experiment 2 by switching their box. However, those children who did not report regret in 
the first experiment were significantly less likely to engage in choice switching. None of the 
patients in experiment 1 who failed regret trials, RR, LB and MG showed a similar 
behavioural pattern to the children in O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney’s (2014) study who 
failed initial regret trials and subsequent choice switching in experiment 2. RR, LB and MG 
were able to engage in ACS despite their lack of experienced regret. Therefore, results from 
this experiment do not produce evidence for a link between experienced regret and the 
ability to engage in ACS in the patients who took part in this project. 
Patients RR, MG and LB do not report experiencing regret in either the medium or 
large size condition in Experiment 1, yet all three patients pass Experiment 2, demonstrating 




switching exercise due to their memory of the task and not because they previously 
experienced regret (during ACS part 1). If this is indeed the case, it would suggest that 
individuals do not directly require regret to change their behaviour in order to build upon 
past experiences and engage in behavioural modification. This finding is possible support for 
the notion that memory of regret facilitates ACS (O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2014). 
An alternative to the memory account is Coricelli et al’s (2005) argument that 
anticipated regret is the mediating factor between the experience of regret and ACS. 
Although it is surprising that individuals do not experience regret but do anticipate it. 
However, evidence from individuals with HFA/AS has shown that participants can make 
choices in accordance with maximizing expected values and anticipate regret without the 
ability to experience regret directly (Zalla et al., 2014). Thus, patients RR, MG and LB are 
demonstrating the same response pattern to that of Zalla et al.’s HFA/AS individuals and are 
providing support for Coricelli et al.’s (2005) notion that anticipated regret facilitates DM.  
The finding that three patients do not require the experience of regret to adaptively 
switch their behaviour is in line with research conducted by Raeva et al. (2011).  Indeed, 
Raeva et al. (2011) have argued that the experience of regret itself is not a necessary 
precursor for altering DM. The authors investigated how feedback on individual DM affected 
behavioural change. It was shown that participants became regret averse once they 
received feedback on the obtained outcome (factual outcome) and also on the hypothetical 
outcome (counterfactual outcome). Regret aversion was observed not only when 
participants experience regret, but also when no regret was experienced (factual outcomes 
were equal to counterfactual outcomes). Thus, the findings imply that the effect of 




induced during the prior choice. This claim made by Raeva et al. (2011) opposes Coricelli 
et al.’s (2005) suggestion the experience of regret leads to anticipated regret and through 
this process, individuals choose to make decisions based on avoiding the experience of 
regret.  
In addition, patient GM failed both medium and large size conditions for relief trials, 
yet passed both regret conditions. GM passes both the memory check and the baseline trial 
which suggests she understands the task. Based upon O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney’s 
(2014) work one would expect GM to use choice switching in Experiment 2; however this is 
not the case. GM’s pattern of results further indicates that patients after neurological 
damage does not follow the same pattern of behaviour seen in typically developing children 
(the experience of regret predicts ACS behaviour), suggesting, in this group of patients, that 
the experience of regret is not crucial for behavioural modification and possibly regret 
avoidance.   
Overall, this experiment was adapted from O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney’s 
(2014) work that demonstrated that children who experience regret are more likely to 
engage in ACS behaviour. The aim of this experiment was to examine the relationship of 
regret and future DM and if the experience of regret underpins adaptive behavioural change 
in a patient population. Two patients failed the ACS task (GM and NB). Patient GM failed 
both medium and large size conditions for relief trials in yet passes regret trials in 
Experiment 1. Patient NB passes all conditions for both regret and relief in Experiment 1. It 
is possible however that NB’s performance on the current task was impacted by impaired 
number calculation. Patients who do not experience regret in Experiment 1 (RR, MG and 




developmental findings described by O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney’s (2014), suggesting 
that, for the patients tested in this experiment, the experience of regret does not underpin 
the ability to engage in ACS. However, it is not clear whether ACS is facilitated by the 
memory of regret or anticipated regret. In order to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of which account is most likely, it would be necessary to investigate 
anticipated regret in a patient population. In addition, investigating the effects of memory 
strategies in patients who are unable to engage in ACS might shed light on the relationship 
between memory and behavioural modification while also providing an important 
contribution to rehabilitation programmes for such patients. It is important to note the 
possibility that the developmental trajectory that binds the experience of regret and ACS 
together is required for normal development through childhood, but once the ability to 
adapt ones behaviour is acquired the ability to engage in ACS becomes independent to that 














7.1 Introduction  
Counterfactuals are thoughts of what might have been (Epstude & Roese, 2008). For 
example if an individual is late for work they might think ‘If I had not pressed snooze on my 
alarm, I may not have missed my bus to work and been late’. Previous research has shown 
that neuropsychological patients, especially those with damage to the OFC, have problems 
with reporting regret (Camille et al., 2004). However, it has not been investigated if these 
patients struggle with the reasoning that is thought to underpin regret, CFT. Here I will test 
neuropsychological patients’ ability to answer simple counterfactual conditional questions. 
Counterfactual reasoning in Schizophrenia patients has been examined by Hooker, 
Roese and Park (2000) (see Chapter 1). Results indicated that CFT was impaired in the group 
with Schizophrenia compared to controls; Schizophrenia patients used less counterfactual 
language and engaged less frequently in counterfactual thought when prompted. The two 
groups of participants were not significantly different in tests for general cognitive ability, 
suggesting that deficits seen in patients was not due to general cognitive declined observed 
in Schizophrenia. However, CFT was correlated with social functioning. It is possible that the 
problems faced by Schizophrenia patients in counterfactual reasoning are linked to the 
frontal lobe dysfunction that causes the disorder.  
Further research on CFT has been conducted by McNamara et al. (2003) with 
Parkinson’s patients (see Chapter 1 for description of methods). Results indicated that 
despite demonstrating no difference from controls in a semantic fluency test, Parkinson’s 
patients produced significantly fewer spontaneous counterfactuals. Furthermore, results 
from the CIT, where participants infer which of two story protagonists feel worse after a 




CFT and these deficits correlated with tasks that probe frontal lobe dysfunction. The 
relationship between impaired performance in counterfactual inference tasks and tests 
examining frontal lobe dysfunction (EF) are similarly reported in typically developing 
children (Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 2009; Beck, Riggs & Burns, 2011). 
These studies of CFT in patient groups have focussed on advanced abilities: such as 
spontaneous generation of counterfactuals (which developmental psychology suggests is 
late developing and more challenging than simply considering counterfactual worlds, 
Guajardo, McNally, & Wright, 2016), and the evaluation of CMEs (at least 2 of 4 questions in 
the CIT explicitly ask about emotions following from counterfactual thoughts). As mentioned 
above, studies of neuropsychological patients have also focussed on experience of CMEs 
(e.g. Coricelli et al., 2004) rather than people’s competence at thinking about 
counterfactually, in the first place. This emphasis is particularly interesting when considered 
in the light of the developmental literature on CFT, which has first tried to analyse children’s 
ability to think about counterfactuals, and only more recently turned to CMEs. In this 
literature, it suggested that in order to experience CMEs, children must first develop the 
ability to reason about counterfactual worlds. That is why in this study, I investigated 
whether simple counterfactual reasoning was impaired in patients with acquired brain 
damage. We do not yet know whether acquired brain damage can also impair very simple 
counterfactual reasoning abilities, that emerge early in development. All healthy adults 
would be expected to have these simple abilities. I now review the developmental literature 
to identify these specific abilities.  
Some argue that children as young as 3 or 4 years old can pass counterfactual tasks 




focused on sequences of events (if A then B) and counterfactual events (in the absence of A, 
then not B). For example, a character, Carole, walks over a clean floor with muddy shoes. 
Children are then asked a counterfactual question ‘‘What if Carole had taken her shoes off, 
would the floor be dirty?’ Although there is some dispute over the exact age at which 
children answer this question correctly (e.g. Riggs et al., 1998), the authors argued that 
when children pass these tasks they are using counterfactual reasoning abilities. 
However, Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas and Perner (2010) have argued that answering 
simple counterfactual conditional tasks, such as those described above, does not require 
counterfactual reasoning and instead children can use Basic Conditional Reasoning (BCR) to 
answer these questions. BCR involves logical reasoning and general knowledge of the world 
but not the consideration of a specific alternative world that characterises a counterfactual 
(Rafetseder et al., 2010). For example, BCR could be used to answer the questions asked in 
Harris et al.’s (1996) study about Carole and her muddy shoes by thinking that typically, if 
shoes are removed, floors stay clean.  
Rafetseder et al. (2010) argue that BCR is used when the information about specific 
events is dismissed and general regularities are relied on instead. In order to think 
counterfactually, one’s reasoning must be within the realm of actual events; creating the 
nearest possible world. The authors aimed to design a series of experiments that avoided 
the problem of BCR that Harris et al. (1996) encountered (see Chapter 1 for description of 
methods). In conditions where CFT and BCR would produce the same response, children 
performed well. However, performance declined in conditions where BCR and 




In a further study, Rafetseder and Perner (2010) showed that by 6 years, children 
used counterfactual reasoning, not BCR, to answer the questions. In support of this, other 
authors have also argued that children are not thinking counterfactually until they are 
around 5 or 6 years old, because they fail to see the counterfactual as an alternative that 
could have replaced the real world (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006, see also Beck 
& Guthrie, 2011). 
Thus, in this study of counterfactual reasoning ability in neurological patients I 
wanted to use questions that could not be answered using BCR, but rather required genuine 
counterfactual reasoning, and yet, I did not wish to make the additional demand of asking 
participants to infer regret. I used a scenario in which events could be singly or doubly 
determined. Singly determined outcomes have only one cause, whereas doubly determined 
outcomes could have been the result of either of two causes. For example, if Professor Plum 
poisons the victim, and then Miss Scarlet, who is ignorant of the poisoning, stabs him, we 
can describe the victim’s murder as doubly determined. If Miss Scarlet had not stabbed the 
victim, he would still have died. In a singly determined event (where for example no 
poisoning happens) if Miss Scarlet had not stabbed the victim, the outcome would have 
been different. Using doubly determined questions allows us to identify patients who are 
using BCR and those who are thinking counterfactually. BCR-reasoners will answer the 
question simply by cancelling the stabbing event and asking whether people who have not 
been stabbed are typically alive or dead. While this gives the same answer for the singly 
determined event, it leads to the incorrect answer in the doubly determined event (BCR = 
alive, counterfactual reasoning = dead, because of Professor Plum). Recent developmental 




doubly determined questions. McCormack et al. (2017) showed that while singly 
determined questions were answered correctly by 4-to-5 year olds, doubly determined 
questions were not answered correctly until 6-to-7 years. Thus, I aim to investigate how 
determination affects performance in a patient group. It is possible that patients, like 
children, find doubly determined questions harder to answer than singly determined 
questions.  
Two different types of counterfactual questions were asked, either subtractive or 
additive. Subtractive questions require participants to mentally undo an action that has 
already occurred or remove an element of the stimulus set up that is presented. Additive 
questions require participants to imagine an additional element to the stimulus set up. In 
both instances the adding or subtracting of an element/action may or may not affected the 
outcome. The distinction between additive and subtractive counterfactual questions has 
been described by Roese, Hur, and Pennington, (1999) and Roese and Olson, (1993). 
McCormack et al. (2017) investigated children’s ability to answer additive and subtractive 
counterfactual questions, although children answered more questions correctly in the 
subtractive condition the difference did not reach significance. I wish to establish if there is 
a difference in patients’ ability to answer subtractive and additive counterfactual questions.  
A further type of temporal conditional is incorporated in this study. Developmental 
evidence suggests that children find it easier to consider possible worlds in the future 
compared to the past. While 3-year-olds struggle with past conditionals ‘What if Carole had 
not taken her shoes off, would the floor be clean or dirty?’ they perform much better when 
asked about the future ‘What if next time Carole takes her shoes off, will the floor be clean 




than the former (this may be because ignoring what you know to be true about the past 
makes additional inhibitory control demands, Beck, Carroll, Brunsden, & Gryg, 2011). In this 
study I included both singly and doubly determined future conditional questions as well as 
counterfactual questions, to form a complete picture of the effect of the neurological 
damage.   
The current experiment was conducted to establish if CFT in neurologically damaged 
patients is impaired on a task that requires patients to ignore current reality and consider an 
alternative in either the future (future hypothetical) or the past (counterfactual conditional). 
The questions asked were either singly determined (characterised by only one event causing 
the outcome in one trial) or doubly determined (characterised by two events causing the 
same outcome in one trial) and had a subtractive (an element of the apparatus is removed) 
or an additive component (an extra element is added to the apparatus). Combining 
neuropsychological research with developmental studies will permit informed claims about 
the neurological network that supports CFT and DM. A more comprehensive investigation 
into the developmental processes, which have been reported in the literature, and the 
neural framework that facilitates CFT will become possible.  
7.2 Method 
Participants 
A total of 17 patients (7 female) aged between 67 and 84 (M = 73.8 years, SD = 7.02) 
and 15 controls (12 female) aged between 28 and 74 (M = 59.4 years, SD = 12.6) completed 
this test battery. See Table 7.0 for information on the patients who failed, and will be 





 Description of the patients’ information who are discussed in this task 
Patient DOB Hemisphere Year of 
Damage 
Lesion affected Anatomy 
PW  L 2013 Cerebellar  
PS  L 2012 Amygdala. Possible damage to the 
frontal radiation associated with the 
corpus callosum and anterior limb of 
the internal capsule  
GM  L 2013 Left sided lingual gyrus  and nearby 
occipital structures including the left 
intracalcarine cortex and occipital 
fusiform gyrus 
PF  BILAT 1999 Bilateral superior and inferior parietal 
gyri lesion, left sided lesion extends 
into the left angular gyrus and the 
right sided lesion extends slightly into 
the right caudate. Small left thalamus 
lesion. Extensive white matter 
damage to the frontal and parietal 
cortices 
SAR  BILAT 2012 Cerebellar,  occipital lobe, frontal 




damage to the frontal radiation 
associated with the corpus callosum 
and the anterior limb of the internal 
capsule 
MP  R 1998 Extensive temporal, frontal and 
parietal damage. Damage extends to 
the right insular, middle temporal 
gyrus (anterior and posterior 
divisions) as well as the temporo-
occipital region and the OFC.  Possible 
damage to the frontal radiation 
associated with corpus callosum and 
anterior limb of the internal capsule 
 
Design 
The experiment was administered using Power Point. On each trial an image was 
displayed that consisted of two ‘tracks’, one red fast (shorter distance) and one blue slow 
(longer distance). Both tracks ended in the same area, here, a red cylinder block was 
standing upright. One marble was placed at the top of each track (in its corresponding 
colour). Half of the trials were in the counterfactual condition; participants watched an 
animation of the marbles dropping down the tracks. The marbles were dropped down the 
track, and when one reached the block, it would fall over. In this condition counterfactual 




would stay at the top of the tracks (no animation). In this condition future hypothetical 
questions were asked. In addition, black pegs -that acted as barriers- were added in or taken 
away from the tracks, creating additive and subtractive trials. The role of the pegs was to 
stop the marble half way down the track, thus not allowing that marble to knock over the 
block.  
64 trials were administered, 32 in the counterfactual condition and 32 in the future 
condition. In order to create the stimuli, each of the conditions was split into groups of 4, 
containing 4 stimuli (16 trials) which had the same set up; i) no pegs. ii) a peg placed on the 
slow track. iii) a peg placed on the fast track. iv) a peg on both tracks. Each of these images 
was flipped on the vertical axis to create filler trials. One of each ‘type’ of question was 
coupled with each of the 4 stimuli once, for example (see table 7.1 for an example of each 
type of question coupled with stimuli). The slides were then ordered using a pseudo random 
trial; an 8x8 Latin Square was used. The trial randomisation limited any sequence effects 
that may have occurred otherwise.  
Half of the trials (32) were doubly determined questions. Doubly determined 
questions are created by the stimulus set up. Two events cause the same outcome in one 
trial. The blue and orange marble will both knock over the block if the stimuli are not altered 
(pre-question). When a counterfactual conditional question (counterfactual condition) or a 
future hypothetical question (future condition) is asked, neither adding nor subtracting a 
barrier or stopping a marble being dropped will alter the outcome of the trial.  
The other half of trials (32) were singly determined. Singly determined trials are 
characterised by only one event causing the outcome. Either one marble only knocks the 




single marble that will knock the block down is stopped or either of the two barriers are 
removed then the outcome of the trial will change; this rule applied to both counterfactual 






Example questions for both counterfactual and future trials, including information regarding question type, determination and correct 
response. 
Stimulus Question Condition Additive or 
Subtractive  
Determination  Response 
 
If I had not rolled the blue 
marble that time would the 
block have fallen down? 
Counterfactual Subtractive Double Yes 
 
If I do not drop the orange 
marble this time will the 
block fall down? 





If I take away the blue peg 
this time will the block still 
fall down? 
Future Subtractive Single Yes 
 
If I had put the peg on the 
blue side as well that time 
would the block have fallen 
down? 
Counterfactual Additive  Single No 
 
If I take away the orange peg 
this time will the block fall 
down? 





If I had put the peg on the 
blue side that time would 
the block have fallen down? 
Counterfactual Additive Double Yes 
Note. 6 different questions are used as not every question can be paired with every stimulus. For example during trials where the stimuli has 






Training: Participants were trained on the rules of the question game. PowerPoint 
slides were shown depicting small sections of the apparatus accompanied by an 
explanation. “What you are going to see is a marble at the top of a fast track like this 
[picture]. The marble is going to drop down the track like this [animation of marble dropping 
is shown]. As you can see, the marble has knocked over the block [animation of block falling 
occurs].” This was followed by an explanation of how the peg would be used throughout the 
task. “In some trials there will be a peg stopping the marble from rolling down the track like 
this [animation]. This means the block didn’t fall over.” The participants were read the same 
instructions, accompanied by slides and animation, for the red fast track. The experimenter 
then showed the two tracks together. “In the experiment there will always be two marbles, 
dropped down each of the tracks. When the marbles are dropped, only one marble can 
knock the block over like this [animation].” Finally, the timing conditions were explained; 
“Sometimes the marble will stay at the top of the track like this [picture]. Other times the 
marbles will drop down the tracks like this [animation].” It was then explained what the task 
demanded from the participants; “I am going to ask you questions about the slides, either 
adding or taking away a peg. You have to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to whether the block would have 
fallen down.” Participants were given the opportunity to ask any questions.  
Experimental phase: Participants were shown a 64 slide Powerpoint presentation. 
Slides were advanced by the experimenter at an appropriate pace. Each slide was 
accompanied with a single question read by the experimenter live. The order of pseudo 
random trials was the same for all participants. Participants were asked the questions in the 




in the counterfactual condition while viewing the stationary image. The experimenter read 
questions from a printed version of the task. Participants’ responses of yes/no were 
recorded by the experimenter on the printed sheet. 
Questions that were asked in the future condition were as follows: “If I do not drop the 
blue marble this time will the block fall down?” “If I put a peg on the blue side this time will 
the block fall down?” “If I put a peg on the blue side as well this time will the block fall 
down?” and “If I take away the blue peg this time will the block still fall down?” 
Questions that comprised the counterfactual condition were: “If I had not dropped the 
red marble that time would the block have fallen down?, “If I had taken away the orange 
peg that time would the block have fallen down?”, “If I had put the peg on the orange side 
that time would the block have fallen down?” and “If I had put the peg on the orange side as 
well that time would the block have fallen down?” 
7.3 Results 
Participants’ responses were sorted into conditions. Counterfactual and future 
questions were separated first, followed by additive and subtractive trials, they were then 
distinguished by determination and finally through the criteria of the questions referring to 
the marble or the barrier/peg. 
On questions which referred to either the addition or subtraction of a peg e.g. ‘If I 
had taken away the orange peg that time would the block have still fallen down?’ 
participants were categorised as failing to meet the criteria for success on a condition if they 
answered 4 out of 4 questions incorrectly (responding with yes when the answer is no or 




systematically answering the question incorrectly. Answering 4out of 4 questions incorrectly 
has a probability of .06. I used this very strict criterion because performance overall on this 
task was poor and I wanted to be sure that patients had specific problems with 
counterfactual questions and because young children make systematic errors on this type of 
task (Riggs et al., 1998). 
There were 8 questions in which the counterfactual referred to the addition or 
subtraction of the marble e.g. ‘If I had taken away the orange peg that time would the block 
have fallen down?’ Patients were taken as failing to meet the criteria for success on a 
condition if they scored equal to or less than 7/8 questions incorrectly. Answering 7 out of 8 
questions incorrectly has a probability of .03. 
 Only two control participants answered a question incorrectly. One incorrect answer 
was recorded in the ‘Counterfactual subtractive doubly determined MARBLE /8’ condition 
and one answer in the ‘Counterfactual subtractive doubly determined PEG /4’ condition. 
Six patients failed during at least one of the 12 conditions (see table 7.2). Each of 
these six patients failed, at least once, to answer any questions correctly in trials that were 
doubly determined where the barrier was either added or subtracted.  4 of these were 
counterfactual doubly determined trials and 3 were future doubly determined trials. Only 
one patient failed to pass a condition where the question referred to marbles and was a 






Table 7.2: Responses of patients during the counterfactual conditionals questions task 
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Past Sub Single MARBLE /8 1 2 1 5 
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Future Sub Double PEG /4 





4 1 2 1 1 3 
 
15 
Overall errors 3 7 1 17 0 0 21 1 6 0 0 6 28 13 3 6 35   147 
 
NB: CF stands for counterfactual. The numbers refer to the amount of questions each participant answered incorrectly in that condition. 
Highlighted in yellow are the conditions where the patient failed. The Control Average refers to the average number of incorrect responses 




The table shows the questions broken down into 4 conditions: counterfactual and 
future conditions were sorted first, followed by additive and subtractive, then by 
determination and finally by if the question referred to a peg or a marble. This created 12 
sub-conditions (which can be seen on the left of the table) for which each participants’ 
answers were recorded. The table shows the number of questions each patient got wrong in 
each of the 12 sub-conditions. The highlighted numbers signify that that patient has failed 
the corresponding sub-condition. From the table it is clear that patients PF and SAR answer 
the most questions incorrectly; PF answers 28/64 questions incorrectly while SAR answers 
35/64 questions incorrectly. A binomial test was completed to establish if PF and SAR were 
answering non-systematically. Results demonstrated that PF’s response pattern was no 
different from chance p = .382 additionally, SAR’s response pattern was no different from 
chance p = .532. All other patients’ cumulative results were different to chance. Therefore 
PF and SAR were removed from any further analysis. Once PF and SAR were removed, a 
Mann-Whitney U test was run to establish if the number of questions answered incorrectly 
was significantly different to controls. There was a significant difference between the 
number of errors made by patients (Mdn = 18.5) and controls (Mdn = 6.5); U = 0, p < .001. 
After the results were ordered in the above manner, it became evident that there 
was a pattern to which sub-conditions were being failed by patients. Thus, the conditions 
were divided into two further categories; ‘world’ and ‘action’. Questions that referred to a 
change in the stimuli e.g. ‘If I had taken away the blue peg that time would the block have 
fallen down?’ were classified under ‘world’. This is the case because the stimuli set up that is 
presented in front of the participants must be altered in order to answer the question 




the stimuli set up is different and compare the current outcome to a hypothetical one. 
Questions that were categorised as ‘action’ referred to a change in the input to the stimuli 
e.g. ‘If I had not rolled the blue marble that time would the block have fallen down?’ This 
type of question does not require a separate counterfactual world to be created. 
Participants must imagine an alternative outcome using the same stimuli set up that is 
presented in front of them. To highlight the difference in conditions a heat map was created 










                                                                         Condition 
 
  
                                                      World Action 
  
DD SD DD SD 
  
Additive Subtractive Additive Subtractive Subtractive Subtractive 
  







t PW                         
PS                         
GM                         
MP                         
 
NB: CF stands for counterfactual. DD refers to doubly determined. SD refers to singly determined. Yellow sections highlight where a participant 





I set out to explore how neurologically damaged adults answer counterfactual 
conditional questions. Patients were asked a set of future hypothetical and counterfactual 
conditional questions. The questions were asked in the future (future hypothetical 
questions) or the past tense (counterfactual questions). In addition to this, questions were 
either additive or subtractive and were distinguished by determination (singly or doubly 
determined). Results indicate that six patients failed during at least one of the 12 conditions. 
However after inspection of response patterns two patients, PF and SAR, were removed 
from further investigation due to their responses not being different from chance. Doubly 
determined trials appear to be harder for patients to answer than singly determined trials. 
Each of the 4 patients (not including PF and SAR) that failed on one or more sub-condition, 
failed in the doubly determined condition. Overall, 3 additive and 2 subtractive sub-
conditions were failed of which 2 were future and 3 were in the counterfactual sub-
conditions. This demonstrates that there was no difference in how hard patients found 
these sub-conditions.  
Singly determined questions were easier to answer than doubly determined 
questions. It is possible that singly determined trials are easier for patients to pass because 
BCR can be used to reach the correct response. As only one cause is affects the outcome of 
the trials, if this is altered in anyway (the marble is not dropped or a peg is placed in the 
way) then the outcome is changed. Therefore, simply the patient can use ‘general 
knowledge’ to assume that if the cause changes, then the outcome changes too e.g. no the 
block would not have fallen down (assuming previously it did). Notably, no patients failed a 




In contrast, doubly determined questions proved harder for some patients to answer 
correctly. During doubly determined trials, there are two possible causes that create the 
outcome. Therefore, BCR cannot be used to correctly answer the question. It is necessary to 
use counterfactual reasoning to respond correctly. Unexpectedly, all of the trials which 
proved problematic for patients  were not only doubly determined, but also referred to a 
change in the stimuli itself, the ‘world’, not just the actions which had taken place (e.g. 
which marble had been dropped).  
As discussed in Chapter 4, it is possible that failure in this task could be due to 
problems with visuo-spatial deficits, and not impairments in CFT. Visuo-spatial perception 
allows individuals to process visual information regarding the position of objects in space 
(Pinel, 1993).  The visuo-spatial deficits that I will discuss in relation to BCoS scores are 
neglect and extinction. BCoS scores show that PS, PW and GM do not have deficits in 
neglect or extinction.  However, MP has visuo-spatial deficits in object neglect and visual 
extinction. This impairment could have resulted in MP failing this task. However, I am 
reluctant to explain MP’s failure in this task as a result of his visuo-spatial deficits; MP only 
fails one condition out of a possible 12 and only responds incorrectly throughout the whole 
experiment 6 times. If visuo-spatial deficits were the cause of MPs failure I would expect 
him to fail on multiple conditions. Thus, although it is important to note that visuo-spatial 
deficits could play a vital role in explaining results in this task, I am confident that MP does 
not fail a condition in this task because of object neglect and visual extinction.  
The demands on visual imagery and language also should be considered when 
discussing this task. Visual imagery is the process of mental simulating an image based on 




on visual imagery were reduced in the current experiment by keeping the stimulus image on 
the screen until the participant had answered the corresponding question during each trial. 
There was no separate assessment conducted to assess participant’s visual imagery abilities, 
thus I cannot say if any patients who participated in this research had such a deficit. As a 
result I am not able to determine if patient performance was affected by visual imagery 
impairments.  Future research should focus on establishing if a relationship between visual 
imagery and counterfactual abilities exists. The current experiment involves a greater 
language element than other tasks in this thesis, for example complex grammatical 
structures are involved such as the subjunctive. It is possible that patients with problems 
with grammatical rules would struggle with this task. However, to express CFT complex 
language is necessary.  A further suggestion for future research is to access this relationship.  
 The 4 patients who failed this task (PW, PS, GM and MP) were unable to consistently 
use CFT to predict the outcome of the stimulus set up (the block falling or not). It is clear 
from the results that some ability to reason counterfactually is preserved as no patients fail 
more than 2 sub-conditions. However, there is a stark contrast between the number of trials 
failed by patients (see Table 7.3) compared to that of controls, thus it is evident that 
reasoning is impairing task performance. It is possible that the explanation behind poor 
performance is that during the world version of the task participants have to think about the 
specific events that have happened, such as adding or subtracting a peg. Whereas in the 
action version participants can simply look at the stimulus set up in front of them and rerun 
the scenario with a new marble (or not).  This would suggest that during the marble version, 




counterfactual reasoning to pass. If this is indeed true, it is evident that counterfactual 
reasoning is impaired in the 4 patients who fail this task.  
Patients PF and SAR were removed from further investigation do to their responses 
not being significantly different from chance; throughout the entire experiment PF 
answered 28/64 questions incorrectly while SAR answers 35/64 questions incorrectly. It is 
possible that neither PF nor SAR are able to engage in counterfactual reasoning and thus 
responded with random answers throughout the experiment. However I acknowledge that 
the cause of their response pattern could be due to a lack of task understanding. In addition, 
SAR’s BCoS scores demonstrate that she suffers from neglect. It is not clear the reasoning 
for SAR’s failure on this task. However an avenue for future research would be to further 
investigate PF and SAR’s ability to reason counterfactually.  
The patients that were tested during this experiment had diverse lesion sites. The 
four patients who failed this task did not have similar neural damage. I suggest that 
counterfactual reasoning does not depend on one specific brain area. Instead my results 
suggest that counterfactual reasoning is supported by a large neural network. In support of 
this argument Van Hoek et al. (2015) reviewed the neural networks that support CFT 
highlighting three systems: the mental simulation network, the cognitive control network, 
and the reward network (see Chapter 1 for detailed description).  
PW has isolated damage in the cerebellar. The cerebellar has been implicated in 
tasks assessing DM (Guggisberg et al., 2008; Rosenbloom et al., 2012). More specifically, 
Habas et al. (2009) used resting state functional connectivity MRI to suggest that damage to 




play a role in social cognitive processing, such as CFT, which has directly been investigated in 
the present experiment.   
Additional research that supports this evidence that the cerebellar is involved in 
counterfactual reasoning comes from Rosenbloom and Schmahman (2012). The authors 
reviewed the role of connectivity in DM and devised a model of DM that incorporates the 
PFC (the OFC), ACC, DLPFC and also subcortical structures: the limbic system, striatum, 
thalamus, and cerebellum. The model defines a cortical area by its neural connections, thus 
a lesion affecting any of cortical or subcortical areas within the DM network might disrupt 
the DM process. Therefore the damage to the cerebella that PW and SAR have sustained 
could have disrupted the decision network and subsequently the processes which are 
required for counterfactual reasoning.  
Of importance is also that NB, MG and DJR have cerebella damage and appear to 
have no difficulty in this task. It is clear that simply having damage to the cerebella does not 
result in an inability to think counterfactually for all individuals. It is not clear what factors 
have dictated that PW’s, and possibly SAR’s, cerebella damage have led to an impairment in 
this task while NB, MG and DJR’s damage has not resulted in a disruption to counterfactual 
thinking. As mentioned, BCoS results shed no light on why these patients have different 
response patterns in this task. Due to the complexity of cerebella connections, it is not 
possible to rule out the damage to the area as the cause of PW’s (and possibly SAR’s) 
counterfactual deficits on the basis that successful patients have damage to the same 
structure. It is likely that the damage seen in SAR and PW differs to that of NB, MG and DJR 




damage. My findings would suggest that such differences in the lesions of the discussed 
patients are the differentiating factors between success and impairment in this task. 
The lingual gyrus (the location of GM’s primary lesion) has been linked to visual 
memory; a key component to the current task. Leshikar, Duarte and Hertzog (2012) 
investigated task selective memory during encoding. Participants viewed pairs of abstract 
nouns while using visual imagery or sentence generation encoding instructions. Activation in 
the left middle occipital gyrus, the left precuneus, and the lingual gyrus was observed for 
memory during visual imagery tasks.  The lingual gyrus has also been cited by Blumenfeld et 
al. (2011) and Johnson and Rugg (2007) in studies investigating visual imagery. The link 
between the lingual gyrus and visual memory could be resulting in GM’s failure to pass in 
one condition that incorporates imagery; Counterfactual subtractive doubly determined 
PEG. However, GM does pass all other conditions throughout the experiment, suggesting 
that her counterfactual understanding, even when imagery is necessary, is preserved under 
certain circumstance.  
Due to PF’s left angular and supermarginal gyri and superior temporal gyrus damage 
she is classified as having damage to the left TPJ. MP is also classified as having a right sided 
fronto-TPJ lesion (see Forti, Humphreys & Watson, 2005). Previous research conducted with 
left TPJ damaged patients, including PF, has shown that in addition to the frontal lobes, the 
TPJ is required for reasoning about others’ beliefs (Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino & 
Humphreys, 2004). The three patients tested in the experiment did not perform above 
chance-level on false-belief tasks which lead the authors to conclude that cognitive 
processing was impaired. Van Hoeck et al. (2012) present findings that demonstrate the 




go some way to explaining PF’s poor performance in tasks requiring patients to reason 
about others’ beliefs and the counterfactual task presented. However, Samson et al.’s 
experiment incorporated a counterfactual task as a control and PF did not make an error. 
The authors give an example question from the counterfactual task: ‘If the object had not 
moved, then where would it be?’ BCR could have been used to pass the control task. It 
would be fair to assume that BCR was not considered in Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino and 
Humphreys’ (2004) task as the paper proposing this possibility by Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas 
and Perner was not published until 2010. Thus, PF’s good performance on the 
counterfactual measure could be questioned in the Samson study.  
Further evidence that implicates the TPJ, among other areas, with social cognition 
comes from Rodrigo et al. (2014). Participants read typical scenarios and were asked to 
make choices under risky or ambiguous circumstances. During RDM, compared to 
ambiguous, activated occurred in the bilateral TPJ, bilateral middle temporal gyrus, right 
medial PFC, and the precuneus bilaterally. The authors link this activation to regions 
associated with social cognition processes, such as ToM.   
The amygdala (location of PS’ lesion) is routinely cited as a key area for emotional 
processing, specifically self-blame regret (Nicolle et al., 2011) and regret avoidance (Coricelli 
et al., 2005). The reason for its involvement in this task could be due to its connectivity with 
the PFC. The VMPFC has reciprocal connections with the amygdala, hippocampus, temporal 
visual association areas and dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) (Barbey et al., 2009). Research has 
suggested that the VMPFC is recruited when choices and anticipated emotions are 




It is important to consider that both PS and MP also have damage to the right frontal 
lobe. Convincing evidence that right frontal lesions result in inefficient judgments comes 
from Gomez-Gomez-Beldarrain, Harries, Garcia-Monco, Ballus and Grafman (2004). Patients 
with right frontal lesions were impaired in reasoning when forecasting oneself into the 
future; greatly affecting DM. In order to successfully pass the presented task, participants 
must consider how the outcome of each trial would have been different if the stimulus set 
up or input had changed. This task therefore requires participants to consider alternative 
outcomes and answer each question based on the comparison between the actual (stimulus 
set up/input) and the hypothetical (dependent on the conditional questions asked). 
Therefore a deficit in forecasting may have caused PS and MP to fail some conditions in this 
task.   
Both PS and MP’s damage to the white matter located in the frontal lobe maps onto 
the frontal radiation associated with the corpus callosum and anterior limb of the internal 
capsule. As previously explained in Chapter 5, white matter is crucial for relaying 
information between grey matter areas. If the white matter microstructural integrity 
becomes affected then the efficiency of information transfer will be reduced (Hagmann et 
al., 2008).  Therefore once this damage has occurred it is likely that signal transfer is 
affected and thus non-typical behaviour may be exhibited.  
Despite JH and RP also having frontal damage and responding in line with controls, it 
is clear from examining their scans that the damage is not in the same position as PS and 
MP’s.  JH and RP’s frontal lesions are caudal to PS and MP’s. Thus, the information transfer 
discussed above may not be affected in JH and RP, resulting in an intact ability to reason 




It has been shown by Zhang et al. (2014) that type 2 diabetes patients have white 
matter disruptions in the corpus callosum and anterior limb of the internal capsule which 
was positively correlated with cognitive impairments including EF (spatial processing, 
attention and WM). Previous developmental research has shown that EF abilities are linked 
to children’s success in passing tasks where counterfactual questions are asked (Beck, Riggs, 
& Gorniak, 2009; Beck, Riggs & Burns, 2011). In addition, McNamara et al. (2003) have 
linked Parkinson’s patients’ deficits in counterfactual tasks to their EF abilities, which have 
resulted from the frontal lobe dysfunction that is associated with the condition.  
Additionally, fractional anisotropy (a measure of diffusion) reductions in 
Schizophrenia patients have been demonstrated by Mitelman et al. (2007). The anisotropy 
was detected bilaterally in the corpus callosum and in the anterior and posterior limbs of 
internal capsule (among other areas). Additionally, anisotropy in the right hemisphere tracts 
(seen in PS’ pathology) was linked to patients experiencing positive symptoms of 
Schizophrenia. As previously described, Hooker, Roese and Park (2000) showed that 
Schizophrenia patients with positive symptoms produced less counterfactual language and 
engaged less frequently in counterfactual thought when prompted.  
In line with McNamara et al. (2003), Hooker, Roese and Park (2000) suggest that the 
lack of counterfactual insight in Schizophrenia patients is caused by frontal lobe dysfunction. 
It is possible that, in both Parkinson’s and Schizophrenia, counterfactual production is 
compromised by the damage to the white matter microstructural integrity between the 
corpus callosum and the internal capsule. It is not clear if counterfactual reasoning is 




information relay indirectly affects her ability to answer counterfactual questions through 
affecting her EF.  
Importantly, 11 patients were able to succeed in this task. Of those 11, 3 patients (TJ, 
LB and EL) did not answer any questions incorrectly, 2 patients (DJR and JB) answered only 
one question incorrectly and two patients (NB and MB) answered three questions 
incorrectly. As this task incorporated doubly determined questions I can infer that the 11 
patients who were successful are going beyond BCR and have counterfactual reasoning 
abilities. This would suggest that simple counterfactual reasoning is resilient to some brain 
damage in these patients.   
The success of 11 patients demonstrates that the majority of patients were 
successful. Not only does this highlight the usefulness of the presented task to determine 
which individuals have problems in counterfactual reasoning but also that the aim of the 
task was communicated effectively. Thus, the two patients whose responses were not 
different from chance (PF and SAR) were likely failing due to an impairment in 
counterfactual reasoning and not due to a lack of understanding. . 
It is generally accepted that the experience of a CME is dependent on CFT (Roese, 
1994). It is interesting to note at this point that although CFT is thought to be a domain 
general skill; previous research has shown that the experience of a CME, regret, can be 
linked to specific brain regions. Research conducted with patients has shown that there are 
key brain areas responsible for regret as a CME. The OFC, middle temporal gyrus, ACC and 
hippocampus have been implicated in patient and fMRI studies (Camille et al., 2004; 




with healthy adults during fMRI investigations; the VMPFC and anterior insula have been 
implicated as other key region (Canessa et al., Chua et al., 2009; 2009; Nicolle et al., 2011).  
Overall, the patients in this experiment showed problems answering counterfactual 
conditional questions that did not have an emotional component. The 4 patients who were 
subject to post-hoc investigation were impaired in ‘world’ type questions only, suggesting 
that BCR had been used to correctly answer ‘action’ type questions. The impaired patients 












8.1 Summary of experiments 
8.1.1 Is the Processing of Regret in Adulthood Effortless? 
There are conflicting opinions in the literature about whether CMEs are produced 
slowly, through deliberative processes, or quickly and effortlessly. In order to answer this 
question, I devised two experiments based upon Camille et al.’s (2004) gambling task that 
was adapted from Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov (1999). The task incorporated two wheels 
that offered differing numbers of points. These were manipulated so that there were 
different probabilities of winning and losing a high and low number of points. In Experiment 
1, we manipulated the length of time that participants were able to view the outcome of the 
two wheels. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the WM load that participants were exposed 
to. Results from Experiment 1 showed that the length of time that participants viewed the 
outcome of the chosen and unchosen wheel did not affect their emotional rating. Results 
from Experiment 2 indicated that the WM load did not affect participants’ ability to process 
regret. I interpret these results as evidence for fast and effortless CME production.  
8.1.2 Exploring the use of The Regret Gambling Task in patients  
The task was, as in Chapter 2, adapted from Camille et al.’s (2004) RGT that 
investigated role of the OFC in the experience of regret. The first aim of the experiment was 
to compare results from the RGT with a sub-set of patients, who have participated 
throughout my PhD research, with reported patients in the existing literature. The second 
aim was to use the RGT to widen the search for areas of brain damage that result in patients 
reporting emotional responses different to controls. Analysis of control data revealed the 




they were missed by choice (regret and relief) than by chance (disappointment and elation). 
This was a replication of findings, from control participants, reported in the literature 
(Camille et al., 2004) and findings from Chapter 2. Group analysis of patient responses 
showed that the amplification effect was not present; there was no difference in emotional 
ratings for regret and disappointment conditions. Individual analysis revealed that only 1 
patient was responding in line with the amplification effect, and thus similarly to controls. 5 
patients did not demonstrate the amplification effect. Analysis of memory data showed that 
controls and patients did not differ in accuracy and thus results cannot be explained by 
patients having poorer memory for the chosen and alternative outcomes. Results were 
interpreted to suggest that a wide range of lesions (such as: frontal, parietal, cerebella, 
insula, lingual gyrus) lead to patients’ inability to differentiate between regret and 
disappointment, which is present in controls. Thus, the RGT has successfully been utilised to 
extend the search for brain areas that, after damage, affect individuals’ emotional responses 
to regret and disappointment.  
8.1.3 A Measure of Risk Taking  
Research with healthy adults has shown that behaviour is affected by counterfactual 
information. This relationship is strengthened when the available counterfactual 
information provides an insight into a missed opportunity. It has been suggested that a 
missed opportunity leads to subsequent risk taking (Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Brassen et al., 
2012). This experiment aimed to widen the search for patients with varying lesion sites who 
displayed a different pattern of risk taking compared to controls. I used a simple task based 




Behavioural data on the number of boxes open by each patient showed that, in 
comparison to controls, two patients, MP and SAR, were riskier (opening more boxes on 
average) and one patient, GM, was more cautious (opening fewer boxes on average). MP 
has extensive damage to the temporal, frontal and parietal regions while SAR also has 
frontal damage and bilateral damage to the cerebellum. Both patients have right insula 
damage. GM has damage to the left lingual gyrus and surrounding areas.  
Data indicating how a previous missed opportunity affected participants’ subsequent 
risk taking showed that after a large missed opportunity, controls were significantly more 
likely to open more boxes. This replicates the finding by Buchel et al. (2011). However, it 
was not possible to analyse the effect of the missed opportunity for patients. This occurred 
because there were too few instances where a large missed opportunity was followed by a 
‘bank’ (a requirement to assess the effect of the missed opportunity). Thus, further 
investigation with patients into RDM should incorporate, where possible, more trials than 
were used in this experiment.  
8.1.4 A Simple Task Assessing Patient’s Counterfactual Mediated Emotional Responses 
The experience of regret is thought to be beneficial and of significant importance to 
learning. Due to the experience of regret adults are able to learn from mistakes and make 
more informed decisions creating desirable outcomes in the future (Roese, 1997). The 
development of regret has been widely researched in children and healthy adults. However, 
few studies have been published that examine the experience of regret in brain damaged 
patients. Therefore, this experiment was designed to establish regret and relief are 




Previous work with brain damaged patients has used complex gambling tasks in 
order to induce regret and relief. This experiment used a simple task that builds upon 
Weisberg and Beck’s (2010) and O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney’s (2010; 2014) work to 
establish if patients with varying lesion sites can report regret and relief in a simple regret 
task. 
Analysis revealed that controls did not routinely feel sadder in the small regret 
condition or feel happier in the small relief condition. This was also the case for patients. 
However, controls did, for medium and large conditions, feel sadder in regret trials and 
happier in relief trials.  However, analysis of patient data revealed 3 interesting patterns of 
behaviour: 2 patients (LB and RR) failed both medium and large conditions for both regret 
and relief trials. LB has damage to the amygdala and RR has large left temporal lesions 
extending into his frontal and parietal cortex. 1 patient, MG with a cerebella lesion, failed 
both medium and large conditions for regret trials and 1 patient, GM with a lesion in the left 
lingual region and surrounding structures, failed both medium and large conditions for relief 
trials. Results are interpreted as lending support to the network theory that supports 
counterfactual reasoning and emotions. 
8.1.5 Exploring the link between the Experience of Regret and Adaptive Choice Switching  
The experiment used in this chapter has previously been used by O’Connor, 
McCormack and Feeney (2014) to demonstrate the relationship between the experience of 
regret and the ability to engage in ACS. The aim of this experiment was to investigate how 





Results from Chapter 5 showed that three patients did not experience regret. If the 
developmental pattern, described by O’Connor, McCormack and Feeney’s (2014), was 
persistent after a brain injury then I would have expected these three patients to not 
engage in ACS. However, results showed that 2 different patients failed to modify their 
behaviour in this task. One patient, GM who has damage to the left sided lingual gyrus and 
the surrounding areas, previously did not report experiencing relief. The other patient, NB 
who has lesions covering the right angular gyrus, left cerebellum, right inferior occipital lobe 
and parietal lobe passed both regret and relief conditions in Chapter 5. Thus findings 
provide support for the concept that memory of the initial task is sufficient to engage in ACS 
and the experience of regret is not required (O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2014). 
8.1.6 Can Patients answer Counterfactual Conditional Questions? 
Previous research has shown that neuropsychological patients, especially those with 
damage to the OFC, have problems with reporting regret (Coricelli et al., 2005). In addition, 
results from Chapter 4 and 6a suggest that a select number of individuals within my patient 
cohort have problems experiencing regret. However, it has not been investigated if these 
patients struggle with the reasoning that is thought to underpin regret and relief, CFT. Thus 
the aim of this experiment was to establish if any patients struggle to answer simple 
counterfactual conditional questions which incorporated various elements (past/present, 
additive/subtractive, doubly/singly determined). Using a combination of different question 
elements, 12 sub-conditions were created.  
Analysis of control responses showed that no controls failed this task. Patient 
analysis of correct responses showed that 4 patients failed in at least one sub-condition. 




additive/subtractive sub-conditions. However, all sub-conditions that were failed were 
categorised as doubly determined. It is possible that singly determined questions are easier 
to answer correctly because Basic Conditional Reasoning (BCR) can be used to logically work 
out the correct answer without using CFT (see Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas & Perner, 2010). It is 
not possible to use BCR to answer doubly determined questions.  
Post hoc analysis revealed an interesting trend in sub-conditions that proved more 
difficult for patients. Conditions were split into ‘world’ (questions that referred to a change 
in the stimuli) and ‘action’ (questions that referred to a change in the input to the stimuli). 
All of the trials which proved problematic for patients were not only doubly determined, but 
also referred to a change in the stimuli itself; the ‘world’ category. Therefore, questions that 
required participants to consider a change to the stimuli were harder for patients to answer 
correctly compared to questions that referred to a change in the input to the stimuli. This 
finding provides evidence to suggest that CFT, in patients, is impaired when participants are 
asked a specific type of question. However, in the same patient group, some counterfactual 
reasoning is preserved as patients do not fail every trial in the doubly determined world 
condition. 
8.2 How the findings from the thesis relate to the existing literature  
The developmental literature suggests that there is a developmental hierarchy in 
children’s counterfactual abilities (see Chapter 1 for description). I aimed to investigate if 
this trend is present within the patient group who participated in my research. Assuming the 
developmental structure that has been observed in children’s counterfactual abilities is 
persistent into adulthood, and indeed after brain damage, then I would expect 




developmental hierarchy I would expect patients who fail the Counterfactual Conditional 
Questions to fail the rest of the tasks also. 
The rationale behind this claim comes from developmental findings. Children at the 
age of 3 and 4 begin to correctly answer explicit counterfactual conditional questions 
(Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004; Riggs et al., 1998). Although it should be noted that Perner 
and Rafeseder (2011) have put forward an argument which claims children do not 
understand counterfactual questions until the age of 11. Rafetseder, Schwitalla and Perner 
(2013) suggest that adult like counterfactual reasoning does not develop until 12-14 years.  
However, it is evident from research by Beck et al. (2006), Perner et al. (2004) and 
Robinson and Beck (2000) that there are different ‘types’ of counterfactual questions that 
are passed at different ages. Results have been consistent with Riggs et al. (1998); simple 
counterfactual conditionals are answered at approximately 4 years, although there are 
claims that ‘true’ CFT does not emerge until 5-to-6 years of age (Beck et al., 2006). 
Therefore, different ‘types’ of counterfactual questions were incorporated into Chapter 7.   
The majority of developmental evidence points to the suggestion that children 
answer counterfactual questions between the ages of 3 and 6. Evidence for children 
experiencing CMEs has suggested that this occurs later than children’s counterfactual 
reasoning abilities. Amsel and Smalley (2000) found no evidence that 3 or 5 year old 
children understood regret or relief.  
The task devised by Weisberg and Beck (2010), which was modified for the purpose 
of my research (Chapter 6a), was administered to children aged: 5-6, 6-7 and 7-8. All age 




only 7-8 year olds reported the feeling of relief. This finings indicates that developmentally 
relief is a more complex emotion to experience.  
Further to this, O’Connor et al. (2014) built on Weisberg and Beck’s (2010) ‘boxes 
task’ adding an element to investigate behavioural modification. Authors found that 
children’s ability to engage in ACS was dependent on an initial experience of regret. 
Although children who did not initially demonstrate behaviour modification were more 
likely to do so if reminded of their prior negative experience, suggesting that memory is a 
component factor in this relationship. 
Overall, it appears that there is a developmental trajectory in which children pass the 
discussed tasks. Children seem to pass future hypothetical questions first, followed by 
counterfactual conditional questions. CMEs appear to develop after counterfactual 
reasoning, with the experience of regret preceding the experience of relief. Behaviour 
modification and ACS occurs after the experience of regret and thus is last in the 
developmental chain. Therefore, developmentally, the experience of regret is dependent on 
CFT and behavioural modification is dependent on experiencing regret. Thus, it is 
reasonable to suggest that if the developmental relationship between counterfactual 
reasoning and CMEs is persistent after brain injury, then a task examining counterfactual 
conditional understanding (Chapter 7) would underpin success in tasks examining regret and 
relief and adaptive choice switching.  
However, results from my investigation into counterfactual understanding and CMEs 
in brain damaged patients do not support the developmental pattern. Table 8.0 is presented 
as an overview of individual patient performance across all tasks used in my investigation 




that a different behavioural pattern is present in brain injured patients compared to 
typically developing children; 2 of the 4 patients who fail in a task assessing simple 
counterfactual questions demonstrate that they do experience regret and relief. These 
patients are also able to successfully engage in ACS. Interestingly, of the patients who do 
not experience problems answering counterfactual conditional questions, 3 are impaired in 
their ability to experience regret (2 are impaired in experiencing relief also) and 1 does not 
engage in ACS. This would suggest that, for some patients, their basic counterfactual 
reasoning is preserved while they appear to struggle experiencing CME’s. In other words 
tasks higher up in the hierarchy are failed yet the basics remain intact. This pattern of 
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  Risky 2 5 40% 
MP  Baseline Memory No Analysis  Risky 2 5 40% 
GM   Relief     Cautious 5 5 100% 
 
NB: Words written in cells are labelling the specific condition which that patient failed, for 
example ‘Regret’ indicates that regret is impaired, ‘Risky’ indicates that that patient has a 
behavioural profile which suggests they engage in riskier DM compared to controls. MP has 
various experiments highlighted in orange with ‘baseline’, ‘memory’ and ‘no analysis’ 
written in the cells. Each description written in the cells refers to the reason why I am 
unsure if MP is classified as failing that particular experiment. For example, ‘no analysis’ has 
occurred because too few responses were recorded. Thus, this task is highlighted in orange 
as ‘unclear’ due to ambiguity resulting from an absence in analysis. Additionally ‘memory’ is 
present due to a failure to pass the memory test. Finally, ‘baseline’ is recorded as MP was 





8.3 BCoS Review 
As described in Chapter 1b, the cognitive profile of each patient was derived 6 
months post-stroke using the Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCoS; Humphreys, Bickerton, 
Samson, & Riddoch, 2012). It is important to consider which, if any, cognitive impairments 
individual patients have as these losses in cognition may directly affect task performance. 
One of the aims of my project was to establish if there is a link between lesion site and 
behavioral profile in a cohort of patients with varying lesion sites. Therefore it is essential to 
establish if task failure can be explained by general cognitive impairment or if task 
performance is directly caused by a brain injury. Each patients’ graphical report is presented 
in Chapter 1b. I will discuss domains, tested during a BCoS assessment, that I believe may 
affect task performance. In the next section I will then discuss individual patient’s 
performance in the light of their BCoS results. 
8.3.1 Language 
Comprehension: Each task is verbally explained to participants before the task 
begins, thus language comprehension is required to understand the instructions. It is 
therefore plausible that if an individual is inhibited in language comprehension then the aim 
of the task will not be translated. This possibility was taken into consideration when 
designing the tasks used in this project. Language demands were kept to a minimum and 
written instructions were provided along with examples demonstrated by the experimenter 
and also completed by the participants. Written instructions were included as their use has 
been shown to improve task performance (Eiriksdottir & Catrambone, 2011). 
Demonstrations were used as it has been shown that participant understanding is increased 




In my opinion, difficulties in language comprehension would have the greatest effect 
on task performance during Counterfactual Conditional Questions. During Chapter 7 
participants are read questions for each trial. The use of verbal questions is required in this 
task as it would be impractical to ask patients to read each question in the testing time slot. 
Additionally, there is an equal chance that patients would have problems in language 
reading.  
BCoS results demonstrate that only one patient, RR, has a language comprehension 
impairment. RR’s performance on the Counterfactual Conditional Questions task is in line 
with controls. This suggests that impairments in language comprehension do not affect task 
performance in Chapter 7. 
8.3.2 Attention and Memory 
Controlled auditory WM: As described above, the tasks used in this project use 
verbalized instructions. Thus, WM for auditory information is required for participants to 
hold in mind the instructions throughout each experiment and carry out the aim of the 
experiment as explained by the experimenter. For this reason, short term verbal memory 
both delayed and immediate would be considered important also. In order to minimize the 
effects of memory impairments participants are reminded on several occasions that they 
are permitted to ask questions regarding the ‘rules’ of a task to ensure that they clearly 
understand what the task requires. 
BCoS results demonstrate that only three patients have a controlled auditory WM 
impairment, one of which passed every experiment (patient EL). NB and PF’s BCoS scores 




Choice Switching task is different from controls whereas PF’s performance on the RGT is 
different from controls. The fact that these two patients fail different tasks with the battery 
suggest that there is no relationship between controlled auditory WM and general patient 
ability in the presented experiments.  
Controlled auditory sustained attention: Auditory sustained attention is required 
when instructions are read to participants. This skill becomes progressively important when 
the amount of auditory information increases. During Counterfactual Conditional Questions, 
each question is one sentence long. Questions were designed to be short and easy to 
compute, thus limiting the probability that deficits in both controlled auditory WM and 
controlled auditory sustained attention would affect task performance.  
Three out of the four patients who failed the Counterfactual Conditional Questions 
task (PS, GM and MP) have impairments in auditory sustained attention. This impairment 
could result in failure in the Counterfactual Conditional Questions task due to the high 
language demands of the task. However as explained in Chapter 7, complex language is 
required to express counterfactual thoughts. In addition, four patients (TJ, MB, DJR and LB) 
who took part in this experiment and were unimpaired also have impairments in auditory 
sustained attention. Thus, the relationship between success on the Counterfactual 
Conditional Questions task and auditory sustained attention is not clear and requires further 
research to fully understood.  
WM and attention are crucial for patients to engage in CFT generally. Beck, Riggs, 
and Burns (2011) discuss how CFT and EF skills are linked in children. The authors highlight 
several stages in childhood that possibly lead to successful CFT. Two of these stages are: 




particular abilities require individuals to have WM skills to recall possible outcomes of a 
counterfactual alternative and attention to switch between the multiple possibilities in 
order to establish a CME (regret when the alternative is deemed more desirable). As a 
result, patients who have very limited WM and attention capacity may struggle on all 
aspects of this project. Therefore, for patients who produce a set of results that are 
consistently different to controls, across all experiments, I will examine if their WM and 
attention has been highlighted in their BCOS assessment as impaired.  
Spatial Attention: It is important to consider all aspects of spatial attention when 
interpreting patient performance on every task in this project. If a patient suffered from 
extinction or spatial neglect this could result in skewed emotional responses caused by a 
patient’s failure to attend to the whole stimulus set up. For example, during Chapter 4 
participants are presented with two wheels of fortune, one wheel is presented on the left 
and one wheel on the right side of space.  Visual extinction or page asymmetry neglect 
could dictate that a participant ignored the wheel in the contralesional side of space (for 
example always choosing the wheel on the right side). This would cause the patient to not 
incorporate the counterfactual information provided in the full feedback condition (this 
information would be provided by the wheel in the ignored visual field). This patient would 
therefore present as though they did not differentiate between regret and disappointment. 
Additionally, object neglect would dictate that an individual would only attend to one side 
of an object. This would lead to the patient ignoring the outcome on left or right of the 
chosen and unchosen wheel, affecting their emotional responses to regret and 




BCoS scores for the patients who have responded differently to controls are 
discussed in Chapter 4; MP has visuo-spatial deficits in object neglect and visual extinction 
while SAR has page neglect. It is not possible to rule out MP’s visuo-spatial deficits as the 
cause of his impairment in this task. However, it is interesting to note that the only patient 
whose responses in this task are in line with controls also has a visuo-spatial deficit in page 
neglect. SAR’s success in this task demonstrates that her visuo-spatial deficits has not 
impeded her performance and sheds light on her abilities despite her neglect. 
The effects of spatial attention impairments during the Counterfactual Conditional 
Questions task are discussed in Chapter 7. As described above, MP has visuo-spatial deficits 
and also is impaired in the Counterfactual Conditional Questions. However, MP only fails 
one condition out of a possible 12 and only responds incorrectly throughout the whole 
experiment 6 times. If visuo-spatial deficits were the cause of MPs failure in this task then I 
would expect him to fail on multiple conditions. 
8.4 Patients demonstrating interesting patterns of results  
GM is the only patient who failed every task during this project. A review of BCoS 
scores suggest that the only area that GM is impaired in is ‘sustained auditory attention’ 
(the ability to respond to specific words and ignore others, for example tapping the table 
when the words ‘please, hello and no’ are said and not taping the table when the words 
‘thanks, goodbye and yes’ are said). This could account for GM’s failure during 
Counterfactual Conditional Questions, due to the auditory language demands placed on 
participants. However during a task assessing understanding of counterfactual conditional 




Throughout this project I have tried to keep verbal instructions to a minimum. 
Participants are given written instructions to accompany verbal instructions. Participants 
watch example trials and also engage in practice trials during each experiment in attempt to 
consolidate the aim of each experiment. Therefore I do not believe that GM’s impairment in 
sustained auditory attention is an explanation for her behavioural pattern of consistency 
failing tasks in this project.  
It is very unlikely that GM has failed the tasks due to misunderstanding. GM reports 
responses that are in line with controls to regret situations in the Simple Regret task. If GM 
did not understand this task then she would have also failed to report relief and additionally 
failed the baseline test. GM also successfully answered the memory questions during the 
ACS task implying that her lack of choice switching was not due to memory for the 
unobtained monetary reward. In addition, GM’s memory data during the RGT does not lead 
me to believe that memory is a consideration when interpreting GM’s results.  
Therefore, it is likely that GM’s brain damage is the cause of her inability to engage 
in counterfactual tasks and experience relief. This would suggest that there are separate 
processes for experiencing regret and relief, of which regret processing is preserved after 
damage to the left lingual gyrus and surrounding areas. This suggestion is in line with the 
finding that GM is more cautious than all other patients and also controls. GM does not 
report experiencing relief during the Simple Regret task, thus it is possible that her actions 
are guided solely on her experience of regret. This may have resulted in a reluctance to lose 
during the RDM Task which as a result manifested in cautious DM during this task.  
MP also appears to fail multiple tasks within both test batteries. It is unclear if MP 




one condition required for analysis. Although, visual inspection of MP’s graph did not imply 
that there are any obvious patterns to his emotional ratings. MP also fails the memory 
questions in the ACS task which implies that impaired memory should be taken into 
consideration when interpreting his results. 
MP seems to understand the aim of certain tasks, for example he reports feeling 
regret and relief in line with controls, yet is the only patient who fails the baseline condition 
in the Simple Regret task. Although, as discussed previously, this can be explained through a 
different method of logical thinking than what is regularly demonstrated.  Additionally, MP 
answers enough questions correctly, during the Counterfactual Conditional Questions task, 
to have a performance significantly different to chance, suggesting he understands the task 
instructions.  
MP’s BCoS results do not highlight any particular cause for concern that would imply 
he should fail the current tasks. The only aspect of MP’s memory which is deemed, via BCoS, 
as impaired is personal information which would not impact on task performance. MP’s 
auditory attention, like GM, is considered impaired. As described, this could explain MP’s 
performance on Counterfactual Conditional Questions, however this does not explain MP’s 
risky behaviour identified in Chapter 5. Other cognitive domains that are impaired (as 
indicated with BCoS results) would also not affect counterfactual ability and CME responses.  
PS fails Counterfactual Conditional Questions only. As previously described when 
linking the findings from this project to the developmental literature, this is the first task 
that developmentally would be passed. Thus, PS demonstrates the exact opposite pattern 




PS has an amygdala lesion. An amygdala lesion could go some way to explain an 
individual’s inability to express emotion due to the area’s involvement in emotional and 
evaluative judgments (Berntson et al., 2011) and also its limbic connections to the OFC 
(Barbas, 2007; Zald & Rauch, 2006) and ACC (Allman, 2001). However, PS does not 
demonstrate inhibited emotional responses yet is impaired in answering counterfactual 
conditional questions. Thus, it is possible that damage to the PFC (including the OFC) can 
cause problems in counterfactual reasoning without affecting emotional processing.  
However, PS also has damage to the white matter located in the frontal lobe. The 
right frontal lobe has been implicated during an economic DM task which demonstrated 
that damage to this area causes patients to struggle with incorporating advice/information 
and impacts their forecasting and DM as a result (Hooker, Roese & Park, 2000). The damage 
which maps onto the frontal radiation associated with the corpus callosum and anterior 
limb of the internal capsule could indirectly affect PS’ counterfactual reasoning due to the 
fractional anisotropy that could disrupt normal EF abilities.  
On review of PS’ BCoS data, she also has impaired auditory attention. As previously 
explained this impairment would not be considered a factor for various tasks used 
throughout this project, however it must be highlighted as a possible reason for PS’ results 
during Counterfactual Conditional Questions. This task requires a high level of sustained 
auditory attention. Although patients were regularly offered breaks, and indeed asked 
clarification questions throughout the experiment, it is possible that the demands on PS’ 
auditory attention were too great for her to demonstrate her counterfactual understanding. 
However, I would argue that if this was the case then PS would fail more than 2/12 




other 3 patients who also fail this task. This suggests that her failure is systematic and is not 
a result of attentional demands. Thus, it is more likely that her brain injury is the cause of 
her failure during this task.  
It should be noted that EL, TJ, MB and RP do not fail any of the tasks used 
throughout my research project. This would suggest that the tasks used were suitable for a 
patient population and the aim of each experiment was communicated effectively. These 
patients have performed in line with controls across all experiments and thus demonstrate 
that their brain damage does not affected their counterfactual reasoning, CME processing 
and DM. However, as previously discussed, it is not possible to rule out the brain areas 
affected in EL, TJ, MB and RP purely on the basis that these patients perform well. The 
extent to which the structures damaged are affected by a stroke is likely to be an influencing 
factor when considering counterfactual abilities, including CME and DM. For example, RP 
has damage to the right insula.  The insula has been cited as important for counterfactual 
reasoning in multiple investigations (Berntson et al., 2011; Canessa et al., 2009; Chua et al., 
2009; Clark et al., 2008; Nicolle et al., 2011; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Palminteri et al., 2012). 
In addition, SAR, JB and JH have insula damage and are all inhibited in at least one task in 
this research project. Thus, evidence clearly points to the insula playing a role in 
counterfactual processes, yet RP does not appear to be impaired. This would suggest that 
the insula damage RP has sustained does not affect the whole structure and the spared 
sections of the structure are those that are important for counterfactual abilities.   
8.5 Neural Specialisation vs Neural Network 
The overall findings from this project lead me to support the idea that DM, CFT and 




DM process, counterfactual production, and the experience of CMEs. Previous work by 
Rosenbloom and Schmahman (2012) has suggested that a cortical area is defined by its 
neural connections (see Figure 1.0 for visual representation of the DM Network model). In 
addition, Van Hoek et al. (2015) reviewed how neural connectivity influences CFT. Three 
systems work together to produce counterfactuals and CMEs; the mental simulation 
network, the cognitive control network and the reward network. Network arguments imply 
that damage to any of cortical or subcortical areas within the networks might disrupt their 
ultimate goal of successful DM or appropriate emotional responses.  
Research with brain lesioned patients has implicated specific brain regions that are 
important for the production of regret as a CME. Famously, Camille et al. (2004) used the 
RGT to demonstrate that OFC lesioned patients did not experience regret over 
disappointment. Coricelli et al. (2005) also used the RGT to show that activity in the medial 
OFC and amygdala is related to initial regret and also cumulative regret whereas 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity is a result of the immediate regret experienced caused 
by the gamble outcome. Research with healthy controls have shown that the VMPFC, ACC 
and hippocampus are active when experiencing regret and also when imagining a third 
party’s regret (Canessa et al., 2009). 
In addition to region specificity during the experience of CMEs, specific brain areas 
have been linked to CFT and DM. Gomez-Gomez-Beldarrain et al.’s. (2004) research 
highlighted the role of the right frontal cortex in reasoning when forecasting oneself into the 
future. The VMPFC has routinely been cited as an important region for DM (Canessa et al., 




I do not question that specific brain regions are crucial for the production of CMEs, in 
particular regret (such as the OFC). It is worth noting that the patients who participated in 
this research who have OFC damage show different patterns of behaviour. MP does not 
demonstrate a clear behavioural profile in that 3 out of 5 experiments cannot be analysed 
due to varying reasons such as limited data, failure in memory or baseline conditions. MP 
also has extensive damage so it is unclear what directly causes his responses throughout this 
research. However, JB fails the RGT only. It is possible that the OFC has a more refined role 
in regret than is previously discussed in the literature. I would suggest that the role of the 
OFC needs further research to accurately understand how damage to the area affects 
counterfactual abilities in general.  
The results from my investigation lead me to believe that after damage to multiple 
brain areas the experience of regret and effective DM can be compromised. It is possible 
that wider brain regions are directly involved in the production of CFT and regret (such as 
the lingual gyrus and immediate surrounding areas), however I think it is more likely that it 
is the neural connections from these regions to specialised areas that cause the behavioural 
profile seen in my patients. I therefore suggest that damage to a seemingly unimportant 
region can inhibit an individual’s emotional experience and choices significantly. This reason 
for this disruption, in my opinion, can be underpinned by neural connectivity.  
This concept is supported by Clausi et al. (2015) who showed that patients with 
cerebella lesions were able to make choices that minimise regret but were impaired in 
reporting regret during the RGT. Importantly, the authors consider the cerebellum’s 
connectivity with the PFC, limbic system and basal ganglia when interpreting this finding. 




essential to consider if the damaged region is directly responsible for the measured variable 
or if neural connectivity is a factor.  
During my project I have worked with 5 patients with cerebellar damage; SAR, NB, 
PW, MG and DJR. The latter of the 3 patients have isolated damage. All 5 patients fail in at 
least one task used within my investigation. However, there is no pattern between the tasks 
failed. In addition, SAR is the only patient to perform in line with control responses during 
the RGT. Thus, cerebellar damage can lead to inhibited DM, CMEs and CFT but does not 
always.  It is likely that a more fine grained understanding of the cerebellar and its neural 
connections is needed to fully appreciate its role in these tasks.  
In addition to the cerebellum, I believe that further investigation into the lingual 
gyrus and the immediate surrounding areas is required. GM fails each task used within my 
project. This is, to my knowledge, the first piece of research that suggests that either the 
lingual gyrus (and surrounding areas) is directly linked to CFT, CMEs and DM or is connected 
to specialised brain regions that support individuals successfully passing these tasks.  
8.6 Future Considerations and limitations  
While discussing the experiments I have used in different chapters, I have already 
highlighted possible task adaptions and specific brain regions that warrant further 
investigation. Therefore I will now consider more speculative directions for future research.  
A possible influential factor which I did not initially consider when collecting my data 
was the possibility that some participants were recreational gamblers. It is possible that 
individuals who more regularly engage in gambling activity are less sensitive to adverse 




in an addictive manner during the Iowa Gambling Task, significantly affecting their DM 
capabilities (Petry, 2001). A sense of loss of awareness is one possible explanation for 
altered gambling behaviour; a factor which would be influential in the interpretation of my 
results, specifically on tasks requiring a self-report of regret experience (Langham et al., 
2006). 
There is little discrimination between gambling platforms, for example casino 
gamblers versus slot machine gamblers (Sharpe, 2002). However, it is clear that persistent 
gambling behaviour affects performance on the type of DM tasks used within my research 
(see Goudriaan et al., 2005).  
The use of group analysis for control data would more than likely average out a 
participant who responded differently due to a preference for gambling. However, this 
would not be the case for patients; patient data was analysed on an individual basis. Thus it 
is possible that patients’ results appear less risk averse or desensitised to regret due to 
gambling behaviour. Thus, future work conducted with DM and regret should look to 
measure pre-morbid gambling behaviour as a possible exclusion factor.  
Throughout this thesis I have opted for a strategy of comparing individuals patients’ 
responses to a control mean. I chose to do this as I did not want to lose differences in 
patient behaviour by grouping patients for analysis. It is possible to perform group analysis 
with patients, as seen in Camille et al. (2004). However, the patients participating in my 
research did not have similar lesion sites and thus I had no justification for grouping them. 
Additionally, through analysing each patient separately I have been able to discuss each 
patient individually and assess the most likely cause for their task performance, in turn 




lingual gyrus). However, I would suggest that future research consider using more 
sophisticated analysis to test for differences between a single individual and a control group 
(see Hulleman & Humphreys, 2007 for discussion of the modified F test).  
A further consideration for future work would consist of using voxel-based 
morphometric (VBM) analysis. Through using VBM, a precise relationship can be draw 
between patients’ lesion sites and behavioural profile. Although I have aimed to relate 
patient lesion sites to task performance, I believe that using VBM could facilitate a greater 
level of accuracy when assessing a patient’s lesion site. The process of lesion identification 
would have been more efficient and more accurate using VMB. Thus, I would urge future 
research conducted with patients to use this technique.  
A general limitation of the tasks I have used throughout my research is the influence 
visuo-spatial deficits could have on task performance. As discussed in Chapter 7 the spatial 
configuration of my tasks could lead to visuo-spatial deficits, namely neglect and extinction, 
causing patients to appear as though they have deficits in CFT, CME production and DM, 
when in fact these patients are merely unable to demonstrate their understanding due to 
their inability to engage in the task. I suspect that the effects of visuo-spatial deficits would 
be most detrimental during the counterfactual questions task, the simple regret task and 
the RGT. I suggest this as these are the three tasks that require participants to track two 
separate stimuli in opposite visual fields.  I have already discussed the possibility of neglect 
and extinction affecting task performance for the counterfactual questions task in Chapter 7 
and I am confident that visuo-spatial deficits of the patients who failed this task did not 
interfere with task performance. In addition, all patients who I am confident understood the 




complete feedback trials is representative of the outcome on the unchosen wheel, thus this 
result indicates that all patients were attending to the unchosen wheel, signifying that 
visuo-spatial deficits were probably not affecting response patterns. However, during the 
simple regret experiment I did not record if patients’ consistently chose the box on the right 
or the left. Thus, I cannot be certain that visuo-spatial deficits did not affect patient choices 
and thus affect their ratings on this task. Moving forward I would suggest that all 
experiments conducted with patients record this information. However, it should be noted 
that effort was made to minimise the effects of neglect and extinction on patients’ 
responses. This was done by using a vertical response scale over a horizontal response scale. 
A further limitation of my work is the effect of patient mood on task performance. It 
is possible that mood fluctuation could affect patients’ emotional self-ratings of regret. 
Mood disturbances are commonly reported post-stroke. It has been documented that mood 
disturbances are highly complex and are affected by multiple factors, such as depression, 
sex, age, and condition comorbidity (Hackett et al., 2006). It is possible that mood 
disturbances fluctuate day-to-day. It would have been possible to establish if the mood 
affected task performance by giving each patient a simple mood questionnaire to fill out 
before the start of each testing period. This would have allowed me to establish if there 
were any trends in task performance and mood. The Stroke Association advise that patients 
are assessed using any of the following standardised measures (or a combination of): 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS), General Health Questionnaire (GHQ- 12), 
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ9) and  brief assessment schedule depression cards 




measure to assess mood before each testing session to ensure that results are not affected 
by a variable that can otherwise not be accounted for.  
8.7 Conclusion  
There were three general aims of this research that were set out in Chapter 1b. First, 
to explore the component processes of CMEs, namely regret, and widen the search for the 
brain areas that support these. Second, to establish if regret or its alleged component 
processes are experienced in brain damaged individuals. Third, to conduct research that 
points to how the experience of regret directly impacts on future DM and underpins 
adaptive behavioural change. 
The first aim of the project has been investigated in two ways. I have conducted 
research with undergraduate students to further our understanding of how CMEs are 
experienced. Results from this study have shed light on the speed and ease that healthy 
adults produce CMEs. Additionally I have widened the search for the brain areas that 
support CMEs by testing a wide range of brain damaged patients on varying tasks that 
require CFT, DM and CMEs. I have established that damage to varying neurological areas, 
some of which are infrequently cited in the literature (such as the cerebellum and lingual 
gyrus) can cause impaired performance on such tasks.  
The second aim of the project has been investigated through establishing if regret 
itself is experienced in brain-damaged individuals during two experiments. It would appear 
that several patients have a different emotional response compared to controls during 
these experiments. The Simple Regret task demonstrates that regret and relief is equally 




the RGT sheds light on how the differentiation between regret and disappointment is not 
made by the majority of patients tested. It is possible that specific brain regions that have 
been damaged as a result of a stroke have caused this pattern.  
To complete the second aim of this project I have also included varying tasks 
adapted from the literature and tasks developed by myself. The developmental literature 
has suggested that counterfactual reasoning is necessary for the production of CMEs. Thus I 
included a task assessing patients’ ability to answer counterfactual questions and compared 
the results to multiple tasks that include a measure of regret and relief. Additionally, I 
included a task which measured RDM; an indirect measure of counterfactual consideration. 
Research with healthy adults has shown that counterfactual information regarding a missed 
opportunity affects risk taking behaviour (Zeelenberg et al., 1996). Finally the RGT was used 
in attempt to compare the group of patients tested throughout this project with OFC 
patients described by Camille et al. (2004). Therefore, a comprehensive assessment of the 
components of CMEs with brain injured patients has been completed and thus my results 
have shed light on the relationship between damaged brain regions and counterfactual 
capacity.  
The final aim of this project is addressed in Chapter 6, ACS. Through adapting 
O’Connor et al.’s (2014) experimental procedure I have investigated the link between 
patients’ experience of regret and their ACS behaviour. Results demonstrated that for the 
patients tested in this experiment, the experience of regret does not underpin the ability to 
engage in adaptive choice switching. It is possible that memory of regret or anticipated 
regret underpins patients’ ability to engage in behavioural modification without reporting 




To conclude, the three aims set out at the start of this project have been 
investigated through a series of six experiments. The main findings from my research are as 
follows: I have ascertained that healthy controls experience CMEs quickly and effortlessly. I 
have established that, in the group of patients who took my part in my research, the 
developmental hierarchy is not persistent after brain damage. In addition it would appear 
that damage to a number of neurological areas interferes with the experience of CMEs and 
successful DM. When considering the range of neurological damage that my patients 
present with, paired with their task performance, it is reasonable to argue that my results 
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